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Abstract: Safety-related Systems (SRS) protect from the unacceptable risk resulting
from failures of technical systems. The average probability of dangerous failure on de-
mand (PFD) of these SRS in low demand mode is limited by standards. Probabilistic
models are applied to determine the average PFD and verify the specified limits. In this
thesis an effective framework for probabilistic modeling of complex SRS is provided. This
framework enables to compute the average, instantaneous, and maximum PFD. In SRS,
preventive maintenance (PM) is essential to achieve an average PFD in compliance with
specified limits. PM intends to reveal dangerous undetected failures and provides repair
if necessary. The introduced framework pays special attention to the precise and detailed
modeling of PM. Multiple so far neglected degrees of freedom of the PM are considered,
such as two types of elementwise PM at arbitrarily variable times. As shown by anal-
yses, these degrees of freedom have a significant impact on the average, instantaneous,
and maximum PFD. The PM is optimized to improve the average or maximum PFD or
both. A well-known heuristic nonlinear optimization method (Nelder-Mead method) is
applied to minimize the average or maximum PFD or a weighted trade-off. A significant
improvement of the objectives and an improved protection are achieved. These improve-
ments are achieved via the available degrees of freedom of the PM and without additional
effort. Moreover, a set of rules is presented to decide for a given SRS if significant im-
provements will be achieved by optimization of the PM. These rules are based on the
well-known characteristics of the SRS, e.g. redundancy or no redundancy, complete or
incomplete coverage of PM. The presented rules aim to support the decision whether the
optimization is advantageous for a given SRS and if it should be applied or not.
Zusammenfassung: Sicherheitsbezogene Systeme (SRS) schützen vor unverhälnismä-
ßigen Gefährdungen, die durch Ausfälle technischer Einrichtungen verursacht werden. Die
mittlere Wahrscheinlichkeit eines gefahrbringenden Ausfalls bei Anforderung (PFD) für
die SRS mit niedriger Anforderungsart wird durch Normen begrenzt. Um die mittlere
PFD zu ermitteln und die durch Normen vorgeschriebenen Grenzwerte zu verifizieren,
werden probabilistische Modelle verwendet. In dieser Dissertation wird eine neue Metho-
de zur probabilistischen Modellierung komplexer SRS entwickelt, mit der die Kenngrößen
mittlere, instantane und maximale PFD ermittelt werden können. Für SRS ist die prä-
ventive Instandhaltung (PM) unentbehrlich, damit die mittlere PFD die vorgeschriebe-
nen Grenzwerte nicht überschreitet. Durch PM werden die gefahrbringenden unerkannten
Ausfälle aufgedeckt und falls erforderlich repariert. Bei der entwickelten Methode wird
ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die präzise und detaillierte Modellierung der PM gelegt.
Es werden mehrere bisher vernachlässigte Freiheitsgrade der PM berücksichtigt, wie z.B.
für jedes Element zwei Typen der PM, jeweils zu beliebigen variablen Zeiten. Wie in
Analysen gezeigt wird, haben diese Freiheitsgrade einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die
Kenngrößen. Um eine Verbesserung der mittleren oder maximalen PFD oder von beiden
v
zu erzielen, wird die PM optimiert. Mittels eines Verfahrens der heuristischen nichtlinea-
ren Optimierung (Nelder-Mead-Verfahren) werden die mittlere oder maximale PFD oder
eine gewichtete zusammengesetzte Zielfunktion minimiert. Es werden signifikante Verbes-
serungen der Optimierungsziele und ein besserer Schutz vor Gefährdungen erreicht. Diese
Verbesserungen werden mittels verfügbarer Freiheitsgrade der PM erzielt und erfordern
keinen Mehraufwand. Zusätzlich werden Regeln bereitgestellt, um abzuschätzen ob für
ein SRS signifikante Verbesserungen durch die Optimierung erzielt werden können. Diese
Regeln basieren auf den bekannten Merkmalen des SRS, wie z.B. Redundanz oder keine
Redundanz, vollständige oder unvollständige Abdeckung der PM. Damit lässt es sich ab-
schätzen, ob der Einsatz der beschriebenen Optimierungsmethoden für ein SRS vorteilhaft
sein kann.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In industry, potentially hazardous applications are widely used, e.g. in large-scale plants
of the chemical industry. The incorrect functioning of the technical systems related to the
potentially hazardous applications threatens the health of humans, the environment, and
assets. The potentially hazardous application might require to be put from a "dangerous"
into a "safe" state to avoid the mentioned threats.
The Safety-related Systems protect from the unacceptable risk resulting from the po-
tentially hazardous applications. An adequate protection has to be achieved through
effective Safety-related Systems. To ensure the adequate protection, the safety require-
ments for effective Safety-related Systems are regulated by international standards, e.g.
by the standard [IEC11e] for the electrical/electronic/programmable electronic Safety-
related Systems (SRS). The SRSs are a large class of systems applied in many different
branches of industry, e.g. chemical and process industry, transportation, nuclear industry.
The failures of an SRS can result in severe accidents. A well-known example for the
outcome of an SRS failure is the Deep Water Horizon accident in 2010. On April 20, 2010,
a blow-out of hydrocarbons occurred at the offshore oil drilling rig Deep Water Horizon.
Eleven people were killed by explosions and the Deep Water Horizon finally sank after the
resulting fire could not be extinguished for 36 hours. The accident had such disastrous
consequences because the blow-out preventer, which is the critical SRS to prevent an
oil spill, failed to seal the drilling well. In total, a huge amount of oil was released and
polluted the sea. The oil spill continued for five month until it was stopped.
An effective SRS is designed to exhibit certain characteristics, which ensure an ade-
quate protection for the respective potentially hazardous application. These characteris-
tics have to be built in during design and development, and retained during production
and operation of an SRS. The characteristics of an effective SRS are:
1. Ability to continuously perform failure-free for a given appropriately long period of
1
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time
2. Ability to detect failures and be repaired within a given appropriately short period
of time
The characteristic 1 ensures that an SRS is effective for a potentially hazardous application
that frequently demands the SRS to be put into a safe state. In this case, a failure of the
SRS is not tolerated. The characteristic 1 is referred to as reliability. In contrast, there
are potentially hazardous applications where a failure will be tolerated if it is quickly
detected and repaired. Such an application rarely demands the SRS. For example, the
blow-out preventer of an oil drilling rig is demanded in the rare event of a blow-out.
Hence, the blow-out preventer might fail if the failure is quickly detected and repaired.
For such applications, which are called low demand applications, the effectiveness of an
SRS is ensured by the two characteristics 1 and 2. A quick detection and repair, which is
ensured by the characteristic 2, makes an SRS effective as well as the ability not to fail,
ensured by the characteristic 1. An SRS will be effective if the characteristics 1 and 2 are
balanced, which can be done in various ways. Therefore, a degree of freedom is available
that enables the choice of a technically reasonable and economically advantageous SRS.
The characteristics 1 and 2 are quantified by a single probabilistic figure of merit, the
probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFD). The PFD is closely related to the
safety-related availability. It has to be noted that, the PFD, as well as the characteristics
1 and 2, are probabilistically quantified. This is because these characteristics are not
"regular" measurable technical characteristics. For example, the exact period of time, in
which an SRS will continuously perform failure-free, can not be determined. A probability
can be determined if a given SRS, analyzed at the time of its startup, will continuously
perform failure-free for a mission time of 10,000 h. In contrast, a measurable technical
characteristic, e.g. the electrical resistance of a given resistor, can be simply determined
by measurement.
The SRSs applied in low-demand applications are treated in this thesis. To ensure
that an SRS is adequately effective, the safety requirements regulated by [IEC11e] define
thresholds for the PFD. The probabilistic modeling aims to determine the PFD of an
SRS and verify the respective safety requirements. The possibly occurring failures and
respective maintenance are evaluated via the probabilistic model. An SRS is built up of
multiple possibly dependent elements, which have multiple failure modes and are subject
to multiple different maintenance activities. The maintenance activities of an SRS have a
significant impact on the PFD. Particularly, the preventive maintenance (PM) activities,
such as scheduled periodic proof tests and respective repairs, have a crucial impact. This
is because the SRSs are prone to the hidden or undetected failures, not detectable during
operation. The PM aims to reveal the undetected failures and provide repair. Various
types of PM are applied to the elements of an SRS in the field of industrial applications.
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For example, two frequently applied types of PM are the full stroke test and the partial
stroke test of a safety valve with respective repairs if necessary. The PM plan defines the
time schedule of the PM related to an SRS for the time from startup to decommissioning.
Two identical SRSs might have strongly varying values of PFD if different PM plans are
applied. Hence, a PM plan has to be chosen such that the respective SRS complies with
the given threshold for the PFD. An acceptable PM plan is determined and verified via
the probabilistic model of the respective SRS.
In this thesis, the probabilistic models based on the Stochastic and Deterministic
Timed Automata andMulti-phase Continuous-time Markov Chains are introduced. These
probabilistic models are strongly connected to the concepts of the SRSs and straightfor-
ward in application. Additionally, deeper insight is provided into further types of proba-
bilistic models, which feature more or less restrictions. A framework is presented to first
model individual SRS elements and then automatically compose the respective model of
the entire SRS. Hence, arbitrarily complex SRSs can be modeled, even SRSs that have
numerous and dependent elements. Moreover, the introduced probabilistic models are
designed to evaluate PM plans that support up to two different types of arbitrarily sched-
uled PM for each element. Additional degrees of freedom are provided to the PM. The
restrictions, which are applied on the PM plans in practice and in literature, are over-
come. These restrictions particularly imply the PM to be simultaneous for all elements
and periodically scheduled with equal periods. The analysis of the introduced probabilis-
tic models shows that the additional degrees of freedom have a significant impact on the
PFD. The choice of a PM plan is formulated as an optimization problem for the available
degrees of freedom. The evaluated objective function is the achieved PFD that is calcu-
lated via the introduced probabilistic model. The Nelder-Mead method is applied to solve
the optimization problem. The choice of a PM plan by solving the respective optimiza-
tion problem is demonstrated for selected practically relevant types of SRSs, which have
a different degree of redundancy, fraction of common-cause failures, and coverage of PM.
The PM plans that are determined via optimization in many cases provide significant
improvement of the PFD and therefore increase the effectiveness of the respective SRSs.
Furthermore, useful general conclusions on the choice of PM plans are provided. Partic-
ularly, a set of rules is given to decide for a given SRS if the PFD can be significantly
improved via optimization of the PM plan.
1.2 Background and state of the art
1.2.1 Preliminaries
The structure of section 1.2, which deals with the state of the art and the related literature
of this thesis, is outlined below. The content of this section is mainly addressed to readers
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with fundamental knowledge of the SRSs, functional safety, and probabilistic modeling.
The used terms will not be defined in section 1.2, for reasons of improved readability
and a compact representation. The definitions of the used terms will be given mainly in
chapter 2 and also in the following chapters.
In subsection 1.2.2, the safety requirements on the SRSs and the probabilistic figures
of merit are described. The characteristics of the SRSs are described at the beginning of
subsection 1.2.3. These characteristics have to be supported by the applied probabilistic
modeling. Thereafter, an overview of the probabilistic modeling methods described in
literature is provided. The probabilistic modeling methods are reviewed in regard to the
support of the identified SRSs characteristics. The advantages and drawbacks of each
reviewed method are pointed out. In subsection 1.2.4, the analysis of the probabilistic
models is treated and the motivation for the application of optimization is explained.
In the following section 1.3, the main novel contributions and targets of this thesis are
presented. Finally, the organization of the thesis is described in section 1.4 to guide the
reader.
1.2.2 Safety requirements on Safety-related Systems (SRSs)
The SRS comprises "everything (hardware, software and human elements) necessary to
carry out one or more safety functions, where failure of the safety function would give
rise to a significant increase in the risk to the safety of persons and/or the environment",
as described in [Int14]. An individual set of safety requirements is assigned to every
safety function and applies to the related SRS. The safety requirements were regulated
by the international standard [IEC11e]. The meaning of acts, regulations, guidelines, and
standards related to the SRSs was outlined in [Lit98]. Particularly, the legal situation
in Germany was treated in detail. The fundamentals and the terminology related to the
field of SRSs were pointed out.
The safety requirements were classified in four Safety Integrity Levels (SILs), SIL 1 to
SIL 4, see [IEC11e]. The SIL assigned to a safety function depends on the risk, identified
via the hazard and risk assessment of the related potentially hazardous application. Thus,
the SIL 4 is assigned to a safety function with a high identified risk, in contrast to the SIL
1, which is assigned to a safety function with a low identified risk. The hazard and risk
assessment was described in [IEC11c] and [Zio07]. It is not treated with full details in this
thesis. Overall, the hazard and risk assessment defines the required safety functions and
assigns the appropriate SIL to every safety function. Based on the SIL, the associated
set of safety requirements is assigned to the safety functions. These safety requirements
are relevant for the respective SRSs, which carry out the safety functions. The relevant
safety requirements for an SRS carrying out multiple safety functions are these associated
with the highest SIL. The relationship between the risk, SIL, and safety requirements
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is illustrated in figure 1.1. In the process industry sector the applications with SIL 4
safety functions are not used. Instead, the related potentially hazardous applications are
redesigned to reduce the resulting risk.
Risk Safety requirementsSIL
1
2
3
4
Low
Medium
High
Very high
Figure 1.1: Relation of risk and SIL
The safety requirements comprise qualitative and quantitative requirements. A large
part of [IEC11e] was designated to the qualitative safety requirements. These require-
ments have to be followed over the complete life-cycle of an SRS. The activities for the
concept development, specification, realization, validation, operation, and decommission-
ing of the SRSs were regulated by the qualitative requirements defined by [IEC11a].
Complementary, the quantitative requirements provide thresholds for the SRSs quanti-
tative figures of merit. The SRSs are applied to a large variety of categorically different
potentially hazardous applications. These applications are categorized based on their SRS
mode of operation. Therefore, depending on the mode of operation different figures of
merit are relevant for the SRS to be effective. The modes of operation were defined in
[IEC11b] as the low demand mode, high demand mode, and continuous mode. The low
demand mode is applicable when the safety function is rarely demanded by the related
potentially hazardous application, i.e. once per year or less frequent. The potentially
hazardous applications generating more frequent demands than once per year are cate-
gorized as high demand or continuous mode. The described categorization is motivated
to differentiate between applications where a failure at system level is tolerated and such
where it is not. That leads to different figures of merit for effective SRSs. For the SRSs
with different modes of operation the standard [IEC11a] introduced the relevant figures of
merit and respective thresholds. The figures of merit introduced for the low demand mode
of operation include the average probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFD) and
further figures of merit, e.g. the hardware fault tolerance, etc. For the high demand mode
and continuous mode the average frequency of a dangerous failure (PFH) was introduced
instead of the PFD.
The PFH and PFD are both probabilistic figures of merit, intended for the SRSs
with different modes of operation. The PFH is the average occurrence rate of failures
leading to a hazardous event in the related potentially hazardous application. The PFD
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is the complement of the mean availability referring to the SRS safety function. The PFD
is determined for the time interval of interest from the instantaneous PFD, denoted by
PFD(t). The time interval of interest usually comprises the mission time from the startup
until the end of the operation time. Additionally, the maximum PFD for the time interval
of interest, denoted by PFDmax, was suggested in [IEC11c] to be evaluated. The PFDmax
reflects the maximum occurring hazard probability. However, no mandatory thresholds
have been provided for the PFDmax so far, in contrast to the PFD.
This thesis is focused on the SRSs in low demand mode of operation. The probabilistic
modeling of SRSs mainly aims to determine the PFD(t). The figures of merit PFD and
PFDmax are calculated from the PFD(t). Hence, it can be verified if a given SRS meets
the respective thresholds. However, the probabilistic models introduced in this thesis can
also be applied with minor adjustments to the high demand and continuous modes of
operation.
1.2.3 Probabilistic modeling
The SRSs are complex systems build up of dependent elements, which are subject to mul-
tiple maintenance actions and failure modes. The dependencies of elements arise from the
failures or repairs of one element affecting other elements, e.g. multiple elements might
share one repair team, the failures of one element might inhibit the failure detection of
other elements, etc. The multiple maintenance actions comprise the corrective mainte-
nance (CM), providing repair after detected failures, and preventive maintenance (PM),
revealing the undetected failures and providing repair if necessary. The PM comprises
up to two different types of PM for each element of an SRS, the regular and the supple-
mentary PM. Each individual type of the PM provides a different coverage to reveal the
undetected failures. For example, the partial stroke test is applied to a valve, providing
an incomplete test coverage to reveal failures, and the full stroke test is also applied,
providing a higher but still incomplete test coverage to reveal failures. The repair of the
revealed failures, if necessary, is part of the PM. The PM related to the elements of an
SRS is scheduled via a PM plan that specifies the time when each PM activity will be
executed. It has to be noted that, no restrictions on the time schedule of the PM are
given, i.e. the PM plans other than periodic with equal periods are permitted. The mul-
tiple failure modes result from the modeled types of failures that are subject to different
maintenance actions. Dependencies within an SRS element are caused by these multiple
failure modes. The dependency that is caused by the two failure modes detected failures
and undetected failures is explained in the following example. An undetected failure can
only occur if either no detected failures have occurred so far or the occurred detected
failures have already been repaired. The state of an element that failed is not influenced
by further failures. Hence, the detected and undetected failures of the analyzed element
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depend on each other. The dependencies caused by multiple failure modes were treated
in [Bir10], where they were referred to as no further failures at system down.
The SRSs characteristics outlined above have to be supported by the probabilistic
modeling. Different probabilistic modeling methods to determine the PFD(t) and further
probabilistic figures of merit can be found in literature, see [IEC11d], [Bir10], [Zio07],
and [TE09]. The probabilistic modeling methods in literature are mostly formulated
more generally and target at the availability of systems. These methods usually can be
adapted to determine the PFD(t) of SRSs. Generally, it is not regulated by standards
which method has to be applied to verify the regulated PFD thresholds of SRSs. This
decision is left to the safety engineer. The different available methods have advantages
and drawbacks. The probabilistic modeling methods can be fundamentally classified into
1. Boolean methods,
2. Hybrid methods, and
3. State-based methods.
The Boolean methods include the Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), Fault Trees
(FTs), and further less known methods. For example in [Zio07] the FTs were treated. The
PFD of a given SRS is determined via the static logical Boolean structure function from
the PFDs of the respective SRS elements. An FT modeling the SRS failure, which depends
on the SRS elements failures, is shown in figure 1.2. The Boolean methods are limited
to model the SRSs consisting of independent elements. The dependencies within an SRS
element, caused by multiple failure modes, can not be modeled by Boolean methods.
Moreover, the Boolean methods can not model time dependencies of the SRSs elements
PFDs, resulting from incomplete diagnosis, undetected failures, and PM. This restriction
of the Boolean methods can be overcome by an extension of these methods. Therefore,
the Boolean methods are usually extended by complementary modeling methods to model
the time dependencies.
The extension of the Boolean methods leads to the Hybrid methods. The complemen-
tary modeling methods are mostly State-based methods. The principle of the Hybrid
methods is illustrated in figure 1.3. The individual SRS elements are modeled by the
State-based methods, providing their PFD(t). Subsequently, the PFD(t) of the entire
SRS is calculated from the PFD(t) of its individual elements via the Boolean structure
function. Hence, the dependencies between elements are not modeled by the Hybrid
methods. Moreover, the dependencies caused by the multiple failure modes of elements
are not modeled in full details for reasons of simplicity. An SRS element with multiple
failure modes is approximated by separately modeling each failure mode and combination
of the submodels with a Boolean structure function, as shown in figure 1.4. Thus, the
multiple failure modes are modeled equivalent to the independent series elements and the
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Figure 1.2: Fault tree
respective dependencies are neglected. Frequently, the multiple failure modes are even
completely neglected, except one selected "dominant" failure mode. The Hybrid methods
are often used in literature. [TE09] used the Hybrid method to model the SRSs behavior
and determine the PFD(t) and PFD. The two failure modes, detected and undetected
failures, were modeled. For every element only one type of PM, which provides a complete
test coverage and is scheduled by a periodic PM plan with equal periods, was considered.
In [BBB12], the Hybrid method was applied to analyze the impact of PM on the PFD(t),
PFD, and PFDmax. Two types of PM, one with complete test coverage and one with
incomplete test coverage, were modeled. The considered PM plans were periodic with
equal periods for the PM with high coverage and variable periods for the PM with low
coverage. The so-called α-test policy was introduced to define the variable periods. The
detected failures were neglected. Furthermore, the so-called simplified equations (SEs) are
frequently used to directly calculate the PFD. The SEs are mostly based on the Hybrid
methods. The most often used SEs were introduced by [IEC11d]. Further important
reference to mention is [HLHH10], more detailed SEs were presented in this handbook.
Overall, for the SRSs with multiple failure modes, dependencies, and PM the Hybrid
methods provide only approximated, inaccurate results. Despite these limitations, easily
applicable probabilistic models to approximately calculate the SRSs figures of merit are
provided by the Hybrid methods.
The State-based methods are capable to overcome the limitations of the Boolean and
Hybrid methods described above. The state-based models consider the dependent ele-
ments, multiple maintenance actions, and multiple failure modes. The State-based meth-
ods comprise the Finite State Automata (FSAs), Markov chains (MCs), Petri nets, etc.
The states of the elements of an SRS are represented by the model states. The failures
and restorations resulting from the CM and PM are represented by the events triggering
the state transitions. An SRS modeled by an FSA is shown in figure 1.5 to illustrate
the State-based methods. The occurrence of an event indicating failure, i.e. f1, f2, f3,
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Figure 1.3: Principle of Hybrid methods
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Figure 1.4: Approximation of multiple failure modes via Hybrid method
or restoration, i.e. r1, r2, r3, triggers state transitions. The states set is subdivided into
two subsets with the attributes U and U, which indicate whether the safety function is
available in a given state or not. The PFD(t) is given by the probability of the model
states with the attribute U. Generally, the challenge of the State-based methods is to cope
with the large number of states emerging in models of SRSs with multiple elements and
multiple failure modes. This challenge can be dealt with, as was shown in [Gab10] and is
shown in this thesis. In [CL08], the Stochastic Timed Automata (STAs) were introduced
to model the behavior of systems triggered by discrete and arbitrarily timed events. In
fact, the STA is an FSA equipped with a stochastic event timing mechanism. The state
transitions of an STA are triggered by the stochastic timed events. An STA enables to
separate the model logic function, given by an FSA, from the model event timing, given
by a timing mechanism. The timing of events is defined by an arbitrary cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF). Thus, the STA is capable to model an SRS under consideration
of arbitrarily timed events. The behavior of a given SRS can be simulated via the STA
and the resulting events and states sequences, so-called random walks, can be generated.
However, one or even a small number of the random walks are not applicable to
determine the figures of merit of interest for a modeled SRS. Either a large number of the
random walks has to be generated and evaluated, leading to the Monte-Carlo methods,
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Figure 1.5: Principle of State-based methods
or the probabilistic model has to be analytically evaluated. This thesis follows the latter
methodology, although the presented modeling framework is capable of random walks
generation and might be used for Monte-Carlo methods. The Monte-Carlo methods were
described in [Sob91] and are not further treated in this thesis.
In [CL08], the stochastic process generated by the STA was analyzed and identified as
equivalent to the Semi-Markov process. Hence, the Semi-Markov chains can be applied
to analytically evaluate the STAs. The PFD(t) is determined by evaluation of the Semi-
Markov chains state probabilities. The state probabilities are given by the transient
solutions of the relative integral equations. These integral equations to calculate the Semi-
Markov chains state probabilities can be found in [Bir10]. Overall, the Semi-Markov chains
meet the requirements on the probabilistic modeling of SRSs, described at the beginning of
the subsection. The application of the Semi-Markov chains is considered by the author to
be more complex in comparison to further applicable methods. In [Bir10], the complexity
of the Semi-Markov chains was assessed to be higher than that of the ordinary MCs. For
that reason, the Semi-Markov chains are not selected to be applied and the review of
probabilistic modeling methods is continued.
It was shown by [CL08] that, if the event timing of an STA is restricted to the expo-
nential CDFs, the respective stochastic process will be equivalent to the Markov process.
In this case, the STAs can be evaluated by the MCs that can be considered as an alterna-
tive representation of the STAs. Since it is common to assume the model event timing of
an SRS to be distributed by the exponential CDFs, the MCs are widely applied to model
the SRSs, e.g. they were applied in [Bir10], [Zio09]. For this purpose, the PM has to be
either neglected or approximated by events with exponential CDFs. The state probabili-
ties of the MCs are calculated to determine the PFD(t). Either the Discrete-time MCs or
the Continuous-time MCs can be used for the calculation of the state probabilities. The
state probabilities of the Discrete-time MCs are evaluated by matrix multiplications for
every time step of a constant step size, see [Gab10], [FF11]. In [FF11], the Discrete-time
MCs were compared to the Continuous-time MCs. It was shown that, the Continuous-
time MCs provide significantly higher computational efficiency. The state probabilities of
the Continuous-time MCs are given by the transient solutions of the ordinary differential
equations (ODEs). The order of the system of ODEs is given by the respective number
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of model states. Efficient numeric ODE solvers are available to compute the transient
solutions. The application of the MCs to model and evaluate industrial systems was de-
scribed in the standard [IEC07]. In [Blu10], the Continuous-time MCs were applied to
model and determine the probabilistic figures of merit of SRSs for the high demand mode
and continuous mode of operation.
However, the scheduled PM, comprising of periodic proof tests and respective repairs,
can not be precisely modeled via the MCs, since the respective event timing is not expo-
nential, but deterministic. A technique to consider the PM by extension of the MCs was
published in [BCO94]. For this purpose, the MCs were extended to the Multi-phase MCs.
The PM is modeled via the so-called phase transitions. The phase transitions model the
state transitions triggered by the deterministic timed events. This principle is illustrated
in figure 1.6. The MC in figure 1.6 exhibits a phase transition that models the impact
of a scheduled PM. The scheduled PM is modeled via a deterministic timed event that
triggers the related state transition. In [Buk01], the Multi-phase Continuous-time MCs
(MP-CMCs) were applied to model the impact of scheduled PM. [Gab10] modeled SRSs
via the Multi-phase Discrete-time MCs (MP-DMCs) under consideration of the scheduled
PM. In [FF11], the state of the art ODE solvers were applied to determine the PFD(t) of
a modeled SRS via evaluation of the MP-CMC state probabilities.
phase transitions
exponential event timingF2
F1
F3
OK
λf3
λf1
λf2
λr2
λr1
Figure 1.6: Use of phase transitions to model scheduled PM activities
It is concluded by the author that, the MP-CMCs meet the requirements on the
probabilistic modeling of SRSs, which are described at the beginning of the subsection.
Moreover, the application of the MP-CMCs is considered to be less complex in compar-
ison to the Semi-Markov chains. Therefore, the MP-CMCs are applied in this thesis to
determine the PFD(t) of the SRSs. It takes considerable effort to model a given SRS,
with the characteristics mentioned above, via the MP-CMCs. Hence, procedures to reduce
the modeling effort are highly advantageous and were frequently applied to state-based
models in literature. In [Blu10], the MCs modeling independent elements of an SRS were
combined via the Kronecker and Cartesian products to determine the MC that models
the entire SRS. However, this procedure does not handle dependent elements and phase
transitions, which model the PM. [Gab10] proposed a generic approach to automatically
generate the MP-DMCs for SRSs. This approach considers the dependencies resulting
from multiple failure modes, combinatorial voting, maintenance groups, inhibition, etc.
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These dependencies were incorporated in the given algorithm to generate the MP-DMCs
for an SRS specified by the introduced formal description language. In this thesis, an
alternative procedure to reduce the modeling effort is introduced. A special type of STAs,
the Stochastic and Deterministic Timed Automaton (SDTA), is introduced and applied to
model an SRS that is characterized as described above. The SDTA provides an automata-
based probabilistic model that is more straightforward to apply for an engineer. Moreover,
the analysis of the SDTA provides further insight into modeling and the relation to further
modeling methods is better understood. The timing of events that are modeled via the
SDTA are restricted to the exponential CDFs, except the events related to the PM. The
latter, the so-called deterministic timed events, exhibit event timing resulting from the
PM schedule. The modeling effort, that results from the large number of model states,
dependencies of elements, and PM, is reduced by modeling of individual elements via SD-
TAs and subsequent automatic model composition. The defined parallel composition of
SDTAs is applied for the model composition of the SDTAs modeling individual elements
to receive the SDTA modeling an entire SRS. The analysis of an SDTA reveals its relation
to the Multi-phase MCs. Hence, the MP-CMC can be considered as an alternative repre-
sentation of the SDTA, which can be evaluated by the MP-CMC. The transformation to
derive the respective MP-CMC for a given SDTA is provided in this thesis. Consequently,
the MP-CMCs are applied to efficiently calculate the PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax of the
SRSs modeled via the SDTAs.
The probabilistic modeling procedure presented in this thesis is illustrated in figure
1.7. In step 1, each element is separately modeled by an individual SDTA. The model of
the entire SRS is determined via the introduced automatic composition operation in step
2. After that, this model is transformed in step 3 by means of a defined transformation
into an MP-CMC. Finally, the MP-CMC provides efficient probabilistic evaluation of the
model. The state probabilities and the figures of merit PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax are
calculated.
1.2.4 Model analysis and optimization
The probabilistic models enable to determine the figures of merit PFD(t), PFD, and
PFDmax for the modeled SRSs. These figures of merit are determined from the set of the
probabilistic model parameters of an SRS. The parameters are classified into the failure
parameters and maintenance parameters. The failure parameters originate from the se-
lection and installation of the SRS hardware. A widely accepted method to determine
the failure parameters via statistics was presented in [Dü10]. In contrast to the failure
parameters, the maintenance parameters are widely independent of the SRS hardware and
related to the organizational measures of maintenance. The maintenance is further classi-
fied into the corrective maintenance (CM) and preventive maintenance (PM), as described
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Figure 1.7: Probabilistic modeling procedure of this thesis
in [DIN10]. In this thesis, this classification is applied to the maintenance parameters.
The PM is highly relevant for an SRS, as it is crucial to mitigate the undetected failures.
Hence, the figures of merit of an SRS are strongly influenced by the PM parameters. The
set of PM parameters defines the PM plan that schedules the applied PM activities. The
PM plan is crucial for an SRS to meet the threshold for PFD, which are regulated by
[IEC11e]. Therefore, the PM plan has to be chosen to ensure that the mandatory thresh-
old for the PFD is met. On the other hand, the PM activities within a PM plan require
effort and generate expenses.
The probabilistic models introduced in this thesis support the PM plans with the fea-
tures outlined hereafter. The supported PM plans are oriented towards those in industrial
applications in the chemical and process industry. Up to two different types of PM for
each element of an SRS are supported by a PM plan. One type of PM is referred to
as the regular PM activities, which provide possibly incomplete coverage to reveal the
undetected failures and repairs if necessary. For example, the valve in an application
with highly poisonous fluids is not accessible to be dismounted, fully checked, repaired if
necessary, and re-installed in the framework of a regular PM activity. Instead, the regu-
lar PM activity is carried out without dismounting of the valve, resulting in incomplete
test coverage. Hence, some failures might remain not revealed. The supplementary PM
activities are the second type of PM activities that are supported by a PM plan. These
PM activities are usually fully automated, require very low effort and exhibit a lower test
coverage compared to the regular PM activities. The supplementary PM activities are
e.g. partial stroke tests of valves with repairs if necessary, software-based automated self-
diagnosis tests of hardware with repairs if necessary, etc. It has to be emphasized that,
the regular and supplementary PM activities include repair if necessary. In contrast, the
term proof test is frequently used in literature. This term occasionally refers only to the
PM activities that aim to reveal failures and does not consider repair. The proof test
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and the respective repair if necessary are in the following denoted by PM. Eventually, all
the PM activities within a supported PM plan might be arbitrarily scheduled for each
element. This implies that no restrictions on a PM plan are given, e.g. such as being
periodically scheduled with equal periods or simultaneous for all elements.
To the knowledge of the author, probabilistic models of SRSs that support PM plans
offering all the outlined features have not been treated in literature. Traditionally, the PM
activities scheduled by a PM plan were assumed to exhibit a complete coverage. Mean-
while, this assumption has been relaxed, see [IEC11e]. Additionally, the supplementary
PM activities are increasingly considered in PM plans. However, the restriction on the
PM activities to be periodically scheduled with equal periods is still common practice.
The most PM plans treated in literature exhibit this restriction, see [IEC11e], [HLHH10],
[TE09], etc. Just recently, [BBB12] introduced and analyzed the partial relaxation of
this restriction. The analyzed PM plans were periodic with equal periods for the regular
PM with complete test coverage, but periodic with variable periods for the supplemen-
tary PM. The so-called α-test policy was introduced to define the variable periods via
a constantly low number of parameters. It was shown, the resulting PFD and PFDmax
were significantly decreased by the variable periods of the supplementary PM, especially
for redundant SRSs. In this thesis it is shown that, the introduced models with the sup-
ported PM plans considerably increase the degrees of freedom of the applied PM activities
in comparison to the models in literature. The analysis of the introduced models shows
that, the increased degrees of freedom might be used to improve the figures of merit and
increase the effectiveness of an SRS.
A further target of this thesis is to achieve an improvement of the figures of merit via
the increased degrees of freedom of the PM. The optimization was chosen to achieve this
target. The introduced probabilistic models provide the relation between the figures of
merit, i.e. PFD or PFDmax, and the model parameters, e.g the applied PM plan, etc. In
the field of mathematical optimization, this relation is named an objective function. The
optimization aims at maximizing or minimizing the objective function by systematically
choosing parameters from within an allowed set. Therefore, a decrease of the evaluated
objectives is achieved by minimizing the PFD, PFDmax, or the weighted trade-off between
the two former. In literature, the optimization has been previously applied to probabilis-
tic models. An overview of the publications related to the SRSs is given hereafter. [TE09]
presented a survey on the optimization of multiple objectives by evaluating numerous pa-
rameters, including the failure and PM parameters. A multi-objective Genetic algorithm
was applied to the optimization problem. The PFD, spurious trip rate, and life-cycle
costs were used as the objective functions for optimization. The evaluated failure param-
eters were related to a given set of SRSs elements to select from, in order to construct
an SRS that minimizes the given objectives. The considered PM plans contained only
regular PM activities with complete test coverage and periodically scheduled with equal
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periods. The evaluated PM parameters were the time to first PM activity, period dura-
tion of the PM activities schedule, and staggering factor of the PM activities schedules of
redundant elements. In [ML11], the optimization was applied to determine the failure and
PM parameters. Only periodic PM plans with equal periods and regular PM activities
were considered, staggering was not treated. The periods of the PM activities schedule
were determined for a given SIL and variable SRS element structure. The optimization
problem was solved via an enumeration algorithm. The SRS element structure, consisting
of elements from a given set and minimizing the life-cycle costs, was determined. Over-
all, it is confirmed that an increase in parameters of the objective function, which is the
probabilistic model, leads to increased complexity of the optimization problem.
In this thesis, the focus of optimization is put on the parameters related to the PM
plans of the introduced probabilistic models. The decision not to consider further pa-
rameters, e.g. the failure parameters, for the optimization is motivated by the number
of optimization parameters. Due to the detailed modeling of the PM plans by the in-
troduced models, the number of PM parameters is significantly greater than in literature
models. Hence, further parameters would increase the complexity of the optimization
problem even more and are therefore not considered. Moreover, the focus of optimization
on PM parameters is also justified for another reason. The PM parameters are related to
organizational measures and therefore easier to vary in contrast to the failure parameters,
which are related to hardware. The resulting optimization problems are evaluated via
the Nelder-Mead method of heuristic optimization. It is demonstrated that, the applied
optimization algorithm effectively evaluates the treated optimization problems via the
available computation resources. A framework to determine a PM plan that increases the
effectiveness of an SRS is provided.
1.3 Novel contributions
The novel contributions of this thesis are itemized below.
Probabilistic modeling
• Models based on SDTAs and MP-CMCs that are intended for SRSs with PM, mul-
tiple failure modes, and dependent elements and provide efficient calculation of
PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax
• Modeling framework to model individual elements and automatically compose the
model of the entire SRS
• Definition of PM strategies to classify the available degrees of freedom of PM
15
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Model analysis and validation
• Modeling of selected practically relevant SRSs and analysis
• Validation of the introduced models via selected established models from literature
• Sensitivity analysis of parameter variations related to PM
Optimization of PM plans
• Formulation of the optimization problems to minimize PFD or PFDmax or trade-off
between PFD and PFDmax via variation of PM
• Application of Nelder-Mead method to solve the optimization problems
• Optimization of PM for selected practically relevant models of SRSs and analysis of
results
• Set of rules to decide for a given SRS if the PFD or PFDmax can be significantly
improved via optimization of the PM
1.4 Organization
The organization of this thesis is oriented towards the novel contributions formulated in
section 1.3.
First, the technical terms and concepts, used in this thesis, are introduced in chapter
2. The used terminology is set in relation to established literature, such as international
standards, recent publications, and specialized books.
The chapter 3 extensively treats the introduced models of SRSs. At the beginning, the
modeling assumptions are discussed and the SDTA is defined in close connection to the
concepts and characteristics of the modeled systems. A modeling procedure is introduced
that features separate modeling of possibly dependent elements and composition of the
entire model. The models with redundant elements are extended to consider the common-
cause failures. Finally, the SDTA as the introduced new type of probabilistic models is
discussed, its characteristics are described, and the relation to further models is treated.
In chapter 4, the definition of the MP-CMC is given first and the calculation of the
PFD(t) is described. It is based on the calculations of state probabilities. Afterwards,
the SDTA transformation into MP-CMC is defined. That enables efficient calculation of
PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax for systems modeled via SDTA. Moreover, the PM plans and
restrictions of PM plans are defined and discussed. The PM strategies are defined as sets
of PM plans with different applied restrictions.
The practically relevant SRS with one or three elements are modeled and analyzed in
chapter 5. These models are validated via established literature models and the exclusive
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features of the introduced models are demonstrated and discussed. Furthermore, the
parameter variations related to the PM are analyzed and discussed.
In chapter 6, the handled optimization problems are first defined. The characteristics
of the optimization problems and choice of the optimization algorithm are treated after-
wards. Then, the Nelder-Mead method is described. A heuristic approach is introduced
that is capable to overcome local minima and improves the minimization of the maximum
PFD. The results of the optimization of selected practically relevant models are presented
and discussed. Finally, a set of rules is presented to decide if the objectives for a given
model can be significantly decreased by optimization.
In the end, the content of the thesis is summarized in chapter 7 in English and German.
An outlook on future work is given.
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Chapter 2
Safety-related Systems (SRSs)
2.1 Preliminaries
This chapter aims to introduce, clarify, and recapitulate the technical terms and concepts
used in this thesis. Additionally, the introduced terminology is set in relation to the liter-
ature. Selected fundamental definitions related to the SRSs are introduced immediately
hereafter. In section 2.2, the concepts related to the term failure are treated. The term
failure is defined and subsequently the differentiation of the random hardware failure and
the systematic failure is outlined in subsection 2.2.2. The failure categorization, based
on the particular failure effect, failure detection, and the number of affected elements, is
discussed in subsection 2.2.3. In conclusion, the failure categorization into failure modes
is presented and the related events are defined. In section 2.3, the concepts related to
maintenance are treated. The classification of maintenance into corrective maintenance
and preventive maintenance is described. The events related to maintenance are defined.
In section 2.4, the SRSs figures of merit are discussed. The general characteristics relia-
bility and availability are recapitulated and set in relation to the frequency of a dangerous
failure (PFH) and the probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFD).
The definitions given below are formulated according to the standard [IEC11b].
Definition 1 (Safety-related System (SRS)). The SRS refers to the system that
implements "the required safety functions necessary to achieve or maintain a safe state",
see [IEC11b].
The closely related term Safety Instrumented System is also often used in literature
and specifies an SRS applied in the process industry sector, see e.g. [IEC05]. In practice,
an SRS consists of multiple hardware components. The term element is introduced below
to refer to a particular SRS hardware component or to a group of components.
Definition 2 (Element). The element comprises "a single component or any group of
components that performs one or more element safety functions", see [IEC11b].
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In some references the element is also referred to as item, e.g. [DIN10], [Bir10]. The
elements subdivide an SRS into individual functional units of arbitrary complexity. Over-
all, an SRS might consist of one or multiple elements in series – parallel structure. The
subdivision of large systems into subsystems complies with good engineering practice. For
example, the SRS consisting of multiple elements is subdivided into elements to reduce
the modeling complexity and effort. The separate modeling of individual elements is en-
abled. Subsequently, the element models are combined to obtain the entire SRS model.
It has to be mentioned that, this thesis treats dependent elements of an SRS, in contrast
to many literature references neglecting dependencies.
The safety function specifies the primary SRS functionality that aims to protect from
the unacceptable risk.
Definition 3 (Safety function). The safety function refers to the function that is
"intended to achieve or maintain a safe state", see [IEC11b].
If an individual SRS element is analyzed, the attention will be on its contribution to
the safety function. The element safety function reflects this contribution.
Definition 4 (Element safety function). The element safety function refers to "that
part of a safety function which is implemented by an element", see [IEC11b].
In the presence of parallel elements, which is referred to as redundancy, multiple ele-
ments simultaneously implement the same element safety function.
The following example 2.1 illustrates the terms definitions introduced above.
Example 2.1 (SRS hardware components, elements, safety function, and ele-
ment safety functions). The SRS to prevent the overfilling of a vessel is illustrated in
figure 2.1. The respective hardware components are shown in figure 2.2. The SRS is built
up of sensors, barriers, logic solver, barriers, solenoids, and valves. The sensor part is built
up of redundant hardware components and the final element part addresses two different
vessel inflow pipes. The level in the vessel is measured via the two redundant sensors and
the measured values are transferred via the barriers to the logic solver. The logic solver
evaluates the measured values signals and generates the commands, transferred via the
barriers to the solenoids. The valves are operated by the related solenoids according to
the commands of the logic solver. One level sensor, the logic solver, and the final element
subsystem, including barriers, solenoids, and valves, could be chosen as distinct elements
of the SRS. Depending on the modeling, the exemplarily chosen elements can be merged
or split up in further elements.
The safety function of the SRS is the following: The inflow valves to the vessel will be
shut down if the level exceeds the given limit. The element safety function of the element
level sensor is to provide a sufficiently exactly measured level value.
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Figure 2.1: P&ID of SRS to prevent over-
filling of a vessel; [Gab10]
Figure 2.2: SRS hardware structure re-
lated to figure 2.1; [Gab10]
2.2 Failure
2.2.1 Definition
The definition given below is formulated according to the standard [IEC11b].
Definition 5 (Failure). The failure is the event that terminates the "ability of a func-
tional unit to provide a required function", see [IEC11b].
In this thesis, the term functional unit, used in definition 5, refers to an SRS element.
The term required function is intentionally not equivalent to the element safety function,
introduced in definition 4. The required function refers to the perfect functionality of
the respective SRS element, often denoted by as good as new or operating as required.
Particularly, the following functions of an SRS are included in the required function: (1)
to provide the safety function and (2) to avoid spurious operation of the SRS. However,
the ability to provide the safety function is the most crucial part of the ability to provide
the required function.
2.2.2 Random hardware failure vs. systematic failure
Next, the failures of an SRS are differentiated between the random hardware failures
(RHFs) and the systematic failures (SFs). The RHFs and the SFs have different failure
21
2 Safety-related Systems (SRSs)
mechanisms and consequently require different procedures to deal with. Therefore, it has
become common to strictly differentiate between the RHFs and the SFs. For example, in
[IEC11b] the RHFs and the SFs were defined and strictly differentiated. The procedures
to deal with these failures were given.
The definitions given below are formulated according to [IEC11b] and [HLHH10].
Definition 6 (Random hardware failure (RHF)). The RHF results "from the nat-
ural degradation mechanisms", see [HLHH10]. Additionally, for the RHF it is assumed
that "the operating conditions are within the design envelope of the system".
Definition 7 (Systematic failure (SF)). The SF is "related to a particular cause
other than natural degradation and foreseen stressors", [HLHH10]. The SF "can only be
eliminated by a modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational
procedures, documentation, or other relevant factors", see [IEC11b].
Occasionally, the RHFs are alternatively named physical failures in literature, even
though this term does not definitely characterize the RHFs. In contrast, the SFs are
alternatively named non-physical failures. The same remark as above holds here.
The differentiation between the RHFs and the SFs appears reasonable from theoretical
point of view, but in practice it is often difficult to differentiate between them. In the
following, further characteristics and examples are given to clearly contrast the RHFs
with the SFs. The RHFs are not present at the startup of an SRS. In contrast, at least
the causes of the SFs are initially present at startup. An SF might prevent the related
element from performing its required function even though it is still able to operate, as
shown in the following example 2.2.
Example 2.2 (SF of pressure transmitter). A pressure transmitter failure occurs
due to a plugged sensing line. Then, the pressure transmitter failure is caused by wrong
design of the sensing line, which has been initially present at startup.
Example 2.3 (SF of flow transmitter). The unforeseen vibration of a pump causes a
failure of the flow transmitter, which is located on the connected piping.
The pressure transmitter failure of example 2.2 is clearly indicated as an SF and the
alternative denotation as a non-physical failure fits very well. Contrarily to example 2.2,
an SF might also result in a physical failure. Evidently, a physical failure of the flow
transmitter occurs in example 2.3. Nevertheless, the failure of the flow transmitter is
clearly indicated as an SF.
The RHFs arise over time and can be causally traced back to the affected element of
the respective SRS. The following examples 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate two possible RHFs.
Example 2.4 (RHF of sensor converter). A sensor converter failure occurs due to a
transistor failure that is caused by aging of the semiconductor.
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Example 2.5 (RHF of relay). A relay failure occurs due to wear out within operating
conditions.
The RHFs always occur at a random time. For the SFs it holds that, as stated in
[Bir10], "they can appear as if they were randomly distributed in time". In such cases
the SFs might be erroneously classified as RHFs, e.g. if a failure occurs due to faulty
software. If the software sequence related to the failure is infrequently executed, it will
appear as if this failure is randomly distributed in time. An RHF occurs when an element
has "degraded to a point of failure where it is not able to operate and thus needs to be
changed or repaired", [HLHH10]. Multiple elements are never simultaneously affected
by RHFs. In contrast, the SFs can simultaneously affect multiple elements. These SFs
are referred to as common-cause failures. The SFs can be eliminated by use of suitable
countermeasures, e.g. these regulated by the standard [IEC11e]. At least, they have to be
reduced to a negligible number by the applied countermeasures. The SFs mostly cannot be
quantified. In contrast, the RHFs can not be eliminated by means of the countermeasures
for the SFs. Thus, the RHFs are dealt with by quantifying them.
The differentiation of RHFs and SFs is outlined above. However, some failures require
unreasonable effort to fit into the above classification or may not fit at all. The failure
classes RHFs and SFs overlap in practice, as pointed out in [HLHH10]. Hence, it is very
difficult to classify an observed failure as an aging failure, i.e. RHF, or as a stress failure,
i.e. SF.
The question, whether the characteristics of an SRS have to be quantified only based
on RHFs, is controversial. It is further discussed below. To quantify the characteristics
of an SRS only based on RHFs seems to be straightforward and has been frequently
proposed in literature. In particular, [IEC11e] recommends this procedure. The SFs are
neglected, motivated by the mandatory regulations to eliminate them and the difficulties
to quantify them. However, a gap between the predicted SRSs figures of merit compared
to the observed figures of merit or the experience-based figures of merit occurs. This is
explained by the procedure to strictly differentiate between RHFs and SFs. A considerable
amount of the SFs may be not completely excluded by the applied countermeasures to
eliminate them. Nevertheless, these failures are excluded from the quantitative evaluations
of the SRSs characteristics. Some RHFs are therefore often erroneously classified as SFs,
especially by the manufacturer of the SRSs. Due to that, the parameter estimations
regarding the RHFs may provide too optimistic results. In consequence, the predicted
SRSs figures of merit, which are based on the estimated parameters, do not match with
the actual ones.
In [HLHH10], it was proposed to determine the SRSs figures of merit in a more realistic
way, in consideration of the RHFs and all quantifiable SFs. It has to be emphasized that,
it is widely accepted to quantify the SFs threatening multiple elements via the common-
cause failures, see [IEC11e], [HLHH10]. In the same way, the failures applied in this thesis
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to quantify the SRSs figures of merit are not limited to the RHFs, but also include the
quantifiable SFs. To simplify notation, the term failure is used in the following to denote
all quantifiable failures, including RHFs and SFs. Nevertheless, appropriate regulations
to eliminate the SFs, especially the non-quantifiable ones, or at least to reduce these to a
sufficient low level are still mandatory, see [IEC11e].
2.2.3 Failure modes
Within the classifications and definitions, given in the previous section 2.2.2, the failures
treated in this thesis are further categorized in the following to model the impact of
each individual failure category on the SRS. The failure modes that are differentiated for
modeling are based on the failure categorization given below. Three dimensions for failure
categorization are identified. The failures are categorized based on (1) the failure effect
on the element safety function, (2) the failure detection, and (3) the number of affected
elements.
First, the failure categorization based on (1) is described. The resulting failure cat-
egories are dangerous failure, safe failure, and no-effect failure. The failure categories
are based on those differentiated by [IEC11b]. The dangerous failure is characterized to
"prevent a safety function from operating", see [IEC11b]. The safe failure is characterized
to "result in the spurious operation of the safety function", see [IEC11b]. The no-effect
failure is characterized as a "failure of an element that plays a part in implementing the
safety function, but has no direct effect on the safety function", [IEC11b].
The second dimension for the failure categorization is based on the failure detection.
Detected failure, undetected failure, and non-revealable failure are differentiated. The
detected failure is detected by the automatic on-line diagnostic tests or through normal
operation. The characteristic of the detected failure is in accordance with the definition of
the property detected in [IEC11b]. The undetected failure is not detected by the automatic
on-line diagnostic tests or through normal operation. This failure can be revealed by the
PM or upon a demand. The property undetected is accordingly defined in [IEC11b]. The
non-revealable failure is neither detected by the automatic on-line diagnostic tests nor
through normal operation or revealed by the PM. This failure can be revealed only upon
a demand. The non-revealable failure results from the non-perfect PM, which provides
incomplete coverage to reveal failures and is not able to completely reveal all the un-
detected failures, as mentioned in [IEC11d]. Overall, the coverage of the PM to reveal
failures has a significant impact on the SRS and has to be modeled to obtain a precise
model. It has to be emphasized that, in the standard [IEC11d] the non-revealable failures
were not explicitly defined. Instead, the non-perfect PM, referred to as proof test, was
considered via the proof test coverage (PTC) parameter. The extended categorization
into undetected and non-revealable failures is proposed in this thesis. In earlier publica-
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tions the non-revealable failures were occasionally denoted by non-detectable failures, e.g.
in [ML12]. The non-revealable failures were also considered in [HLHH10], denoted by test
independent failures.
Finally, the common-cause failure and single element failure are differentiated. The
common-cause failures are the simultaneous failures of two or more separate redundant
SRS elements that independently implement the same element safety function. These
failures are "leading to system failure", see [IEC11b]. The single element failure is the
failure of a single SRS element, complementary to the common-cause failures.
The failure categorization based on (1), (2), and (3) is illustrated in figure 2.3. It
provides the basis to define the failure modes applied in this thesis for modeling of an
SRS. The no-effect failures do not have an impact on the safety function or spurious
operation of an SRS and are not further considered. The failure modes are defined in the
following.
Failure detection
Effect on
safety function
Number of
affected elements
safe dangerous
single element
common-cause
detected
undetected
non-revealable
Figure 2.3: Failure categorization
Definition 8 (Safe failure mode (s)). The failures classified into the safe failure mode
always cause spurious operation of the respective SRS element and are immediately de-
tected. These failures are referred to as s-failures.
The spurious operation of an SRS element refers to the activation of the SRS element
without the presence of a process demand. The spurious operation of the SRS might be
caused by the spurious operation of an SRS element, depending on the SRS configuration.
The concept of spurious activation of SRSs was described in [LR08].
Example 2.6 (s-failure of sensor). An s-failure will occur if a sensor provides an
erroneous signal, that the monitored measurement of the potentially hazardous application
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has exceeded the given threshold. This is referred to as spurious operation of the SRS
element "sensor". The erroneous signal triggers the SRS to initiate a shut down of the
potentially hazardous application, as if a true demand occurred. This erroneous initiation
of the SRS is named spurious operation of the SRS.
It is further mentioned that, in some references, e.g. [HLHH10], the s-failures were
further subdivided into safe detected failures and safe undetected failures. The latter were
considered as "undetected" failures in terms of the categorization given above and cause
spurious operation. The former were considered as "detected" failures and do not cause
spurious operation.
Definition 9 (Dangerous detected failure mode (dd)). The failures classified into
the dangerous detected failure mode prevent the element safety function from operating
and are detected by the automatic on-line diagnostic tests or through normal operation.
These failures are referred to as dd-failures.
Example 2.7 (dd-failure of sensor). A sensor gets stuck and is not able to respond
upon a process demand. If this failure is detected by the automatic on-line diagnostic
tests or through normal operation, it will be a dd-failure.
The dangerous and undetected failures, resulting from the failure categories described
above, are further categorized in this thesis. In literature, these failures are not further
categorized. The further categorization, introduced below, aims to consider two different
applicable types of PM for each element of an SRS. Hence, the SRS is modeled more
detailed. The two considered types of PM are
• PM type A, introduced as the regular PM activities ;
• PM type B, introduced as the supplementary PM activities.
The PM type B provides a lower coverage to reveal failures, compared to the PM type
A. However, the failures revealed by the PM type B are also revealed by the PM type
A. Moreover, it is assumed that some failures might be "non-revealable" and might be
revealed neither by the PM type A nor type B. These failures might be revealed only
upon a true demand of the SRS. This implies that, the introduced PM might provide an
incomplete coverage to reveal failures. The resulting failure modes are defined below and
illustrated by examples.
Definition 10 (Dangerous undetected failure mode AB (duab)). The failures
classified into this failure mode prevent the element safety function from operating and
are not detected by the automatic on-line diagnostic tests or through normal operation.
These failures are revealed by the PM type A and type B and are referred to as duab-
failures.
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Example 2.8 (duab-failure of sensor). The duab-failure of a sensor is a dangerous
and undetected failure, which is revealed either by the regular PM activities, e.g. a proof
test, or by the less effective supplementary PM activities, e.g. an online field check and
examination.
Definition 11 (Dangerous undetected failure mode A (dua)). The failures classi-
fied into this failure mode prevent the element safety function from operating and are not
detected by the automatic on-line diagnostic tests or through normal operation. These
failures are revealed only by the PM type A and are referred to as dua-failures.
Example 2.9 (dua-failure of sensor). The dua-failure of a sensor is a dangerous and
undetected failure, which is revealed only by the regular PM activities.
Definition 12 (Dangerous non-revealable failure mode (dn)). The failures classi-
fied into this failure mode prevent the element safety function from operating and are not
detected by the automatic on-line diagnostic tests or through normal operation. More-
over, these failures are neither revealed by the PM type A nor type B. These failures are
revealed only upon a true demand and are referred to as dn-failures.
Example 2.10 (dn-failure of valve). The dn-failure is the failure of a valve, which
closes during regular testing, but due to insufficient actuator force does not close upon a
process demand situation, e.g. due to high process pressure.
The failure classification into failure modes, applied in this thesis, is illustrated in figure
2.4. It is compared with the failure classification introduced by [IEC11e]. The comparison
shows that the failures classified as du*-failures by [IEC11e] are further subclassified in
this thesis. Since the dangerous undetected failures are highly relevant for the probabilistic
figures of merit, the introduced failure modes enable more precise modeling. Hence, the
impact of two types of PM is modeled. Despite the safe failures were further subclassified
by [IEC11e] into sd*- and su*-failures, these failures were not used for modeling. In
contrast, the s-failures are used for the models presented in this thesis.
failure
safe
sd* su*
this thesis
IEC 61508
dangerous
dd* du*
sdd dn dua duab
Figure 2.4: Comparison of failure classifications used by [IEC11e] and this thesis
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Hereafter, events are defined for the introduced failure modes to proceed with the
modeling of SRSs. An SRS with k elements is considered. The events set indicating
single element failures is given by
ESF =
{
si, ddi, duabi, duai, dni : i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
, (2.1)
where si denotes the s-failure of the element i, etc. The failures of ESF are named analo-
gously to the respective failure mode defined above.
The common-cause failures are related to the groups of redundant SRSs elements.
These failures are denoted by cc-failures. Let the m groups of elements, which inde-
pendently implement the same element safety function and are subject to common-cause
failures, be denoted by the elements numbers set GE j,
GE j =
{
p, . . . , r : p, . . . , r ∈ {1, . . . , k}} , (2.2)
where p, . . . , r denote the elements included in the group j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} of redundant
SRS elements and p 6= r holds. The following assumptions hold for the common-cause
failures.
Assumption 1 (Groups of elements do not overlap). It is assumed that
GEh ∩ GE j = ∅, ∀h,∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, h 6= j, (2.3)
i.e. an element can be assigned to only one group of redundant SRS elements.
Assumption 2 (Common-cause failure modes). The common-cause failures occur
only for identical failure modes.
The events set indicating common-cause failures is given by
ECF =
{
sGEj, ddGEj, duabGEj, duaGEj, dnGEj : j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
}
. (2.4)
2.3 Maintenance
2.3.1 Preliminaries
The term maintenance was defined as the "combination of all technical, administrative
and managerial actions during the life cycle of an item intended to retain it in, or restore
it to, a state in which it can perform the required function", see [DIN10]. In this thesis
the items addressed by maintenance are the elements of an SRS. The required function
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that is restored by maintenance refers to the maintenance objectives. The latter include
the restoration of the ability to perform the element safety function and the elimination
of the spurious operation. Numerous maintenance activities were defined in [DIN10]
to detail the maintenance actions. In this thesis, the individual maintenance activities
are not addressed. Instead, the two maintenance types corrective maintenance (CM)
and preventive maintenance (PM) are considered. These maintenance types are treated
as entities including all the maintenance activities required to achieve the maintenance
objectives. Overall, the CM and PM describe the processes eliminating the consequences
of failures and resulting in restoration.
Definition 13 (Restoration). The restoration is defined as the "event at which the
ability to perform as required is re-established, after a failure", see [DIN10].
In this thesis, the term ability to perform as required, used in definition 13, refers to the
SRS condition when the maintenance objectives have been achieved. In the subsequent
sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, the CM and PM are defined and discussed in more details. The
given definitions are formulated in the style of the standard [DIN10].
2.3.2 Corrective maintenance
Definition 14 (Corrective maintenance (CM)). The CM is defined as the mainte-
nance that is carried out after failure detection and intends to put the related element
"into a state in which it can perform a required function", see [DIN10].
It has to be mentioned that, for the term required function, used in definition 14, the
remark given in section 2.3.1 holds. For instance, when an s-failure or a dd-failure is
detected, the CM will be immediately initiated and continue until restoration will occur.
The failure detection time delay, resulting from the delay of the failure detection after the
failure occurrence, is neglected. The CM events set of an SRS with k elements is given by
ECM =
{
cmddi, cmsi : i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
, (2.5)
where cmddi, cmsi denote the events indicating that the CM of the element i has been
completed after a dd-failure or an s-failure. The maintenance objectives for the element
i have been achieved by then. Hence, the events cmddi, cmsi indicate restoration.
Example 2.11 (CM event cmddi). The element i is observed and assumed to be subject
to dd-failures only. The element is new and failure-free at the time t = 0 when the
observation is started. A dd-failure occurs at the time t = tdd. During the time period
from t = tdd until t = tcmdd, the element i is not able to perform its element safety
function. At the time t = tcmdd, the CM event cmddi occurs and indicates the restoration
of the element i. From the occurrence of the CM event on, the element is able to perform
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its element safety function until the next failure event will occur. It has to be emphasized
that, the CM event can only occur after the dd-failure has occurred and as long as this
failure has not been restored. The event sequence described above, related to failure and
restoration, is visualized in figure 2.5.
t0
Element i is dd-failure occured
ddi cmddi
tdd tcmdd
dd-failure-free and is not restored yet
Element i is
dd-failure-free
Figure 2.5: Sequence of CM events of example 2.11
2.3.3 Preventive maintenance
Definition 15 (Preventive maintenance (PM)). The PM is defined as the "mainte-
nance carried out at predetermined intervals" and intends to "reduce the probability of
failure or the degradation of the functioning" of the related element, see [DIN10].
It has to be noted that, the presented definition 15 implies multiple aspects of the
PM. These aspects were specified in [Bir10]. The PM is considered to be necessary to (I)
"avoid wearout failures" and (II) "to identify and repair undetected failures", see [Bir10].
The focus of the PM treated in this thesis is on (II), the wearout failures are not treated.
The PM that is treated in this thesis aims to reveal the undetected failures, i.e. the
dua-, duab-failures, and to achieve restoration of the affected elements. The PM consists
of two parts:
1. PM activities to reveal the failures,
2. PM activities that provide repair and achieve restoration.
This two-part structure is reflected by the defined PM events that indicate the termination
of each PM part. The PM events set of an SRS with k elements is given by
EPM =
{
pma1i, pma2i, pmb1i, pmb2i : i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
, (2.6)
where pma1i is the event indicating the revealing of the dua- or duab-failure of the el-
ement i via the PM type A. The revealing of the failure via the PM is assumed to be
instantaneously and is modeled via the respective event. As soon as a failure is revealed,
the PM activities to achieve restoration will be initiated. When the PM activities to
achieve restoration are completed, the event pma2i will occur. Respectively, the event
pmb1i indicates the revealing of the duab-failure of the element i via the PM type B and
pmb2i indicates the restoration. It has to be emphasized that, the introduced framework
neglects the duration of the PM activities to reveal failures. It is assumed that, the
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failures are revealed immediately when the respective PM activities are initiated. Thus,
the events pma1i, pmb1i indicate the initiation of the PM activities and the revealing of
failures if these are present.
The times of the events pma1i and pmb1i are deterministic and assumed to be sched-
uled in advance within a PM plan. Particularly, the PM plan defines the times of pma1i
and pmb1i, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, that comprise the k elements of an SRS. Moreover, the
PM plans are categorized into PM strategies. The PM strategies imply restrictions on the
PM plans, e.g. the times of pma1i and pmb1i being restricted to be periodic with equal
periods, etc. The PM strategies treated in this thesis will be introduced in the chapter 4,
subsection 4.4. Until then, arbitrary PM plans without further restrictions are assumed.
The event pma1i or pmb1i will always occur at the predetermined times, given by the
PM plan, whether a failure occurs or not. In contrast, the event pma2i or pmb2i will only
occur if the event pma1i or pmb1i occurs before. This is comparable to the CM events,
i.e. cmddi, cmsi, that will only occur if the respective failure event, i.e. ddi, si, occurs
before. The following examples 2.12, 2.13 illustrate the event characteristics described
above.
Example 2.12 (PM events pma1i, pma2i occur after failure). The element i is
observed and assumed to be subject to the dua-failures only. A dua-failure of the observed
element occurs, i.e. the event duai occurs. After some time the PM is carried out. Within
the first part of the PM the dua-failure of the element i is revealed, i.e. the event pma1i
occurs. Immediately after the failure is revealed, the PM activities to achieve restoration
are initiated. When these PM activities are completed, the event pma2i will occur. The
sequence of PM events results in condition changes of the observed element. The figure
2.6 visualizes the sequence of PM events.
t0
Element i is dua-failure occured
duai pma1i
tdua tpma1
dua-failure-free and is not revealed yet
dua-failure occured
and is revealed
pma2i
tpma2
Element i is
dua-failure-free
Figure 2.6: Sequence of PM events of example 2.12
Example 2.13 (PM event pma1i occurs when element is failure-free). The element
i is observed and the same assumptions as in example 2.12 hold. The time t = tpma1 of
the scheduled in advance PM activities arrives when no dua-failures of the element i have
occurred. Then, the event pma1i will occur and there will be no condition change of the
observed element, as shown in figure 2.7. Thus, in contrast to the CM events, e.g. cmddi,
the PM events pma1i, pmb1i occur independently of the element failures. This is not the
case for the PM events pma2i, pmb2i, which can only occur successively to the events
pma1i, pmb1i.
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t0
Element i is
pma1i
tpma1
dua-failure-free
Element i is
dua-failure-free
Figure 2.7: Sequence of PM events of example 2.13
2.4 Figures of merit
2.4.1 Preliminaries
The introduced events, that are related to the failures and maintenance, influence the
condition of an SRS. In the subsequent sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, the figures of merit
definitions that are applied to the SRSs are discussed. The given definitions are formulated
in the style of [Bir10] and [Lit01].
2.4.2 Reliability and frequency of a dangerous failure (PFH)
The lifetime distribution function F (t) is given by
F (t) = Pr(TF ≤ t) , (2.7)
where TF is the random variable of the time in which the SRS continuously performs its
assigned safety function or is in spurious operation. The reliability function R(t) is the
complementary function to F (t),
R(t) = Pr(TF > t) = 1− F (t) . (2.8)
The ability of an SRS to continuously remain able to provide its safety function during
the time interval (0, t] is quantified by R(t) or F (t). The spurious operation is permitted
during this time. Usually, the R(t) and F (t) are determined bottom-up, by mathematical
modeling of TF .
The mean of the random variable TF is referred to as the mean time to failure
(MTTF ), given by
MTTF = E [TF ] =
∫ ∞
0
R(t) dt . (2.9)
The MTTF characterizes the random variable TF and the functions R(t), F (t) by use of
a single figure. Furthermore, the MTTF can be estimated top-down, by observation of
the analyzed SRS, e.g. by mean estimation via the method of moments from [HEK09].
The estimate of MTTF is given by
ˆMTTF =
1
n
n∑
i=1
tFi , (2.10)
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where tF1, . . . , tFn are the realizations of TF for the analyzed SRS. The estimated figure
ˆMTTF is applied to characterize the SRSs with unknown R(t) and F (t).
The frequency of a dangerous failure (PFH) was provided by the standard [IEC11e], as
the relevant figure of merit for the SRSs in high demand- or continuous mode of operation.
The PFH was referred to as the probability of dangerous failure per hour in numerous older
references, leading to the abbreviation PFH that is still in use today. The instantaneous
PFH is given by
PFH(t) = lim
∆t→0
F (t+ ∆t)− F (t)
∆t
. (2.11)
The PFH(t) reflects the gradient of the lifetime distribution function F (t) at the point t.
Particularly, the PFH, the average PFH for an analyzed time interval, is applied as the
relevant figure of merit for the SRSs in high demand- or continuous mode of operation.
The thresholds for the PFH were regulated by [IEC11e]. However, the focus of this thesis
is on the SRSs in low demand mode of operation. Therefore, the PFH is not further
treated. In the subsequent section 2.4.3, the availability and PFD are discussed.
2.4.3 Availability and probability of dangerous failure on demand
(PFD)
The availability function A(t) is given by
A(t) = Pr (Z(t) = 1) , (2.12)
where Z(t) is the discrete random variable defined by
Z(t) =

1, SRS either able to perform its safety function
or in spurious operation at time t
0, otherwise
. (2.13)
The ability of an SRS to perform its safety function or to be in spurious operation at a
stated instant of time t is completely characterized by use of A(t). Usually, the A(t) is
determined bottom-up, by mathematical modeling of Z(t).
The average availability in the time interval (t1, t2] is given by
A(t1, t2) =
1
t2 − t1 · E [TU(t1, t2)] =
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
A(τ) dτ , (2.14)
where TU(t1, t2) is the random variable of the time in which an SRS performs its safety
function or is in spurious operation during the time interval (t1, t2]. The mean of TU(t1, t2)
is denoted by E [TU(t1, t2)]. The A(t1, t2) can be estimated top-down, by observation of
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the analyzed SRS. The estimate of A(t1, t2) is given by
ˆ
A(t1, t2) =
1
t2 − t1 · Eˆ [TU(t1, t2)] , (2.15)
where the estimate Eˆ [TU(t1, t2)] is given by
Eˆ [TU(t1, t2)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
tU,i (2.16)
and tU,1, . . . , tU,n are the realizations of TU(t1, t2) for the analyzed SRS. The estimated
figure ˆA(t1, t2) is applied to characterize an SRS with unknown A(t1, t2).
For the SRSs in low demand mode of operation the probability of dangerous failure on
demand (PFD) was provided by [IEC11e] as the relevant figure of merit. The instanta-
neous PFD is given by
PFD(t) = 1− A(t) . (2.17)
The PFD(t) is the complementary function to the A(t) and reflects the instantaneous
unavailability. Particularly, the PFD, the average PFD for an analyzed time interval, is
applied as the relevant figure of merit for the SRSs in low demand mode of operation.
The PFD is given by
PFD(t1, t2) =
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
PFD(t) dt . (2.18)
The time interval (t1, t2], which is considered for the PFD calculation, usually comprises
the mission time interval (0, tm] of the analyzed SRS. The mission time interval starts with
the startup and lasts for the mission time until the SRS is decommissioned or replaced.
In some references, the mission time is also referred to as useful life time.
In addition to the PFD, in [IEC11c] it was proposed to evaluate the PFDmax over the
mission time of the analyzed SRS. However, no requirements have been specified for the
PFDmax. From the point of view of the author the PFDmax is an important additional
figure of merit to quantify the effectiveness of an SRS. The PFDmax over the mission time
interval is given by
PFDmax = max(PFD(t)) 0 ≤ t < tm . (2.19)
Overall, the PFD(t) is considered in this thesis as the figure of merit of major interest
for the analysis of an SRS. The further figures of merit, such as PFD and PFDmax, can
be directly determined from the PFD(t). The relation of the PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax
is shown in figure 2.8 for an SRS with redundancy and PM.
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t1 = 0
PFD
t
PFD
PFDmax
t2 = tm
Figure 2.8: Relation of the PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax
35

Chapter 3
Modeling via Stochastic and
Deterministic Timed Automata
(SDTAs)
3.1 Preliminaries
The SDTA that models an SRS is introduced in this chapter. First, the modeling assump-
tions are described immediately hereafter. In section 3.2, the definition of SDTA is given.
The procedure to determine the SDTA for an SRS with multiple elements is presented in
section 3.3. Eventually, the SDTAs are further characterized and discussed in section 3.4.
Now, the modeling assumptions are treated. The events that influence an SRS were
described in chapter 2. These events are related to failures, CM, and PM. The state
transition of a probabilistic model reflects an SRS condition change that is caused by an
occurring event. A discrete state model will be applicable to model an SRS if the following
assumption holds.
Assumption 3 (Model states and transitions). The SRS is characterized by a finite
number of states. All state transitions are deterministic. Thus, for every state an occurring
event causes a state transition to a unique adjacent state.
Usually, the probabilistic model is evaluated for the time interval that begins at startup
of the respective SRS. At startup an SRS is considered to be failure-free. Therefore, the
following assumption is introduced.
Assumption 4 (Initial model state). The initial state of the SRS model is the fully
operational and failure-free state.
The failures of an SRS are classified into multiple failure modes, as described in sub-
section 2.2.3 of the last chapter. The following assumption is introduced for the failures
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of an SRS element. This assumption is also frequently used in literature. For instance, it
was introduced in [Bir10], where it was referred to as no further failures at system down.
Assumption 5 (No further failures). No further failures occur in an SRS element as
long as the repair after the previous failure has not been completed.
The following assumption results directly from the definition of the PM, see subsection
2.3.3.
Assumption 6 (PM times). The PM is carried out at scheduled times irrespective of
the current SRS state.
At first glance it might appear useless to carry out PM if the SRS is in a failure-free
state. This assumption is better to understand if the objective of the PM is recapitulated.
That objective is to reveal undetected failures, i.e. the dua- and duab-failures, and provide
repair if necessary. Because of the undetected failures the current SRS state is usually not
known. Hence, the PM is carried out though the respective SRS might be in a failure-free
state.
3.2 SDTA definition
3.2.1 Preliminaries
The events, which were described in sections 2.2 and 2.3, are classified into the deter-
ministic timed events or exponential stochastic timed events. The former are treated in
subsection 3.2.2 and the latter in subsection 3.2.3. The events are classified in order to
model the event timing of each event class separately. In subsection 3.2.4, the definition
of an SDTA for an arbitrary number of elements is introduced. Moreover, examples are
given to illustrate the definition.
3.2.2 Deterministic timed events
The set of the deterministic timed events of an SRS model with k elements is given by
Edet =
{
pma1i, pmb1i : i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
. (3.1)
The events pma1i, pmb1i are related to the PM of the i-th element of an SRS and were
described in subsection 2.3.3.
Definition 16 (Deterministic timed event (DTE)). The DTE h is deterministically
timed via the SDTA timing mechanism for a given deterministic clock sequence Vh.
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The set of the deterministic clock sequences Vh is given by
V = {Vh : h ∈ Edet} , (3.2)
where Vh = (vh,1, . . . , vh,neh) is the deterministic clock sequence of the DTE h. The
deterministic clocks are characterized by vh,j ∈ R+, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , neh}. The length
neh of the deterministic clock sequence Vh denotes the execution number of the PM related
to the DTE h. It has to be noted that, the PM plan of an SRS that is modeled by an
SDTA is specified by V . The deterministic clocks vh,1, . . . , vh,neh give the relative times
from the activation to the occurrence of the DTE h.
Here, the activation and occurrence of events has to be briefly explained. This subject
will be detailed in subsection 3.2.4. An event becomes "active" when the SDTA enters
a state where the event is permitted to occur. Once an event is active, the SDTA might
enter a state where the event is not permitted to occur. In this case the event gets
deactivated and becomes "not active". It has to be emphasized that, in this thesis the
DTEs of an SDTA permanently remain active. This characteristic is the consequence of
assumption 6 and ensures that the PM is carried out "at predetermined intervals", see
definition 15. Hence, once a DTE becomes active, it will definitely occur when the time of
the respective deterministic clock will be passed. In contrast to the DTEs, the exponential
stochastic timed events, treated in subsection 3.2.3, do not permanently remain active.
The deterministic clock sequence of a DTE is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.1 (Deterministic clock sequence). Let the deterministic clock sequence
of pma1 be given by Vpma1 = (1000 h, 500 h, 700 h). Hence, the PM, related to pma1,
will be executed nepma1 = 3 times. The deterministic clocks define the relative times from
the activation to the occurrence of pma1. Hence, pma1 will occur at the absolute times
t1 = 1000 h, t2 = 1500 h, and t3 = 2200 h. Because pma1 permanently remains active,
the resulting t1, t2, t3 are determined by summation of the given deterministic clocks.
3.2.3 Exponential stochastic timed events
The set of the exponential stochastic timed events of an SRS model with k elements is
given by
Estoch = {EPMstoch ∪ ESF ∪ ECF ∪ ECM} , (3.3)
where EPMstoch =
{
pma2i, pmb2i : i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
is the set of the exponential stochastic
timed PM events. These events were described in subsection 2.3.3. The sets of events ESF ,
ECF , and ECM are related to the single failures, common-cause failures, and CM events.
These events were described in subsections 2.2.3 and 2.3.2.
Definition 17 (Exponential stochastic timed event (STE)). The STE h is stochas-
tically timed via the SDTA timing mechanism for a given stochastic clock sequence Wh.
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The set of the stochastic clock sequences Wh is given by
W = {Wh : h ∈ Estoch} , (3.4)
whereWh = (wh,1, wh,2, . . . ) is the stochastic clock sequence of the STE h. The stochastic
clocks wh,j ∈ R+, for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, are realizations of the random variablesWh,j. The
random variables Wh,j are characterized by the set of CDFs given by
G = {Gh : h ∈ Estoch} , (3.5)
where each CDF Gh(t), which is assigned to the STE h, is given by
Gh(t) = Pr(Wh,j ≤ t) = 1− e−λht . (3.6)
The parameter λh is the rate parameter of the exponential CDF. It is assumed that, the
stochastic clock sequences Wh = (wh,1, wh,2, . . . ) of arbitrary length will be generated via
the given set of CDFs G.
The stochastic clock sequence of an STE is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.2 (Stochastic clock sequence). Let the stochastic clock sequence Wdd
be determined by random number generation via the given exponential CDF with λdd =
1.14 · 10−6 h−1. The random result is Wdd = (1.8078 · 106 h, 7.9372 · 104 h, 1.1416 · 106 h).
The stochastic clocks of Wdd will define the relative times from the activation to the
occurrence of the STE dd if the event does not get deactivated.
3.2.4 Model of an SRS
The SDTA models an SRS that consists of an arbitrary number of elements.
Definition 18 (Stochastic and Deterministic Timed Automaton (SDTA)). The
SDTA is the seven-tuple SDTA, given by
SDTA = (X , E , ftr,Γ, xinit,V ,G) . (3.7)
The first five parameters of the SDTA define the Finite State Automaton (FSA) that
is given by definition 19. The FSA is driven by the DTEs and STEs, which are fully
specified by V and G. The DTEs and STEs are timed by the SDTA timing mechanism
that will be introduced in definition 20.
Definition 19 (Finite State Automaton (FSA)). The FSA is the five-tuple FSA,
given by
FSA = (X , E , ftr,Γ, xinit) . (3.8)
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The parameters of the FSA are as follows:
X is the set of states, X = {1, 2, . . . }, x ∈ X ;
E is the set of events that can be expressed as the union of the two disjoint sets of
events Edet and Estoch, i.e. E = {Edet ∪ Estoch}, where Edet ∩ Estoch = {};
ftr is the transition function, ftr : X × E → X ;
Γ is the active event function, Γ : X → 2E ;
xinit is the initial state.
Example 3.3 (FSA). The FSA of an SDTA that models an SRS, which consists of one
element, is discussed. The states/transitions diagram of the FSA is shown in figure 3.1.
The set of states is X = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the initial state is xinit = 1. The set of events is
E = {cmdd, dd, dua, pma1, pma2}, where pma1 is the only DTE. The indices that indicate
the relative element are omitted for clarity. The transition function for the state x = 1 is
given by
ftr(x = 1, h) =

1 if h = pma1 ,
2 if h = dd ,
3 if h = dua ,
h ∈ Γ(x = 1) ,
where the active event function for x = 1 is Γ(x = 1) = {pma1, dd, dua}. The rest of
the FSA parameters can be easily derived from the states/transitions diagram. The FSA
models the dd- and dua-failures, which might occur in the initial state. The dd-failures are
repaired by CM and restoration is indicated by cmdd. The dua-failures are first revealed
by PM indicated by pma1. After that, repair is carried out and restoration is indicated
by pma2. The active events in one particular state trigger the transitions to the adjacent
states. In the states/transitions diagram it is clearly visible that, the set of events that
might occur in a state x is a subset of the set of events E . The active event function Γ(x)
defines the set of events that might occur in a state x. It has to be emphasized that,
the PM event pma1 might occur in every state due to assumption 6. In some states the
occurrence of pma1 triggers a state transition to the same state, e.g. for x ∈ {1, 2, 4}.
These state transitions reflect the PM activities that are carried out when no dua-failure
has occurred.
The state transitions of an FSA are triggered by the occurring events, i.e. the DTEs
and STEs. The event timing mechanism determines the next occurring event and the
respective time. These are determined based on the active events in the current state
and the respective event characteristics. The active events of a state x are given by
the active event function Γ(x). The FSA of an SDTA has to ensure that the DTEs
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2 3pma1
dd
cmdd
dua
pma2
4
pma1
pma1
pma1
Figure 3.1: States/transitions diagram of the FSA in example 3.3
remain permanently active in all states. Hence, the FSA definition 19 is completed by
the following restriction:
h ∈ Γ(x), ∀h ∈ Edet, ∀x ∈ X . (3.9)
The SDTA event timing mechanism is based on the STA event timing mechanism
defined in [CL08]. The SDTA event timing mechanism provides event timing to the
logical model that is given by the FSA. In this thesis, the defined SDTA event timing
mechanism differentiates between STEs and DTEs. In contrast, the STA event timing
mechanism defined in [CL08] does not differentiate. The following notation is adopted to
avoid excessive use of subscripts:
x is the current state,
e is the most recent event (causing transition to state x).
Additionally, the following two variables associated with each event h ∈ E are defined:
nh is the current score of event h, nh ∈ {0, 1, . . . };
yh is the current clock value of event h, yh ∈ R+.
The "next" state, event, event time, score, and clock value are denoted using the prime
(′) notation as given in the following:
x′ is the next state, given by x′ = ftr(x, e′);
e′ is the next event, it is e′ ∈ Γ(x);
nh
′ is the next score of the event h (after event e′ occurs);
yh
′ is the next clock value of the event h (after event e′ occurs).
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The initial conditions are defined to determine the first event that occurs after the
initialization of an SDTA. The initial event clock values yh, for all h ∈ Γ(xinit), are given
by
yh =
vh,1 if h ∈ Γ(xinit) AND h ∈ Edet ,wh,1 if h ∈ Γ(xinit) AND h ∈ Estoch . (3.10)
The event clock values yh, for all h /∈ Γ(xinit), are undefined. The initial event scores nh,
for all h ∈ E , are given by
nh =
0 if h /∈ Γ(xinit) ,1 if h ∈ Γ(xinit) . (3.11)
The SDTA event timing mechanism iteratively generates the timed event sequence
{. . . , e, e′, e′′, . . . }. It is assumed that the most recent event is e, the current state is x,
the current event scores are nh, and the current clock values are yh, for all h ∈ E . The next
event e′ and interevent time y∗ are determined via the SDTA event timing mechanism
given below. In the initial state the most recent event e is undefined.
Definition 20 (SDTA event timing mechanism). The next occurring event e′ is
given by
e′ = arg min{yh : h ∈ Γ(x)} . (3.12)
The interevent time y∗, which is the period of time between the previous event e and the
next event e′, is given by
y∗ = min{yh : h ∈ Γ(x)} . (3.13)
The next state x′ is determined via the transition function of the SDTA, x′ = ftr(x, e′),
from the current state x and the next occurring event e′. The next clock values yh′, for
all h ∈ Γ(x′), are given by
yh
′ =

yh − y∗ if h 6= e′ AND h ∈ Γ(x) ,
vh,nh+1 if (h = e′ OR h /∈ Γ(x)) AND h ∈ Edet ,
wh,nh+1 if (h = e′ OR h /∈ Γ(x)) AND h ∈ Estoch .
(3.14)
For all h /∈ Γ(x′) the yh′ are undefined. The next event scores nh′, for all h ∈ E , are given
by
nh
′ =
nh if h 6= e′ AND h ∈ Γ(x) ,nh + 1 if h = e′ OR h /∈ Γ(x) . (3.15)
Afterwards, the event e′′, which is next to the event e′, is determined starting the next
iteration. The stochastic state sequence {xinit, . . . , x, x′, x′′, . . . } is iteratively generated
by the SDTA.
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The definition of the SDTA event timing mechanism and generation of a state sequence
appear complex at first view. However, the complexity mostly results from the formal
notation. The basic idea is quite straightforward, as pointed out below. The SDTA is
initialized via the equations (3.10), (3.11) and the following steps are iteratively executed
to generate the state sequence:
1. Compare clock values for active events and determine the next occurring event e′
via equation (3.12) and the interevent time y∗ via equation (3.13);
2. Update the state via the transition function x′ = ftr(x, e′), given by definition 19;
3. Update the clock values and event scores via equations (3.14), (3.15);
4. The "next" variables e′, y′i, n′i, x′ become current and the next iteration is restarted
at step 1.
The following example illustrates the state sequence generated by an SDTA.
Example 3.4 (SDTA state sequence). The SDTA is considered that consists of the
FSA in example 3.3. Let V , G be given by
V = {Vpma1 = (35040 h, 8760 h, 140160 h)} ,
G = {Gcmdd, Gdd, Gdua, Gpma2} ,
where the rate parameters of the exponential CDFs in G are given by
λcmdd = 0.014 h−1, λdd = 1.5 · 10−6 h−1, λdua = 1.5 · 10−6 h−1, λpma2 = 0.014 h−1 .
Let the respective stochastic clock sequences be
Wcmdd = (20 h) ,
Wdd = (148530 h, 45524 h, 65964 h) ,
Wdua = (29185 h, 2583500 h, 60405 h) ,
Wpma2 = (30 h) .
The random event and state sequences are iteratively generated by the SDTA. The steps
described above are followed to determine the sequences. These sequences are illustrated
in figure 3.2. The solid arrows mark the active events of a respective current state. The
clock value of an active event is reflected by the length of an arrow. The dotted arrows
mark an event that is deactivated. The respective times of the occurring events are given
in table 3.1.
A note on the simultaneously occurring events has to be given because these are not
considered by the timing mechanism in definition 20. First, it has to be noted that, two or
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dd
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e3 = pma2
e4 = pma1
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e5 = dd
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e6 = cmdd
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Figure 3.2: Timed sequence of events and states for example 3.4
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
29185 h 35040 h 35070 h 43800 h 80594 h 80614 h
Table 3.1: Event times of example 3.4
more STEs can occur at exactly the same time only with probability zero. This is implied
by the respective CDFs being continuous over [0,∞). The same holds for a DTE and an
STE that occur at the same time. However, multiple distinct DTEs might occur at the
same time if e.g. the PM of multiple elements is carried out simultaneously. Therefore, it
is assumed that priority rules over the event set Edet are given. These rules define which
simultaneous DTE will affect the state first and also the sequence of the further DTEs,
in case of more than two. Anyway, the final target state resulting from the sequence of
simultaneous DTEs is independent of the priority rules for the treated models. This is
due to the absence of DTE dependencies in the models that is indicated by each DTE
being active in all states. Hence, the priority rules might be arbitrarily chosen for model
implementation and evaluation of simultaneous DTEs.
The classification of SDTA states in regard to the safety function of the respective
SRS is required to calculate the PFD(t). It is introduced hereafter.
Definition 21 (State classification regarding safety function). The function that
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classifies the states of an SDTA is given by fsafety : X → Asafety,
fsafety(x) =

U if in state x SRS is either able to provide its
safety function or in spurious operation,
U otherwise.
(3.16)
Each state x is related to a safety attribute from the set Asafety = {U,U}. If x is related
to U or U is determined by the elements safety attributes and the elements structure. The
elements safety attributes of the state x are given by the function fel safety(x), see definition
22. The set of k-tuples of element safety attributes is given by U , which defines the relation
of x to U or U. Therefore, the function fsafety(x) is specified by U ,
fsafety(x) =
U if fel safety(x) ∈ U ,U otherwise. (3.17)
Hence, the SDTA states, where the respective SRS is able to provide its safety function
or is in spurious operation, are characterized by U . The set U is usually specified by the
safety engineer. U is illustrated for an SRS with a 1oo2 element structure in example
3.5. The state classifications of further MooN element structures that are treated in this
thesis are defined in appendix B.
Definition 22 (State classification regarding element safety functions). Each
state of an SDTA is related via the function fel safety : X → Ael safety × · · · × Ael safety︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
to a
k-tuple of element safety attributes, where the set of element safety attributes is given by
Ael safety = {Uel,Uel}. The function fel safety is given by
fel safety(x) = (AVel safety,1, . . . ,AVel safety,i, . . . ,AVel safety,k) ,
where
AVel safety,i =

Uel if in state x element i is either able to provide its
element safety function or in spurious operation,
Uel otherwise.
(3.18)
Example 3.5 (State classification). The SDTA that models an SRS with k = 2
elements with the 1oo2 element structure is given. The 1oo2 element structure implies
that two redundant elements provide the same element safety function. The set U for the
given model is given by
U = {(Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel)} ,
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see appendix B for the definitions of U for further element structures. The set U includes
tuples of the element safety attributes. These tuples characterize the states where the SRS
is able to provide its safety function or is in spurious operation. The given specification of
U implies that, a state x will be classified by U if at least one element is able to provide
its element safety function or is in spurious operation.
It has to be noted that, each SDTA state x ∈ X \{xinit} reflects the information about
the occurred failure events in the k elements of the modeled SRS. The only exception is
the initial failure-free state xinit. This information is stored via k-tuples of element failure
mode attributes, which will be introduced in subsection 3.3.2.
3.3 Procedure to model SRS with multiple elements
3.3.1 Preliminaries
The SDTA aims to model an SRS that consists of multiple possibly dependent elements.
The modeling procedure to determine the SDTA for such an SRS usually requires high
effort due to the large number of states and dependencies between the elements. The
separate modeling of individual elements and automatic composition of the entire model
reduce the effort of modeling. In the following, a suitable procedure is presented. In
subsection 3.3.2, the SDTA that models an SRS element is introduced. The composition
operation for SDTAs is presented in subsection 3.3.3. The modeling of dependent SRS
elements is treated in subsection 3.3.4. Based on that, the dependencies that are caused
by common-cause failures are modeled in subsection 3.3.5. Furthermore, the modeling
of selected dependencies between elements, such as repair priorities and inhibition, are
covered in appendices C.1 and C.2.
3.3.2 The SRS element
Let an SRS consist of k elements. The i-th SRS element, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, is modeled by
the SDTA that is defined hereafter.
Definition 23 (SDTA modeling the i-th SRS element). The SDTA is given by
SDTAi = (X i, E i, f itr,Γi, xiinit,V i,Gi) , (3.19)
where the parameters are as follows:
X i = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6};
E i = E idet ∪ E istoch, where E idet = {pma1i, pmb1i} and
E istoch = {si, ddi, duabi, duai, dni, cmsi,mdi};
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V i = {(vpma1i,1, . . . , vpma1i,nepma1i ), (vpmb1i,1, . . . , vpmb1i,nepmb1i )};
Gi = {Gsi , Gddi , Gduabi , Gduai , Gdni , Gcmsi , Gmdi}.
It has to be mentioned that, the set of STEs that is given by E istoch is defined in
appendix A. In contrast to the set of STEs that was introduced in equation (3.3) of
subsection 3.2.3, the former set E istoch includes modifications to reduce the number of
SDTA states. These modifications are in detail described in appendix A and lead to the
SDTA that models the i-th SRS element. The states/transitions diagram of this SDTA is
shown in figure 3.3. The transitions that are triggered by the STEs and DTEs are drawn
by the solid and dashed arrows respectively. The set of element failure mode attributes
is given by
Ael fm = {OK, S,DR,DUAB,DUA,DN} . (3.20)
The element failure mode attributes are related to the failure modes applied in this thesis,
see subsection 2.2.3. Additionally, the modifications introduced in appendix A are applied.
1
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Figure 3.3: States/transitions diagram of the SDTA modeling an SRS element
Definition 24 (Element failure mode attributes). The elements of the set Ael fm are
defined as follows:
OK: Element is fully operational and able to provide its element safety function;
S: An s-failure occurred and has not been restored yet, i.e. spurious operation of
element safety function;
DR: A dd-, dua-, or duab-failure occurred, has been detected or revealed, and has
not been restored yet, i.e. element safety function is prevented from operating;
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DUAB: A duab-failure occurred, has not been revealed, and has not been restored
yet, i.e. element safety function is prevented from operating;
DUA: A dua-failure occurred, has not been revealed, and has not been restored yet,
i.e. element safety function is prevented from operating;
DN: A dn-failure occurred, i.e. element safety function is prevented from operating.
A k-tuples of element failure mode attributes is related to each SDTA state via the
state elements failure mode classification function fel fm, given in definition 25. The func-
tion fel fm is defined for an SDTA that models an SRS consisting of k elements.
Definition 25 (State classification regarding failure modes). Each state of an
SDTA is related via the function fel fm : X → Ael fm × · · · × Ael fm︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
to a k-tuple of element
failure mode attributes. The function fel fm is given by
fel fm(x) = (AVel fm,1, . . . ,AVel fm,j, . . . ,AVel fm,k) ,
where
AVel fm,j =

OK if in state x element j is characterized by OK,
S if in state x element j is characterized by S,
DR if in state x element j is characterized by DR,
DUAB if in state x element j is characterized by DUAB,
DUA if in state x element j is characterized by DUA,
DN if in state x element j is characterized by DN.
(3.21)
Example 3.6 (State classification of an SDTA regarding failure modes). The
SDTA that models an SRS with k = 1 element is given. The SDTA is specified by
definition 23 and illustrated by the states/transitions diagram in figure 3.3. The respective
element failure mode attributes are given by definition 24. The function fel fm is given by
fel fm(x) =

OK if x = 1,
S if x = 2,
DR if x = 3,
DUAB if x = 4,
DUA if x = 5,
DN if x = 6.
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The state elements safety classification function fel safety is given by the definition 22.
Hence, the respective fel safety for the treated SDTA is given by
fel safety(x) =
Uel if x ∈ {1, 2},Uel if x ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}.
3.3.3 Parallel composition
The SDTAs that model individual elements are combined to the SDTA that models an
entire SRS via the parallel composition of SDTAs that is introduced below. This operation
is based on the parallel composition of deterministic automata, which was presented in
[CL08]. Let the k elements of an SRS be given by SDTAi = (X i, E i, f itr,Γi, xiinit,V i,Gi),
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The parallel composition of SDTAs of SDTAp and SDTAr, where
p, r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, is defined hereafter.
Definition 26 (Parallel composition of SDTAs). The SDTA that results via the
parallel composition of SDTAs is given by
SDTAp || SDTAr = (X , E , ftr,Γ, xinit,V ,G) , (3.22)
where the individual parameters are determined as follows:
The set of states is given by X = {X p ×X r};
The set of events is given by E = {Ep ∪ Er};
The transition function ftr is given by
ftr((x
p, xr), e) :=

(fptr(x
p, e), f rtr(x
r, e)) if e ∈ Γp(xp) ∩ Γr(xr) ,
(fptr(x
p, e), xr) if e ∈ Γp(xp) \ Er ,
(xp, f rtr(x
r, e)) if e ∈ Γr(xr) \ Ep ;
The active event function is given by
Γ(xp, xr) = [Γp(xp) ∩ Γr(xr)] ∪ [Γp(xp) \ Er] ∪ [Γr(xr) \ Ep] ;
The initial state is given by xinit = (xpinit, xrinit) ;
The set of deterministic clock sequences is given by V = {Vp ∪ Vr} ;
The set of CDFs is given by G = {Gp ∪ Gr} .
50
3.3 Procedure to model SRS with multiple elements
An example is given hereafter to illustrate the parallel composition of SDTAs. It has to
be noted that, the SDTAs that are composed in example 3.7 possess only private events.
This is because these SDTAs are models of independent SRS elements. The dependent
elements will be treated in subsection 3.3.4.
Example 3.7 (Parallel composition of SDTAs). The two given SDTAs, SDTA1 and
SDTA2, are combined via the parallel composition of SDTAs. The states/transitions
diagrams of SDTA1, SDTA2 are shown in figure 3.4. Let the SDTA that results via the
parallel composition be SDTA = SDTA1 || SDTA2. The SDTA is determined via the
definition 26. Selected parameters of the SDTA are the following:
X = {1ˆ, 2ˆ} × {1, 2, 3} = {(1ˆ, 1), (1ˆ, 2), (1ˆ, 3), (2ˆ, 1), (2ˆ, 2), (2ˆ, 3)};
E = {dd1,md1} ∪ {dua2,md2, pma12};
xinit = (1ˆ, 1).
The full expressions of the relative transition function ftr(x, e) and active event func-
tion Γ(x) are omitted in this example. These functions can be deduced from the given
states/transitions diagram. The states/transitions diagram of the SDTA is shown in
figure 3.5.
SDTA1 SDTA2
2 3pma12
pma12
1
OK DUA DR
pma12
dua2
md2
1ˆ
OK
2ˆ
DR
md1 dd1
Figure 3.4: States/transitions diagrams of SDTA1, SDTA2
3.3.4 Dependent SRS elements
The introduced modeling framework comprising the SDTA and parallel composition pro-
vides features that enable to treat elements which depend on each other. It has to be
emphasized that, two types of events are differentiated by the parallel composition of
SDTAs, defined in subsection 3.3.3. The private events are these events, which appear
only in one of the combined SDTAs, i.e. e ∈ Γp(xp) \ Er or e ∈ Γr(xr) \ Ep. In contrast,
the common events appear in both SDTAs, i.e. e ∈ Γp(xp) ∩ Γr(xr). The private and
common events are treated differently in the parallel composition of SDTAs. It is clearly
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1ˆ,2 1ˆ,3pma12
pma12
1ˆ,1
OK,OK OK,DUA OK,DR
pma12
dua2
md2
2ˆ,2 2ˆ,3pma12
pma12
2ˆ,1
DR,OK DR,DUA DR,DR
pma12
dua2
md2
md1 dd1 md1 dd1 md1 dd1
Figure 3.5: States/transitions diagram of SDTA = SDTA1 || SDTA2
evident in definition 26, where the transition function ftr is determined. The private
events are not subject of constraints in the parallel composition and can occur indepen-
dently. Independent elements have only this type of events. A common event can only
simultaneously occur in both elements. The respective SDTAs are synchronized by the
parallel composition. Hence, both elements participate on the common events. These
events can be applied to model dependencies between elements.
Dependencies of elements might strongly influence the probabilistic figures of merit of
a system. Therefore, it is important to model dependencies if these are present. However,
SRS elements might depend on each other in many different ways that can all not be
treated in this thesis. Selected dependencies of elements are described, such as common-
cause failures, repair priorities, and inhibition, see subsection 3.3.5 and appendix C.
3.3.5 SRS elements with common-cause failures
The groups of two or more redundant elements of an SRS, which independently implement
the same element safety function, are subject to the common-cause failures. The common-
cause failures are not part of an individual element model. Thus, the common-cause
failures are considered to be caused by dependencies between elements. Accordingly, the
common-cause failure can not be modeled by combination of the SDTAs of independent
elements. The additional state transitions, which result from the common-cause failures,
have to be separately modeled.
The common-cause failures were described in subsection 2.2.3. The groups of redun-
dant SRS elements are specified in equation (2.2). The events that indicate the common-
cause failures are defined in equation (2.4). The procedure to model a group of redundant
SRS elements with common-cause failures is described below.
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It is assumed that, the SDTA that models an SRS with a group of redundant elements
is given. Let the group of redundant elements have the elements number set GE j, as
defined by equation (2.2). In total, the entire treated SRS might include m groups of
redundant elements, i.e. j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The common-cause failures are modeled by
additional state transitions that are inserted into the respective SDTA. These transitions
are triggered by the STEs that are related to the common-cause failures. Altogether,
one additional transition for each failure mode is introduced. The additional transitions
connect the initial failure-free state with the states where failures of the relevant identical
failure mode occurred in all redundant elements. In total, five additional transitions per
group of redundant elements are introduced.
Finally, the rate parameters of the introduced STEs, which are related to the common-
cause failures, are determined. In this thesis, the so-called Beta model, which was de-
scribed in [IEC11d], is applied to determine the rate parameters. The Beta model exten-
sion, which was introduced in [HLHH10] to consider the varying sensitivity of different
element structures of SRSs to the common-cause failures, is applied as well. The rate pa-
rameters of the common-cause failures are determined from the rate parameters of single
failures of the redundant elements, by use of the following equations:
λsGEj = CMooN · βsGEj ·min{λh : h ∈ Es}, Es = {si : i ∈ GE j} ,
λddGEj = CMooN · βddGEj ·min{λh : h ∈ Edd}, Edd = {ddi : i ∈ GE j} ,
λduabGEj = CMooN · βduabGEj ·min{λh : h ∈ Eduab}, Eduab = {duabi : i ∈ GE j} ,
λduaGEj = CMooN · βduaGEj ·min{λh : h ∈ Edua}, Edua = {duai : i ∈ GE j} ,
λdnGEj = CMooN · βdnGEj ·min{λh : h ∈ Edn}, Edn = {dni : i ∈ GE j} .
(3.23)
The index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is related to the j-th group of redundant elements with common-
cause failures. The parameter CMooN is the modification factor, which was introduced in
[HLHH10]. It depends on the respective element structure of the group. The parameters
βsGEj , βddGEj , βduabGEj , βduaGEj , βdnGEj denote the fractions of common-cause failures for
the respective failure modes.
The example 3.8 illustrates the procedure to model the common-cause failures.
Example 3.8 (Common-cause dd-failures). Let the two SDTAs, SDTA1 and SDTA2,
be given. The respective states/transitions diagrams are given in figure 3.6. Moreover,
the states/transitions diagram of SDTA is also shown in this figure. The SDTA is the
model that consists of the two elements given by SDTA1 and SDTA2. Let the two ele-
ments be redundant elements that are subject to the common-cause failures. Hence, the
SDTA is extended by additional transition to model the common-cause failures. The
states/transitions diagram of the extended SDTA is given in figure 3.7. The additional
transition that is relative to the common-cause failures is drawn by the bold arrow. The
rate parameter of the respective STE ddGEj is calculated via the equation (3.23) and is
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given by
λddGEj = C1oo2 · βddGEj ·min{λdd1 , λdd2} .
SDTA1 SDTA2
21
OK DR
1ˆ
OK
2ˆ
DR
md1 dd1
dd2
md2
1ˆ,1
OK,OK
2ˆ,1
DR,OK
md1 dd1
1ˆ,2
OK,DR
2ˆ,2
DR,DR
md1 dd1
dd2
dd2
md2
md2
SDTA = SDTA1||SDTA2
Figure 3.6: States/transitions diagrams of SDTA1, SDTA2, and SDTA
1ˆ,1
OK,OK
2ˆ,1
DR,OK
1ˆ,2
OK,DR
2ˆ,2
DR,DR
ddGEj
Transitions relative to
Transition relative to
single element failures
common-cause dd-failures
Figure 3.7: States/transitions diagram of SDTA modeling common-cause dd-failures
3.4 Discussion on SDTAs
The introduced SDTA is discussed in this section. An SDTA generates random event and
state sequences that were demonstrated in example 3.4. This example and the discussion
of the state sequence generation provided deep insight into the SDTAs. In the following,
the relation of an SDTA to further models and probabilistic evaluation is discussed. The
focus is to provide efficient calculation of the state probabilities and PFD(t).
An SDTA is based on the Stochastic Timed Automaton with Poisson clock structure
(STAP) that was defined in [CL08]. It results from the extension of the STAP by an
additional type of events, the DTEs. If the set of deterministic clock sequences is empty,
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the SDTA will be identical to an STAP. Moreover, if the set of exponential stochastic clock
sequences is empty, the SDTA will be an automaton with purely deterministic timing
(DTA). The SDTA is understood as a model where an STAP and a DTA are embedded.
These two are sequentially evaluated within the SDTA. The following example illustrates
that.
Example 3.9 (SDTA decomposition). The SDTA of example 3.4 is given. It is
decomposed into the embedded STAP and DTA. In figure 3.8, two states/transitions
diagrams are given to illustrate the respective automata. On the left, the diagram shows
the STAP that is triggered by STEs. The diagram on the right shows the DTA that is
triggered by the DTEs, which is here pma1.
1
2 3
dd
cmdd
dua
pma2
4
1
2 3
pma1
4
pma1
pma1
pma1
Embedded STAP Embedded DTA
Figure 3.8: Embedded automata of SDTA in example 3.9
The state transitions of the SDTA that are triggered by the STEs or DTE are evaluated
by the STAP or DTA, respectively. Let the SDTA be initialized and the STE dua occur
after that. A transition from state 1 to state 3 is triggered in the embedded STAP. Let now
the DTE pma1 occur. This triggers the DTA to be initialized in state 3 and a transition
from state 3 to state 4. After that, the STAP is reinitialized in state 4 and remains there
until the next STE occurs or until the next DTE will trigger the DTA.
The described nature of an SDTA will be used for its probabilistic evaluation. A
further characteristic of the SDTA is essential for that: The DTEs remain permanently
active in all states and therefore occur in predetermined intervals. This characteristic
is part of the SDTA definition, see equation (3.9). The predetermined intervals define
the time intervals where the embedded STAP of the SDTA is active. In these intervals,
the STAP exclusively defines the occurring events and state transitions of the SDTA. In
between, the embedded DTA is initialized and triggers transitions related to the DTEs.
The state probabilities will be calculated based on the embedded STAP and DTA. The
state probabilities of the STAP were investigated in literature, see [CL08], via the Markov
chains (MCs). This method can be applied in the predetermined intervals between the
DTEs to calculate the state probabilities of the SDTA. In addition to that, the state
transitions triggered by DTEs occur at predetermined times. These state transitions
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can not be modeled via MCs. Therefore, the phase transitions of the MCs have to be
introduced. These enable to model the state transitions triggered by DTEs. The state
probabilities of the SDTA will be calculated via the MCs with phase transitions, the
so-called Multi-phase MCs.
It has been investigated in literature that the Multi-phase MCs provide an efficient
calculation of state probabilities, see [FF11]. In the next chapter, they will be applied
to calculate the state probabilities of the SDTAs. However, the application of the SDTA
provides numerous advantages for probabilistic modeling of SRSs. It provides a close
connection to the concepts of the SRSs and enables straightforward modeling of an SRS
under consideration of the dependencies of individual elements. Individual elements can
be modeled separately and composed to the entire model. Furthermore, insight into
further types of probabilistic models is provided, which are based on automata and feature
different timing of events.
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Chapter 4
Probabilistic evaluation of the SDTAs
via Multi-phase Continuous-time
Markov Chains (MP-CMCs)
4.1 Preliminaries
The last chapter treated the modeling of an SRS via the SDTA. A modeling procedure
was introduced to determine the SDTA for an SRS that consists of multiple possibly de-
pendent elements. This chapter treats the probabilistic evaluation of a determined SDTA.
The PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax are determined based on state probability calculations of
the Multi-phase Continuous-time Markov Chains. The provided framework for the prob-
abilistic evaluation will be applied in chapters 5, 6 to analyze the models and optimize
the PM plans.
The structure of the chapter is outlined hereafter. First, the MP-CMC definition is
introduced in section 4.2. The procedure to determine the PFD(t) via the MP-CMC is
described. In section 4.3, the transformation to determine the MP-CMC for a given SDTA
is presented. Finally, the PM plans and PM strategies, which imply restrictions on the
PM plans, are introduced in section 4.4.
4.2 MP-CMC definition
The MP-CMC is closely related to the MP-DMC. The MP-DMCs were applied in [Gab10],
referred to as the Safety Multiphase Markov Models. The extension of the MP-DMCs for
continuous-time leads to the MP-CMCs. The MP-CMCs enable the use of variable-step
ODE solvers providing efficient computation of the state probabilities.
Definition 27 (Multi-phase Continuous-time Markov Chain (MP-CMC)). The
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MP-CMC that models an SRS with k elements is the seven-tupleMP- CMC, given by
MP- CMC = (XMC ,pinit,Q, T ,M, cPFD, tm) . (4.1)
The parameters of the MP-CMC are as follows:
XMC = {1, . . . , n} is the set of states, |XMC | = n;
pinit =
[
pinit,1 . . . pinit,n
]
is the initial state probabilities row vector of dimension
n, where
n∑
j=1
pinit,j = 1;
Q is the square transition rates matrix of dimension n× n;
T = (Ta,1, Tb,1, . . . , Ta,k, Tb,k) is the sequence of phase transition time sequences Th,r,
where Th,r = (th,r,1, . . . , th,r,neh,r), h ∈ {a, b}, r ∈ {1, . . . , k};
M = (Ma,1,Mb,1, . . . ,Ma,k,Mb,k) is the sequence of phase transition matricesMh,r,
where the phase transition time sequence Th,r is related to each n×n phase transition
matrix Mh,r, h ∈ {a, b}, r ∈ {1, . . . , k};
cPFD is the state selection column vector of dimension n that is used to select the
states where the modeled SRS is not able to provide its safety function;
tm is the SRS mission time that is evaluated to determine the PFD.
The MP- CMC is applied in this thesis to determine the relevant figures of merit
of a modeled SRS. The PFD(t) is determined first. Afterwards, the PFD and PFDmax
are determined from the PFD(t) under consideration of the given mission time tm, see
subsection 2.4.3. The PFD(t) reflects the instantaneous probability that the SRS is in
a state, where it is not able to provide its safety function. Consequently, the PFD(t) is
determined via
PFD(t) = p(t) · cPFD , (4.2)
where p(t) =
[
p1(t) p2(t) . . . pn(t)
]
is the state probabilities row vector. The relevant
states to determine the PFD(t) are selected via the state selection vector cPFD. In equation
(4.2), the relevant state probabilities are summed up and yield the PFD(t).
The state probabilities vector p(t) of a given MP- CMC has to be calculated to
determine the respective PFD(t). The p(t) is characterized by the system of ordinary
differential equations (ODEs) that is given by
p˙ = p(t) ·Q . (4.3)
The system of ODEs in equation (4.3) is linear and homogeneous. It is based on the bal-
ance of the state probability flows in theMP- CMC. The balance of the state probability
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flows of the state i is given by the ODE
dpi(t)
dt
=
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
pj(t)qj,i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflows
− pi(t)
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
qi,j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflows
, (4.4)
where qj,i are the transition rates related to the inflows and qi,j are related to the outflows.
In figure 4.1, the state probability inflows and outflows of the state i are illustrated. The
transition rates related to the inflows are located in the i-th column of the matrix Q and
these related to the outflows are located in the i-th row. In equation (4.4), the derivation
of the state probability of state i equals the total state probability inflow minus the total
outflow. The equation (4.4) can be rewritten by
dpi(t)
dt
=
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
pj(t)qj,i + pi(t)qi,i , (4.5)
since the diagonal elements of Q are equal to the negative sum of the transition rates
related to the outflows,
qi,i = −
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
qi,j . (4.6)
The i-th diagonal element of Q, which is denoted by qi,i, reflects the negative transition
rate for a state transition from the state i to an arbitrary adjacent state. The state
probabilities behave as conserved quantities that were initialized by pinit. Hence, the sum
of the elements of Q that are located in one row equals zero.
i
1
qi,1
1
q1,i
n
...
n
...
qn,i qi,n
Q =

q1,1 . . . q1,i . . . q1,n
... . . .
... . . .
...
qi,1 . . . qi,i . . . qi,n
... . . .
... . . .
...
qn,1 . . . qn,i . . . qn,n

Figure 4.1: State probability flows of state i and transition rates matrix Q
The state probabilities vector p(t) is piecewise defined due to the discontinuities caused
by the phase transitions. The procedure to piecewise calculate p(t) is described hereafter.
For the time interval 0 ≤ t < th,r,1, before the first phase transition has occurred, p(t)
is the solution of the initial value problem given by the ODEs in equation (4.3) and the
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initial condition given by
p(t = 0) = pinit =
[
pinit,1 pinit,2 . . . pinit,n
]
. (4.7)
For each phase transition that occurs at t = th,r,s, the state probabilities vector p(t) is
instantly manipulated via
p(th,r,s) = p(th,r,s−) ·Mh,r, ∀th,r,s ∈ Th,r , (4.8)
where p(th,r,s−) is the left-sided limit that is given by
p(th,r,s−) = lim
t→th,r,s
p(t) . (4.9)
It is the limit of p(t) as t increases in value approaching th,r,s.
It is evident that, the phase transitions redistribute the state probabilities at the times
th,r,s, for all h ∈ {a, b}, r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and s ∈ {1, . . . , neh,r}. The state probabilities
vector is modified by multiplication with the phase transition matricesMh,r, see equation
(4.8). The phase transitions describe the impact of the PM on the SRS behavior, which
is characterized by the state probabilities vector p(t). The initial condition for the next
time interval, for th,r,s ≤ t, is given by p(th,r,s). It is determined in equation (4.8) by
multiplication of the state probabilities p(th,r,s−) of the previous time interval with a
phase transition matrix. The vector p(t) is calculated for the next time interval by
solving the initial value problem with the updated initial condition. Step by step, p(t) is
piecewise calculated over the mission time tm. The phase transitions cause discontinuities
of p(t). The described procedure to piecewise calculate p(t) is illustrated by the following
example.
Example 4.1 (Calculation of the state probabilities vector of an MP- CMC).
TheMP- CMC1 is given, which models an SRS that consists of one element. Only the
undetected failures were modeled. These failures are revealed and the SRS is immediately
repaired via the PM. The repair duration is neglected, i.e. the restoration instantly occurs
after a failure is revealed. The states/transitions diagram of theMP- CMC1 is shown in
figure 4.2. TheMP- CMC1 parameters are given as follows:
XMC = {1, 2}; pinit =
[
1 0
]
; Q =
[
−λ λ
0 0
]
; cPFD =
[
0 1
]
; tm = 60000 h;
T = (Ta,1), Ta,1 = (ta,1,1), ta,1,1 = 20000 h;
M = (Ma,1), Ma,1 =
[
1 0
1 0
]
.
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The system of ODEs, which characterizes the state probabilities vector p(t) =
[
p1 p2
]
of theMP- CMC1, is given by
[
p˙1 p˙2
]
=
[
p1 p2
]
·
[
−λ λ
0 0
]
.
The time intervals of the piecewise defined state probabilities p1(t), p2(t) are given by
Interval 1: 0 h ≤ t < 20000 h ,
Interval 2: 20000 h ≤ t < 60000 h .
The initial condition of the initial value problem that defines p(t) for the interval 1 is
given by [
p1(t = 0) p2(t = 0)
]
= pinit =
[
1 0
]
,
and the initial condition for the interval 2 is given by[
p1(t = ta,1,1) p2(t = ta,1,1)
]
=
[
p1(t = ta,1,1
−) p2(t = ta,1,1−)
]
·Ma,1 .
The calculated state probabilities p1(t), p2(t) are plotted in figure 4.3 for the transition
rate λ = 1.5 · 10−5. The discontinuities that are caused by the phase transition appear in
the plots of p1(t) and p2(t) for t = 20000 h. The PFD(t) equals the state probability of
the state 2, i.e. p2(t) = PFD(t).
21
λ
Figure 4.2: States/transitions diagram ofMP- CMC1
4.3 SDTA transformation into MP-CMC
The transformation to determine the MP-CMC for a given SDTA is introduced below.
Before the transformation is introduced, two particular characteristics of SDTAs are dis-
cussed. These characteristics have to be considered to ensure that the SDTA transforma-
tion into MP-CMC exists for a given SDTA.
It has to be noted that, the state transition from state i to state j of an SDTA might be
triggered by multiple STEs. This is not reasonable for modeling of SRSs, but permitted
by automata theory. In that case, in order to enable the SDTA transformation into MP-
CMC, the multiple STEs have to be replaced by a single substitutional STE. The rate
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Figure 4.3: State probabilities p1, p2 ofMP- CMC1 in example 4.1
parameter of the substitutional STE is calculated as the sum of the rate parameters of
all the multiple STEs for a given state transition. This calculation is enabled by the
superposition of exponential CDFs.
Another characteristic of the SDTAs also has to be discussed. An STE that triggers
state transitions with the same start and end state might occur, i.e. from state i to state
j, where i = j. Such STEs are permitted by automata theory. However, these STEs
do not have any impact that is relevant for state probabilities calculation. Hence, these
STEs are not considered for the transformation of an SDTA into the MP-CMC.
Let an SDTA be given by SDTA = (X , E , ftr,Γ, xinit,V ,G), equivalent to the definition
18. The respectiveMP- CMC = (XMC ,pinit,Q, T ,M, cPFD, tm) is denoted equivalent to
the definition 27. The definitions given below enable to determine the parameters of the
MP- CMC from the parameters of the given SDTA.
Definition 28 (Calculation of XMC). The states set XMC is given by
XMC = X = {1, 2, . . . , n} . (4.10)
TheMP- CMC states set XMC is identical to the SDTA states set X .
Definition 29 (Calculation of pinit). The initial state probabilities vector pinit =[
pinit,1 pinit,2 . . . pinit,n
]
is given by
pinit,i =
1 if i = xinit0 else , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} . (4.11)
The pinit is determined from the initial state xinit of the SDTA.
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Definition 30 (Calculation of Q). The transition rates matrix Q is given by
qi,j =

λh if transition from state i to state j exists and
is triggered by STE h with rate parameter λh,
0 otherwise,
i 6= j ,
qi,i = −
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
qi,j ,
(4.12)
where qi,j with the indices i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are the elements of the n× n matrix Q.
The matrix Q is related to the adjacency matrix of the SDTA states/transitions dia-
gram that includes only the transitions triggered by an STE. In contrast to an adjacency
matrix, the entries of Q are weighted by the rate parameters of the respective STEs, see
definition 30. As mentioned at the beginning of the current section, the STEs that trigger
state transitions with the same start and end state are not considered. The diagonal ele-
ments of Q are determined via equation (4.6). Moreover, each state transition is assumed
to be triggered by only one STE. Otherwise, the transition rate matrix Q can not be
determined via definition 30. Therefore, a substitutional STE can be introduced for each
state transition that is triggered by multiple STEs.
Definition 31 (Calculation of T ). Let Ta,r, Tb,r, r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, be the phase transition
time sequences related to the element r. The elements of Th,r = (th,r,1, . . . , th,r,neh,r),
h ∈ {a, b}, are given by
ta,r,s =
s∑
i=1
vpma1r,i , s ∈ {1, . . . , nea,r} ,
tb,r,s =
s∑
i=1
vpmb1r,i , s ∈ {1, . . . , neb,r} ,
(4.13)
where vpma1r,i, vpmb1r,i are the i-th deterministic clocks of the DTEs pma1r, pmb1r.
It has to be noted that, a time of a given phase transition time sequence Th,r =
(th,r,1, . . . , th,r,neh,r) will have an impact on the PFD(t) within the evaluated time interval
only if it complies with the inequality given by,
0 < th,r,s < tm , (4.14)
for all h ∈ {a, b}, r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and s ∈ {1, . . . , neh,r}. The given inequality is explained
by the fact that, a PM that is carried out before startup or after decommissioning has
no impact on the PFD(t) of an SRS during the time span of interest. Hence, only these
times th,r,s that comply with the given inequality are considered to calculate the PFD(t).
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Definition 32 (Calculation of M). Let Ma,r, Mb,r, r ∈ {1, . . . , p}, be the phase
transition matrices related to the element r. The elements of Ma,r, Mb,r are given by
mi,j =

1 if transition from state i to state j exists
and is triggered by the relevant DTE,
0 otherwise,
(4.15)
with the indices i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The relevant DTE forMa,r is pma1r and respectively
pmb1r for Mb,r.
The matrices Ma,r, Mb,r are these adjacency matrices of the SDTA states/transitions
diagram, where only the state transitions that are triggered by pma1r, pmb1r are consid-
ered. The phase transition time sequence that is related to Mh,r is Th,r, h ∈ {a, b}.
Definition 33 (Calculation of cPFD). The states selection vector cPFD, where cPFD =[
cPFD,1 cPFD,2 . . . cPFD,n
]T
, is given by
cPFD,i =
1 if fsafety(i) = U,0 otherwise, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} . (4.16)
The introduced definitions enable to determine the MP-CMC for a given SDTA. An
example is given hereafter to illustrate the SDTA transformation into an MP-CMC.
Example 4.2 (SDTA transformation into MP-CMC). Let the SDTA be given that
was treated in examples 3.3 and 3.4. The respective MP-CMC was determined. The
states set is given by XMC = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The initial state probabilities vector is given by
pinit =
[
1 0 0 0
]
. The elements of the 4× 4 transition rates matrix Q, which are not
equal to zero, are given by
q1,1 = −(λdd + λdua), q1,2 = λdd, q1,3 = λdua,
q2,1 = λcmdd, q2,2 = −λcmdd,
q4,1 = λpma2, q4,4 = −λpma2 .
The phase transition time sequence is given by Ta = (35040, 43800, 183960), where the
respective times are specified in hours (h). The relevant DTE to determine the phase
transition matrix is pma1. The elements of the phase transition matrix Ma, which are
not equal to zero, are given by
m1,1 = 1, m2,2 = 1, m3,4 = 1, m4,4 = 1 .
The states selection vector is given by cPFD =
[
0 1 1 1
]
. The determined MP-CMC
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enables to calculate the state probabilities vector p(t), PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax for a
given interval of interest 0 ≤ t < tm.
4.4 Preventive maintenance (PM) plans and strategies
4.4.1 Preliminaries
A PM plan was described above in subsection 2.3.3. After that, it has been briefly
mentioned that the PM plan is specified by the set of deterministic clock sequences of
an SDTA. In this section, the PM plan is defined based on an MP-CMC. First, the
definition of a PM plan is introduced immediately hereafter. Afterwards, the restrictions
on a PM plan are discussed, formulated and defined. Finally, the PM strategies, which
will be treated in this thesis, are defined. The PM strategies are based on the introduced
restrictions.
4.4.2 Definition of PM plan
A PM plan defines the schedule of the applied PM to a given SRS. The applied PM
includes for each element the PM type A and B, where each includes the PM activities
that reveal failures and the PM activities that provide repair and result in restoration
if necessary. Let the model of an SRS with k elements be given by an MP-CMC as in
definition 27.
Definition 34 (PM plan). The PM plan is given by the sequence of phase transition
time sequences T = (Ta,1, Tb,1, . . . , Ta,k, Tb,k).
Each phase transition time sequence Th,i = (th,i,1, . . . , th,i,neh,i), for all h ∈ {a, b},
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, specifies the times of the phase transitions that are related to the PM type
A or B of the i-th SRS element. The particular impact of a PM type A or B of element i
is given by the phase transition matrix Mh,i. It has to be noted that, the impact of each
PM type A or B is considered to be build in into the SRS and therefore it can not be
varied. In contrast, the times of the PM are considered to be variable.
4.4.3 Restrictions on PM plans
The restrictions on the PM plans are treated in this thesis for the purposes to: (1)
illustrate the characteristics of the introduced models and (2) identify, classify, and analyze
the restrictions. The probabilistic models, which are applied in literature, imply several
restrictions on the PM plans, such as simultaneous PM for all elements and periodically
scheduled with equal periods. These restrictions mostly aim to reduce the complexity
of the models and are only rarely motivated by application-related restrictions. One
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important objective of this thesis is to find out if it is beneficial to overcome particular
restrictions. The treated restrictions on a PM plan are introduced hereafter.
The first restriction aims to limit the effort that is required for the PM. It will be
enabled to compare different PM plans with identical characteristics in regard to this
effort. Therefore, the execution numbers of each particular PM type A or B of each
element of a PM plan are restricted to be constant.
Definition 35 (Constant execution numbers of PM). Each execution of a PM is
modeled by a respective phase transition. The numbers of the phase transition times are
specified for a PM plan and remain constant. These numbers are given by neh,i, for all
h ∈ {a, b}, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
The next two restrictions result in simultaneously executed PM type A or B for all
elements of an SRS.
Definition 36 (Simultaneous PM type A). The phase transition time sequences Ta,i,
which are related to PM type A for all elements, are given by the phase transition time
sequence Ta,SRS,
Ta,SRS = (ta,SRS,1, . . . , ta,SRS,nea,SRS) . (4.17)
Hence, it is Ta,i = Ta,SRS for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Definition 37 (Simultaneous PM type B). The phase transition time sequences Tb,i,
which are related to PM type B for all elements, are given by the phase transition time
sequence Tb,SRS,
Tb,SRS = (tb,SRS,1, . . . , tb,SRS,neb,SRS) . (4.18)
Hence, it is Tb,i = Tb,SRS for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Example 4.3 (Simultaneous PM type A). Let theMP- CMC of an SRS with three
elements be given. The phase transition time sequences that are related to the PM type
A of each element are given by Ta,i = (ta,i,1, ta,i,2), for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The restriction
of definition 36 is applied to provide simultaneously executed PM type A for all three
elements. Hence, the phase transition time sequences Ta,i, for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are equal
and given by Ta,SRS = (ta,SRS,1, ta,SRS,2), where ta,SRS,1 = 3.5 years and ta,SRS,2 = 7 years.
In example 4.3 it is shown that, the simultaneous PM results in equal phase transition
time sequences of all phase transitions that are related to this particular PM. Hence, all
these phase transitions will occur simultaneously.
The next two restrictions effect the periodicity of the PM type A or B. The PM are
restricted to be periodically scheduled with equal periods.
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Definition 38 (PM type A periodic with equal periods). Let a phase transition
time sequence related to PM type A be given by Ta,i = (ta,i,1, . . . , ta,i,nea,i), for all i ∈
{SRS, 1, . . . , k}. The initial phase transition time ta,i,1 is given by
ta,i,1 =
tm
nea,i + 1
, (4.19)
for all nea,i ∈ N, where nea,i is the number of phase transition times. It is assumed that
0 < ta,i,j < tm. If it is nea,i = 0, the ta,i,1 will be undefined and the respective phase
transition time sequence empty, i.e. Ta,i = (). In the case of nea,i > 1, the further phase
transition times will be given by the recursion
ta,i,j+1 = ta,i,j + ta,i,1 , (4.20)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , nea,i − 1}.
A phase transition that is related to a PM type A is restricted by definition 38 to
occur periodically with the equal period ta,i,1, which is given by equation (4.19).
Example 4.4 (PM type A periodic with equal periods). Let a PM type A be
periodic with equal periods, according to the restriction of definition 38. Hence, the
phase transition time sequence is given by Ta,i, i ∈ {SRS, 1, . . . , k}. Let the mission time
be tm = 10 years and the number of transition times be nea,i = 1. The sequence Ta,i = (5)
years is determined via the equation (4.19). The phase transition will occur periodically
with the equal period ta,i,1 = 5 years.
Definition 39 (PM type A and B periodic with equal periods). Let a phase
transition time sequence that is related to PM type A be given by Ta,i, i ∈ {SRS, 1, . . . , k}.
The sequence Ta,i is restricted via definition 38. It has to be noted that, the case of
nea,i = 0 and the sequence Ta,i being empty, i.e. Ta,i = (), might occur. A phase transition
time sequence that is related to PM type B is given by Tb,i = (tb,i,1, . . . , tb,i,neb,i). The initial
phase transition time tb,i,1 is given by
tb,i,1 =
 tmneb,i+1 if nea,i = 0 ,ta,i,1
mi+1
if nea,i 6= 0 ,
(4.21)
for all neb,i,mi ∈ N, where the neb,i is the number of phase transition times in Tb,i that
occur within the period 0 < tb,i,j < tm. If it is nea,i 6= 0, the number of phase transition
times in Tb,i that occur within the period 0 < tb,i,j < ta,i,1 will be given by mi,
mi =
neb,i
nea,i + 1
, (4.22)
where mi ∈ N0. If it is mi = neb,i = 0, the tb,i,1 will be undefined, the respective phase
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transition time sequence empty, i.e. Tb,i = (). In the case of nea,i = 0, mi will equal neb,i,
i.e. mi = neb,i. The further phase transition times of the sequence Tb,i are given by the
recursion
tb,i,j+1 =
tb,i,j + tb,i,1 if mod
(
j
mi
)
6= 0 ,
tb,i,j + 2 · tb,i,1 if mod
(
j
mi
)
= 0 ,
(4.23)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , neb,i − 1}, for neb,i > 1 and mi 6= 0.
In definition 39 it is obvious that, the phase transition times related to PM type B,
which is periodic with equal periods, depend on the phase transition times related to
the respective PM type A, which is periodic with equal periods. Particularly in equation
(4.22) it is noticeable that, neb,i depends on nea,i. It has to be emphasized that, a phase
transition related to PM type B occurs periodically with equal periods either within the
period of the PM type A or within the period of the mission time tm.
Example 4.5 (PM type A and B periodic with equal periods). Let a PM type
A be periodic with equal periods, as in example 4.4. Therefore, it is tm = 10 years,
nea,i = 1, and Ta,i = (5) years. For a phase transition that is related to a PM type B it is
assumed that mi = 1. Hence, neb,i = 2 results from equation (4.22). The sequence Tb,i is
determined via the equations (4.21), (4.23). The result is given by Tb,i = (2.5, 7.5) years.
4.4.4 Definition of PM strategies
The restrictions that were defined above are applied to PM plans. The PM strategies
are introduced as the sets of PM plans with different applied restrictions. These PM
strategies are defined hereafter in ascending order for increasing number of restrictions.
Definition 40 (PM strategy I). The PM type A and B have a constant execution
number neh,i ∈ N0, for all h ∈ {a, b}, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, see definition 35. The set of PM
plans that are classified into the PM strategy I is given by
SI = {(Ta,1, Tb,1, . . . , Ta,k, Tb,k) | Th,i = (th,i,1, . . . , th,i,neh,i)} , (4.24)
where th,i,j ∈ R+.
The set of PM plans that are classified into the PM strategy I is further restricted to
determine the set of PM plans classified into PM strategy II.
Definition 41 (PM strategy II). The PM type A and B have a constant execution
number, see definition 35. The PM type A is simultaneously executed for all elements,
see definition 36. The set of PM plans that are classified into the PM strategy II is given
by
SII = {(Ta,SRS, Tb,1, . . . , Tb,k) | Th,i = (th,i,1, . . . , th,i,neh,i)} , (4.25)
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where h ∈ {a, b}, i ∈ {SRS, 1, . . . , k}, and th,i,j ∈ R+.
The set of PM plans that are classified into the PM strategy II is further restricted
to determine the sets of PM plans classified into PM strategy IIIa or IIIb. Different
restrictions are applied in each case to define the PM strategy IIIa or IIIb, respectively.
Definition 42 (PM strategy IIIa). The PM type A and B have a constant execution
number, see definition 35. The PM type A and B are simultaneously executed for all
elements, see definitions 36 and 37. The set of PM plans that are classified into the PM
strategy IIIa is given by
SIIIa = {(Ta,SRS, Tb,SRS) | Th,SRS = (th,SRS,1, . . . , th,SRS,neh,SRS)} , (4.26)
where th,SRS,j ∈ R+.
Definition 43 (PM strategy IIIb). The PM type A and B have a constant execution
number, see definition 35. The PM type A are simultaneously executed for all elements
and periodic with equal periods, see definitions 36 and 38. The set of PM plans that are
classified into the PM strategy IIIb is given by
SIIIb = {(Tb,1, . . . , Tb,k) | Tb,i = (tb,i,1, . . . , tb,i,neb,i)} , (4.27)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, tb,i,j ∈ R+. The sequence Ta,SRS is uniquely specified by nea,SRS.
The set of PM plans that are classified into the PM strategy IIIa or IIIb are further
restricted to determine the sets of PM plans classified into PM strategy IV.
Definition 44 (PM strategy IV). The PM type A and B have a constant execution
number, see definition 35, and are simultaneously executed for all elements, see definitions
36, 37. The PM type A is periodically executed with equal periods, see definition 38. The
set of PM plans that are classified into the PM strategy IV is given by
SIV = {(Tb,SRS) | Tb,SRS = (tb,SRS,1, . . . , tb,SRS,neb,SRS)} , (4.28)
where tb,SRS,j ∈ R+. The sequence Ta,SRS is uniquely specified by nea,SRS.
The last PM strategy includes PM plans that are restricted by all introduced restric-
tions.
Definition 45 (PM strategy V). The PM type A and B have a constant execution
number, see definition 35, and are simultaneously executed for all elements, see definitions
36, 37. Moreover, the PM type A and B are periodically executed with equal periods,
see definitions 38, and 39. The set of PM plans that are classified into the PM strategy
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V includes a single PM plan. This PM plan is uniquely determined by the specified
execution numbers neh,SRS of the PM A and B, for all h ∈ {a, b}. The respective set is
denoted by SV .
It has to be emphasized that, the available degrees of freedom of a model for the PM
are classified by the PM strategies. Usually, the PM plans of a PM strategy with more
restrictions are included in that with less restrictions. In particular, it is
SV ⊂ SIV ⊂ SIIIa,SIIIb ⊂ SII ⊂ SI . (4.29)
Furthermore, it has to be noted that the choice of the PM strategies is explained by
the different characteristics of the PM type A or B. The PM type B is considered to
require less effort to vary the respective schedule compared to those of type A. That is
because PM type B is usually fully automated and does not require human interaction.
The PM type A usually requires human interaction and even an interruption of operation
might be required. Therefore, changes of the PM type A schedule are sometimes just not
possible for various reasons. In general, a framework is provided that enables to treat
SRSs with different degrees of freedom for PM plans. In the next chapter the PFD(t) will
be analyzed for different degrees of freedom.
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Chapter 5
Model analysis and validation
5.1 Preliminaries
Selected SRSs with different structures and characteristics were modeled via the methods
introduced in previous chapters. These models are discussed and analyzed in this chapter.
The one element and three element models with a 1oo3, 2oo3, and 3oo3 element structure
are treated in section 5.2. In section 5.3, the treated models are validated versus the
models that are available in literature. Finally, sensitivity analysis is applied to the
treated models in section 5.4.
5.2 Analyzed models
5.2.1 Preliminaries
The remarks on the motivation of the choice of analyzed models are given immediately
hereafter. After that, the parameters of the analyzed models are introduced in this sub-
section. In subsection 5.2.2, the one element model is described and analyzed. The three
element models with a 1oo3, 2oo3, and 3oo3 element structure are treated in subsection
5.2.3. The analysis results of the treated models are presented in subsection 5.2.4.
Choice of analyzed models
The one element model is chosen to show the model features that are related to an element,
such as multiple failure modes, two types of PM, etc. The three element model provides a
large variety of possible element structures with a varying degree of redundancy, i.e 1oo3,
2oo3, and 3oo3. Hence, the three element models are chosen to show the model features
that appear for multiple elements. The common-cause failures are not considered in this
chapter. These usually dominate the behavior of models with redundancies and would
interfere further characteristics.
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The dependent elements are not treated in this chapter, in order to put the focus on
the models with independent elements. However, the introduced models, the presented
analysis and optimization methods are capable to treat dependent elements. Selected
dependent elements are described in appendix C.
Parameters of analyzed models
The transition rates of an MP-CMC correspond to the rate parameters of the exponential
CDF that is related to the STE that triggers the respective transition of the SDTA. The
rate parameters of the STEs dd, duab, dua, and dn are given by
λdd = dc · λd ,
λduab = tcb · (1− dc) · λd ,
λdua = (tca− tcb) · (1− dc) · λd ,
λdn = (1− tca) · (1− dc) · λd ,
(5.1)
where the parameters λd, dc, tca, and tcb are introduced to express the rate parameters.
The indices that indicate the relative SRS element are omitted for clarity. The parameters
λd, dc, tca, and tcb are characterized in the following:
dc is the diagnostic coverage factor, given by
dc =
λdd
λdd + λduab + λdua + λdn
; (5.2)
λd is the rate parameter of the STEs that indicate dangerous failures, i.e. dd, duab,
dua, and dn; λd is given by
λd = λdd + λduab + λdua + λdn ; (5.3)
tca is the coverage of the PM type A, given by
tca =
λduab + λdua
λduab + λdua + λdn
; (5.4)
tcb is the coverage of the PM type B, given by
tcb =
λduab
λduab + λdua + λdn
. (5.5)
The parameters λd, dc, and tca were also used by the standard [IEC11e] as parameters
of probabilistic models. The parameter tca was denoted by PTC and referred to as proof
test coverage. Additionally, the parameter tcb is introduced in this thesis to quantify the
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coverage of the PM type B. In [BBB12], a comparable parameter was introduced, denoted
by E, and referred to as the efficiency of the partial test.
5.2.2 One element model
The one element model is given byMP- CMC1EL = (XMC ,pinit,Q, T ,M, cPFD, tm). This
model was determined from the SDTA, which was given in definition 23, via the SDTA
transformation into MP-CMC, which was introduced in section 4.3. The parameters of
theMP- CMC1EL are introduced below.
The set of states XMC and the initial state probabilities vector pinit are given by
XMC = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} , pinit =
[
1 0 0 0 0 0
]
.
The transition rates matrix Q is given by
Q =

q1,1 q1,2 . . . q1,6
q2,1 q2,2 . . . q2,6
...
... . . .
...
q6,1 q6,2 . . . q6,6
 .
The elements of Q that are not equal to zero are given by
q1,2 = λs, q1,3 = λdd, q1,4 = λduab, q1,5 = λdua, q1,6 = λdn,
q2,1 = λcms,
q3,1 = λmd,
q1,1 = −(q1,2 + q1,3 + q1,4 + q1,5 + q1,6), q2,2 = −q2,1, q3,3 = −q3,1,
where λdd, λduab, λdua, and λdn are given in equations (5.1). Hence, the parameters of the
matrix Q are λs, λcms, λmd, dc, λd, tca, and tcb. The indices that indicate the relative
SRS element are omitted for clarity. The state selection vector cPFD is given by
cPFD =
[
0 0 1 1 1 1
]T
.
The i-th element of cPFD is zero if in state i either the safety function is provided or the
SRS is in spurious operation. Otherwise, the i-th element of cPFD is one if the safety
function is not provided in state i.
The parameters T , M are related to the phase transitions that model the PM. The
sequence of the phase transition time sequences, which is given by T = (Ta, Tb), defines
the schedule of the phase transitions and the PM plan. M is the sequence of the phase
transition matrices that specifies the impact of each phase transition on the states of the
MP- CMC1EL. M is given byM = (Ma,Mb). The phase transitions specified by Ma,
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Mb model the PM type A, B.
The PFD(t) is calculated via the state probabilities of theMP- CMC1EL, see section
4.2. The respective system of ODEs is piecewise solved via the Matlab ODE solver
ode23tb. This solver uses a variable step size that depends on the precision settings for
the calculation. Particularly, the ode23tb efficiently solves stiff ODEs. The stiff ODEs
result from the elements of the matrix Q that differ by large orders of magnitude, e.g.
the rate parameters λdua and λmd, which indicate failure and restoration, usually strongly
differ.
The calculated PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax are shown in figure 5.1. The PFD, PFDmax
are plotted using a dashed line and a dotted line, respectively. The parameters that were
used for the model evaluation are given in table 5.1. The phase transition time sequences
Ta, Tb are given in table 5.2. In figure 5.1, the results for the PM plans 1 and 2 of table
5.2 are shown in black or blue. The phase transition matrices Ma, Mb are not explicitly
given. The PM plan 1 is classified into the PM strategy V, given by definition 45. Hence,
the PFD(t) plot of the PM plan 1, in figure 5.1, shows that the phase transitions related to
the PM type A and B occur periodically with equal periods. The PM plan 2 is classified
into the PM strategy IIIa, where the periods between the phase transitions do not have
to be equal.
Time t (year)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
F
D
×10−4
0
2
4
6
8
PFD(t) PM plan 1
PFD(t) PM plan 2
Figure 5.1: PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax of one element model
λs (h−1) λd (h−1) dc tca tcb λcms (h−1) λmd (h−1) tm (year)
300 · 10−9 30 · 10−9 0.4 0.8 0.48 5 · 10−3 1 · 10−3 10
Table 5.1: Parameters of one element model
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PM plan 1 PM plan 2
Ta (year) (5) (7.5)
Tb (year) (2.5, 7.5) (4, 9)
Table 5.2: PM plans 1, 2 of one element model
5.2.3 Three element model
The three element model is given byMP- CMC3EL = (XMC ,pinit,Q, T ,M, cPFD, tm). A
three element model can have the 1oo3, 2oo3, or 3oo3 element structure. This model was
determined from the respective SDTA that was transformed into theMP- CMC3EL. The
SDTA was determined via the parallel composition from the SDTAi for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The parameters ofMP- CMC3EL are introduced below.
The set of states XMC and the initial state probabilities vector pinit are given by
XMC = {1, 2, . . . , 216} , pinit =
[
1 0 . . . 0
]
.
The transition rates matrix Q is a 216× 216 matrix and is therefore not explicitly given.
The parameters of the matrix Q are λsi , λcmsi , λmdi , λdi , dci, tcai, tcbi, for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The index i indicates the relative element of a parameter. The state selection vector cPFD
is a column vector with 216 elements. The element structure of the model is reflected by
cPFD. Hence, c1oo3PFD, c2oo3PFD, and c3oo3PFD are differentiated. These state selection vectors were
determined based on the state classification regarding the safety function, see definition
33.
The PM plan is defined by T . That is T = (Ta,1, Tb,1, Ta,2, Tb,2, Ta,3, Tb,3) the sequence
of the phase transition time sequences, where Ta,i is the time sequence scheduling the
phase transition that models the PM type A of the element i. Respectively, Tb,i is related
to the PM type B. Due to the presence of multiple elements, the PM plans can be classified
in more PM strategies compared to a one element model. The PM type A or B might
be separately executed for each element, i.e. elementwise PM. In contrast, the PM might
be simultaneously executed for all elements. The sequence of phase transition matrices
is given byM = (Ma,1,Mb,1,Ma,2,Mb,2,Ma,3,Mb,3). The phase transitions specified by
Ma,i, Mb,i model the PM type A, B of the element i.
The calculated PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax are shown for the 1oo3, 2oo3, and 3oo3
element structures in figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. The parameters that were used for the
model evaluation are given in table 5.3. The phase transition time sequences Ta,i, Tb,i, for
all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which define the evaluated PM plans 1 and 2, are given in table 5.4. The
PM plan 1 implies simultaneous PM type A and B, in contrast to the PM plan 2 with
elementwise PM. The evaluated PM plans 1, 2 are classified into the PM strategy V or
PM strategy I, respectively.
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Time t (year)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
F
D
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
×10−3
PFD(t) PM plan 1
PFD(t) PM plan 2
Figure 5.2: PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax of three element 1oo3 model
Time t (year)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
F
D
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
×10−2
PFD(t) PM plan 1
PFD(t) PM plan 2
Figure 5.3: PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax of three element 2oo3 model
5.2.4 Results
Overall, each PFD(t) plot in figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 shows a similar trend. The
PFD(t) starts at zero in the origin, is increasing from there along the x-axis, and is
decreased by phase transitions. No jump discontinuities are present in the PFD(t) plots in
contrast to example 4.1. This is explained by the duration of repair after the failures were
revealed by the PM. Due to that, the respective models have no direct phase transitions
from a state where the safety function is not available to a state where it is. It is shown
in the states/transitions diagram in figure 3.3. The occurring phase transitions cause
λsi (h
−1) λdi (h
−1) dci tcai tcbi λcmsi (h
−1) λmdi (h
−1) tm (year)
300 · 10−9 3000 · 10−9 0.4 0.8 0.48 5 · 10−3 0.5 · 10−3 10
Table 5.3: Parameters of three element model
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Time t (year)
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Figure 5.4: PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax of three element 3oo3 model
PM plan 1 PM plan 2
Element 1 Ta,1 (year) (5) (4.5)Tb,1 (year) (2.5, 7.5) (2, 7)
Element 2 Ta,2 (year) (5) (5)Tb,2 (year) (2.5, 7.5) (2.5, 7.5)
Element 3 Ta,3 (year) (5) (5.5)Tb,3 (year) (2.5, 7.5) (3, 8)
Table 5.4: PM plans 1, 2 of three element model
discontinuities of the derivative of the PFD(t). A jump of the gradient of the PFD(t) is
caused.
The figures of merit PFD, PFDmax were applied to characterize the PFD(t) via its
average and maximum values. If it is PFDmax > PFD, there will exist a time interval
t1 ≤ t < t2, where the PFD(t) and PFD(t1, t2) are greater than the PFD. Hence, it might
be not sufficient to analyze only the PFD in order to assess the PFD(t) for the entire
mission time interval. For example, refer to the PFD(t) plot of the PM plan 1, given in
figure 5.1. In the time intervals 4 ≤ t < 5 and 8 ≤ t < 10 the PFD(t) and PFD(t1, t2) are
greater than the PFD. Therefore, it is required to analyze the PFD and PFDmax, in order
to assess the PFD(t) for the entire mission time interval and ensure that it is sufficiently
low.
Now, the focus is put on the characteristics of the PFD(t) plots that result from the
analyzed element structures. The figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 were analyzed and compared.
It can be stated that, with decreasing redundancy the PFD(t) plot becomes more similar
in shape to the PFD(t) plot of the one element model, shown in figure 5.1. Moreover, the
PFDmax is significantly greater in relation to the PFD for the 1oo3 element structure, in
comparison to the 2oo3 or 3oo3 element structures. Further, the gradient of the PFD(t)
is discussed without the consideration of its changes due to phase transitions. It can
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be stated that, the gradient of the PFD(t) faster increases over time for an increasing
redundancy, i.e. for 2oo3, 1oo3 element structures. In contrast, the gradient of the
PFD(t) remains constant or even decreases over time for the analyzed models without
redundancy, see figures 5.1, 5.4.
Furthermore, the degrees of freedom of the analyzed models in regard to the PM were
demonstrated. These degrees of freedom, such as elementwise PM of individual elements
and arbitrarily variable individual periods, impact the PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax.
5.3 Validation
5.3.1 Preliminaries
Selected probabilistic models, which were introduced in literature, are briefly described
in the following subsections. Particularly, the models of [TE09], [BBB12], and [IEC11d]
are described in subsections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 5.3.4. These literature models are applied
to validate the models introduced in this thesis. The validation results are presented in
subsection 5.3.5.
5.3.2 Model of Torres-Echeverría et al.
The model of Torres-Echeverría et al. is based on the Hybrid method, see subsection
1.2, and was introduced in [TE09]. The PFD(t) is calculated as the result of the two
independent series elements, which model the two failure modes dd- and du-failures. The
dd-failures with respective repair are quantified by a constant contribution to the PFD(t).
The du-failures are revealed by PM with a complete coverage and repaired thereafter.
Only one type of PM was considered for each element in [TE09]. However, let this PM be
the PM type A, for the purpose of comparison with the models introduced in this thesis.
The PM schedule was specified in [TE09] via the functional test cycle that is shown in
figure 5.5. The time to the first test after the startup at t = 0 is given by tp, the respective
interval in figure 5.5 is denoted by (1). After that, the test (2), repair (3), and standby
(4) intervals cyclically follow each other until the end of mission time at t = tm. The test
time is denoted by tt, the repair time by tr, and the period between two PM executions
by TIa. If the time to the first test is tp = TIa, the PM will be periodic with equal periods
TIa.
The PFD(t) of a one element SRS was calculated by a piecewise defined equation,
see [TE09]. Due to the equal periods between two PM executions and the complete
test coverage, the PFD(t) is a periodic function for t ≥ tp. The PFD(t) for an SRS
with multiple elements is determined by multiplication or summation of the PFD(t) of
individual elements, for parallel or serial elements, respectively. The PM periods were
assumed to be equal for all elements, i.e. TIa. However, the times to the first test can
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t0
tp tt
(1)
TIa
tr
(2) (3) (4)
TIa − tt − tr
. . .
. . .
tm
Figure 5.5: Functional test cycle, [TE09]
be individually parametrized for each element to enable the so-called staggered PM of an
SRS with multiple elements. The staggered PM is illustrated in figure 5.6 for an SRS
with three elements.
t0
tp,1
. . .
TIa
tp,2 TIa
tp,3 TIa
ta,1,1 ta,2,1 ta,3,1 ta,1,2 ta,2,2 ta,3,2
. . .
. . .
. . .
Element 3:
Element 2:
Element 1:
Figure 5.6: Staggered PM of three elements
5.3.3 Model of Brissaud et al.
The model of Brissaud et al. is also based on the Hybrid method. This model was
introduced in [BBB12]. It is capable to model two types of PM for each element, in
contrast to the model from [TE09]. Let these two types be the PM type A and B, for
the purpose of comparison with the models introduced in this thesis. The PM type A,
modeled by [BBB12], is restricted to a complete coverage. Similarly to [TE09], the PFD(t)
is calculated as the result of the two independent series elements, which model the two
failure modes duab- and dua-failures. The former failures are revealed either by the PM
type A or by the PM type B. In contrast, the latter are revealed only by the PM type A.
The dd-failures are neglected by [BBB12]. Moreover, the test time of the PM type A or
B and the repair duration of the failures, which were revealed by the PM type A or B, are
neglected as well. The PM type A is restricted to be periodic with equal periods. The
times of the PM type B are identically located in each period of the PM type A. These
times are specified by a recursion that is referred to as the α-test policy, see [BBB12].
The motivation to use the α-test policy is the reduced number of parameters to specify
the schedule of the PM type B.
The PFD(t) of the one element SRS was calculated by a piecewise defined equation,
see [BBB12]. Due to the equal periods between two executions of the PM type A and the
complete coverage, the PFD(t) is a periodic function for the period of the PM type A.
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Further equations were given to calculate the PFD(t) for an SRS with multiple identical
elements and a given element structure, see [BBB12]. The times of the PM type A and B
are restricted to be equal for all elements, i.e. the PM is simultaneous for all elements.
5.3.4 Model of IEC 61508
The model of IEC 61508 is based on the Simplified equations, see subsection 1.2, and was
introduced in [IEC11d]. This model calculates the PFD as the result of the independent
series elements that model the following failure modes: dd-failures, du-failures, and dn-
failures, if necessary. Let the du-failures be revealed by the PM type A with an arbitrary
coverage, for the purpose of comparison with the models introduced in this thesis. The
incomplete coverage of the PM type A leads to the dn-failures. The dn-failures were
modeled to be revealed by the occurring demands of the SRS. Here, the dn-failures are
assumed to remain effective until the end of the mission time, to enable comparison
between the model introduced in [IEC11d] and the models introduced in this thesis.
It has to be emphasized that, the model of IEC 61508 is not capable to calculate the
PFD(t). The PM type B is not supported as well. The schedule of the PM type A is
restricted to be periodic with equal periods. SRS that consist of multiple elements with
widely used element structures, where the redundant elements are identical, were treated
via the respective equations to calculate the PFD, see [IEC11d].
5.3.5 Results
Selected one and three element models were evaluated, the results are presented hereafter.
The literature models, which were described in subsections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 5.3.4, are ap-
plied to validate the models that are introduced in this thesis. Moreover, the presented
validation results demonstrate selected important features of the introduced models, such
as the PM type A, B with incomplete coverage, elementwise for each element, and arbi-
trarily scheduled, not restricted to be periodic with equal periods.
Case 1: One element model, subject to PM type A with complete coverage
The evaluated one element model is subject to the PM type A with complete coverage and
periodic with equal periods. The model parameters are according to table 5.1, except the
coverage of the PM type A, which is given by tca = 1 that reflects the complete coverage.
The PM plan is derived from the PM plan 1, which is given in table 5.2, where the PM
type B is omitted, i.e. Tb = (). The calculated results of the PFD(t) are plotted in figure
5.7. The respective figures of PFD, PFDmax are given in table 5.5. The presented results
were calculated via the literature models and the model of this thesis.
The literature models and the models of this thesis provide similar results, as clearly
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Figure 5.7: PFD(t) of one element model in case 1
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax
Machleidt 4.1 · 10−4 8 · 10−4 3.2 · 10−4 6.1 · 10−4 4 · 10−4 7.7 · 10−4
[TE09] 4.1 · 10−4 8.3 · 10−4 4.1 · 10−4 8.3 · 10−4 3.3 · 10−4 6.7 · 10−4
[BBB12] 3.9 · 10−4 7.9 · 10−4 3.0 · 10−4 6.0 · 10−4 2.2 · 10−4 4.4 · 10−4
[IEC11d] 4.2 · 10−4 - 4.2 · 10−4 - 5 · 10−4 -
Table 5.5: PFD, PFDmax of one element models in case 1, 2, and 3
evident in figure 5.7 and table 5.5. The PFD(t) plots slightly differ at the time of the
PM, due to the differently modeled repair process that is related to the PM. Instant
repair was modeled in [BBB12] and the repair time was neglected. In [TE09], an average
repair duration was modeled. During the repair duration, failures might occur that will
be completely revealed and restored when the repair duration is over. In this thesis, the
occurred failures are revealed by the PM and repaired after that. The time of repair is
random and distributed via a given exponential CDF. In contrast to [TE09], the failures
that occur during a repair will remain unrevealed and will not be restored by the running
repair activities. These failures will be revealed by the next PM.
Case 2: One element model, subject to PM type A with complete coverage
and B
The evaluated one element model is equivalent to that of case 1, except the PM plan that
is now equivalent to the PM plan 1, which is given in table 5.2. The calculated results of
the PFD(t) are plotted in figure 5.8. The respective figures of PFD, PFDmax are given in
table 5.5.
The PFD(t) plot in figure 5.8 that is related to the model of [TE09] is equivalent to
that in figure 5.7. Moreover, the values of PFD, PFDmax of the models of [TE09] and
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Figure 5.8: PFD(t) of one element model in case 2
[IEC11d] remain unchanged in case 2, in comparison to case 1, see table 5.5. It is clearly
evident that, the models of [TE09] and [IEC11d] do not consider the PM type B.
Case 3: One element model, subject to PM type A with incomplete coverage
and B
The evaluated one element model is equivalent to that of case 2, except the coverage of
the PM type A, which is now incomplete. The coverage of the PM type A is given by
tca = 0.8, which is equivalent to 80%. The calculated results of the PFD(t) are plotted
in figure 5.9. The respective values of PFD, PFDmax are given in table 5.5.
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Figure 5.9: PFD(t) of one element model in case 3
In figure 5.9, the PFD(t) plot that is related to the model of this thesis shows a
greater gradient. Moreover, the decrease in PFD(t) that is caused by the PM type A is
significantly less, compared to the models of [TE09] and [BBB12]. It is clearly evident
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that, the models of [TE09] and [BBB12] do not consider the incomplete coverage of the PM
type A and the resulting dn-failures. This feature is modeled by the model of [IEC11d],
which is unable to model PM type B, see table 5.5.
Case 4: Three element model, subject to simultaneous PM type A
The evaluated three element model is subject to the PM type A with complete coverage,
periodic with equal periods, and simultaneous for all elements. The model parameters are
according to table 5.3, except the coverage of the PM type A, which is given by tca = 1
that reflects the complete coverage. The PM plan is derived from the PM plan 1, which
is given in table 5.4, where the PM type B is omitted, i.e. Tb,i = () for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The calculated results of the PFD(t) for the 1oo3 element structure are plotted in figure
5.10. The respective values of PFD, PFDmax are given in in tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 for
the 1oo3, 2oo3, and 3oo3 element structures.
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Figure 5.10: PFD(t) of three element model in case 4, 1oo3 element structure
Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax
Machleidt 1.3 · 10−4 4.7 · 10−4 1.1 · 10−4 4.2 · 10−4 0.5 · 10−4 2.1 · 10−4
[TE09] 1.3 · 10−4 5.9 · 10−4 1.1 · 10−4 4.6 · 10−4 1.1 · 10−4 4.2 · 10−4
[BBB12] 1.1 · 10−4 4.4 · 10−4 1.1 · 10−4 4.4 · 10−4 0.4 · 10−4 2.0 · 10−4
[IEC11d] 2.3 · 10−4 - 2.3 · 10−4 - 2.3 · 10−4 -
Table 5.6: PFD, PFDmax of three element model in case 4, 5, and 6, 1oo3 element structure
In figure 5.10, it is clearly visible that the plot related to the model of [TE09] sig-
nificantly differs from the plot related to the model of this thesis, due to the differently
modeled repair process. It has to be noted that, the difference is greater compared to the
one element model that is analyzed above. The PFD(t) plot that is related to the model
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Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax
Machleidt 6.3 · 10−3 17 · 10−3 6.1 · 10−3 17 · 10−3 3.7 · 10−3 10 · 10−3
[TE09] 6.5 · 10−3 21 · 10−3 6.0 · 10−3 17 · 10−3 6.0 · 10−3 17 · 10−3
[BBB12] 5.6 · 10−3 16 · 10−4 5.6 · 10−3 16 · 10−3 3.2 · 10−3 10 · 10−3
[IEC11d] 8.8 · 10−3 - 8.8 · 10−3 - 8.8 · 10−3 -
Table 5.7: PFD, PFDmax of three element model in case 4, 5, and 6, 2oo3 element structure
Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax PFD PFDmax
Machleidt 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.17
[TE09] 0.12 0.25 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.22
[BBB12] 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.08 0.16
[IEC11d] 0.14 - 0.14 - 0.14 -
Table 5.8: PFD, PFDmax of three element model in case 4, 5, and 6, 3oo3 element structure
of [BBB12] slightly differs from the plot related to the model of this thesis. This can
be explained by the neglected dd-failures. It has to be emphasized that, the PFD that
was calculated via the model of [IEC11d] is significantly greater in comparison to those
figures calculated via the other evaluated models, see table 5.6. An increase of approx.
75% occurs for the 1oo3 element structure.
Case 5: Three element model, subject to elementwise PM type A
The evaluated three element model is equivalent to that of case 4, except the PM that is
now executed elementwise for each element. The respective PM plan is equivalent to the
PM plan 2, which is given in table 5.4, where the PM type B is omitted, i.e. Tb,i = () for
all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The calculated results of the PFD(t) for the 1oo3 element structure are
plotted in figure 5.11. The respective values of PFD, PFDmax are given in in tables 5.6,
5.7, and 5.8 for the 1oo3, 2oo3, and 3oo3 element structures.
The PFD(t) plot in figure 5.11 that is related to the model of [BBB12] is equivalent
to that in figure 5.10. Moreover, the values of PFD, PFDmax of the models of [BBB12]
and [IEC11d] remain unchanged in case 2, in comparison to case 1, see tables 5.6, 5.7,
and 5.8. It is clearly evident that, the models of [BBB12] and [IEC11d] do not model
the elementwise PM type A. In contrast, the model of [TE09] is capable to model the
elementwise PM type A for the case of the staggered PM, see subsection 5.3.2.
Case 6: Three element model, subject to elementwise PM type A and B
The evaluated three element model is equivalent to that of case 5, except the PM plan that
now includes PM type A and B, which are both executed elementwise. The respective PM
plan is equivalent to the PM plan 2, which is given in table 5.4. The calculated results
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Figure 5.11: PFD(t) of three element model in case 5, 1oo3 element structure
of the PFD(t) for the 1oo3 element structure are plotted in figure 5.12. The respective
values of PFD, PFDmax are given in in tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 for the 1oo3, 2oo3, and
3oo3 element structures.
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Figure 5.12: PFD(t) of three element model in case 6, 1oo3 element structure
In figure 5.12 it is clearly visible that, the plot that is related to the model of this
thesis significantly differs from the plots related to the other models. It is clearly evident
that, the elementwise PM type B is only modeled by the model that is introduced in this
thesis.
Conclusions
Due to the analyzed and discussed results it is concluded that, the models that are intro-
duced in this thesis provide plausible results. It was shown that, significant deviations of
the results between the compared models have occurred. These deviations were analyzed
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and discussed. Different missing features of the literature models in comparison to the
introduced models were identified to cause the deviations. None of the evaluated liter-
ature models was capable of modeling the PM type A and B with incomplete coverage,
executed elementwise for each element, and arbitrarily scheduled. Furthermore, the in-
troduced models exhibit further features, such as s-failures, dependencies resulting from
the multiple failure modes, etc. These further features additionally impact the PFD(t),
PFD, and PFDmax, where the particular impact depends on parametrization. Overall,
less approximations and restrictions are required by the introduced models, particularly
in regard to the PM.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
5.4.1 Preliminaries
The parameters of a probabilistic model influence the PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax. This
section aims to analyze the deviations of the parameters. Particularly, the impact of the
deviations on the PFD or PFDmax is analyzed. In subsection 5.4.2, the theoretical frame-
work of the applied sensitivity analysis procedure is given. The results of the sensitivity
analysis are presented in subsection 5.4.3. The presented results treat the one and three
element models.
5.4.2 Theoretical framework
The system sensitivity theory was introduced in [Fra78]. The analytical procedures of
sensitivity analysis are frequently applied in literature, particularly in [Fra78]. These
procedures apply linearization and therefore only small parameter deviations can be an-
alyzed. In contrast, the sensitivity analysis procedure that is applied in this thesis is
simulative. It does not require linearization and enables to analyze arbitrary parameter
deviations. The procedure is applied to the parameters that are related to the PM plans.
These parameters are mainly focused in this thesis because they are related to purely
organizational measures and easily adaptable. In general, arbitrary parameters can be
analyzed via the described procedure.
The sensitivity measures are introduced and defined below. Let the PFD and PFDmax
be given via anMP- CMC and the procedure to calculate the state probabilities of the
MP- CMC, which was described in section 4.2. The PFD(α) and PFDmax(α) are consid-
ered to be the scalar-valued functions of the actual parameter vector α =
[
α1 α2 . . .
]T
,
which might deviate from its nominal values. Let the vector of the nominal parameter val-
ues be given by α0 =
[
α1,0 α2,0 . . .
]T
. The PFD(α) for an arbitrary actual parameter
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vector α is given by
PFD(α) = G(α0,α) · PFD(α0) . (5.6)
The ability of a deviation of the nominal parameter vector to cause a deviation of the
nominal PFD is given by the gain of the PFD, which is denoted by G(α0,α) and defined
hereafter. In an analogous manner, the gain of the PFDmax is defined afterwards.
Definition 46 (Gain of PFD). The gain of the PFD is given by
G(α0,α) =
PFD(α)
PFD(α0)
, (5.7)
as the ratio of the PFD for the actual and nominal parameter vectors α and α0.
Definition 47 (Gain of PFDmax). The gain of the PFDmax is given by
Gmax(α0,α) =
PFDmax(α)
PFDmax(α0)
, (5.8)
as the ratio of the PFDmax for the actual and nominal parameter vectors α and α0.
In this thesis the deviation of one parameter at a time is analyzed. Let the deviation
of a particular parameter from its nominal value be given by ∆αj, the respective actual
parameter vector will be α =
[
α1,0 . . . αj,0 + ∆αj . . .
]T
. The respective sensitivity
measures are given by G(α0,∆αj), Gmax(α0,∆αj).
The relation of the G(α0,∆αj), Gmax(α0,∆αj) to the performance index sensitivity,
which was defined in [Fra78], is described below. Let the performance index of interest
be G(α0,∆αj), the respective sensitivity in regard to the parameter αj is given by
sG,αj(α0) = lim∆αj→0
G(α0,∆αj)−G(α0, 0)
∆αj
. (5.9)
In equation (5.9) it is clearly noticeable that, the performance index sensitivity reflects
the gradient of the performance index G(α0,∆αj) over ∆αj, at the point ∆αj = 0, i.e.
for the nominal parameter values. This relation is illustrated in figure 5.13. In contrast
to the respective performance-index sensitivities, the sensitivity measures G(α0,∆αj),
Gmax(α0,∆αj) are not restricted to infinitesimal parameter deviations ∆αj → 0 and
enable to analyze arbitrary ∆αj. It has to be noted that, the vector of the nominal
parameter values α0 will be omitted in the notation of the sensitivity measures, i.e.
G(∆αj), Gmax(∆αj).
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Figure 5.13: Performance index sensitivity sG,αj(α0) as gradient of G(α0,∆αj)
5.4.3 Results
One element model
The deviations of parameters of the one element model are analyzed via the introduced
sensitivity measures. The analyzed one element model is equivalent to that, which was
discussed in case 3 of subsection 5.3.5. The parameters that are related to the PM plan are
analyzed. The nominal PM plan is given by T = (Ta, Tb), Ta = (ta,1), Tb = (tb,1, tb,2), where
the times of PM are ta,1 = 5, tb,1 = 2.5, and tb,2 = 7.5 years. The G(∆th,j), Gmax(∆th,j)
are plotted in figures 5.14, 5.15 for the deviations ∆th,j ∈ {∆ta,1,∆tb,1,∆tb,2}.
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Figure 5.14: Gain of PFD of one element model
It is clearly noticeable that, a deviation of a particular time th,j from its nominal
value results in G(∆th,j) ≥ 1, see figure 5.14. Hence, the deviation of a particular time
th,j, while the other times of the PM plan remain constant, does not decrease the PFD in
comparison to the nominal PFD. The PFD will increase if the deviation ∆th,j is increased.
In contrast to G(∆th,j), for some positive deviations ∆ta,1, ∆tb,2 it is Gmax(∆th,j) < 1,
see figure 5.15. The PFDmax might increase or decrease for a given deviation ∆ta,1 or
∆tb,2. The PFDmax remains constant for a deviation ∆tb,1.
An example is given below to illustrate the influence of the deviation ∆tb,2.
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Figure 5.15: Gain of PFDmax of one element model
Example 5.1 (Deviation ∆tb,2 of one element model). The deviation of the time tb,2
by ∆tb,2 = 0.88 year is analyzed. In figure 5.16, the PFD(t) plot for the nominal PM plan
is compared to that for the PM plan with the deviation ∆tb,2. It is clearly noticeable that
the PFD is slightly increased and the PFDmax is significantly decreased by the deviation
∆tb,2. These results are consistent to the sensitivity measures for ∆tb,2 = 0.88 year in
figures 5.14, 5.15, where G(∆tb,2 = 0.88) ≈ 1.03 and Gmax(∆tb,2 = 0.88) ≈ 0.92. Hence,
the PFD is increased by approx. 3% and PFDmax is decreased by approx. 8%.
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Figure 5.16: Influence of ∆tb,2 = 0.88 year on PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax
Three element model
The deviations of parameters of the three element model is analyzed. The analyzed
three element model is equivalent to that, which was introduced in subsection 5.2.3. The
element structure of the model is 1oo3. The PM plan 1 in table 5.4 is given as the nominal
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PM plan. The G(∆th,i,j), Gmax(∆th,i,j) are plotted in figures 5.17, 5.18 for the deviations
∆th,i,j ∈ {∆ta,1,1,∆tb,1,1,∆tb,1,2}.
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Figure 5.17: Gain of PFD of three element 1oo3 model
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Figure 5.18: Gain of PFDmax of three element 1oo3 model
In figure 5.17 it is noticeable that, the PFD can be significantly decreased via the
deviation ∆ta,1,1. Since the elements of the model are identical, the deviation ∆ta,2,1 or
∆ta,3,1 will provide identical results as ∆ta,1,1. A deviation ∆tb,1,1 or ∆tb,1,2 might slightly
decrease the PFD. This also holds for the deviation ∆tb,2,1, ∆tb,2,2, ∆tb,3,1, and ∆tb,3,2.
The deviation ∆th,i,j, ∆th,i,j ∈ {∆ta,1,1,∆tb,1,1,∆tb,1,2}, does not decrease the PFDmax
in comparison to the nominal PFDmax. For a negative deviation ∆th,i,j the PFDmax is
significantly increased. The PFDmax remains constant for a positive deviation ∆th,i,j, see
figure 5.18.
Conclusions
The introduced sensitivity measures G and Gmax enable to analyze the impact of a pa-
rameter deviation on the PFD or PFDmax. It was observed that the PFD or PFDmax
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might be significantly changed by the deviation of a parameter that is related to the PM
plan. It is concluded that, a given model with a nominal PM plan can be analyzed via the
introduced sensitivity measures if the parameter deviations decrease the PFD or PFDmax.
It has to be emphasized that, the deviation of only one parameter at a time was
analyzed. The introduced PM plans and probabilistic models provide the degrees of
freedom to arbitrarily vary the available parameters, also multiple parameters at a time.
The available degrees of freedom span a multi-dimensional space that is explored in only
one direction via the introduced procedure. This is illustrated in figure 5.19, where the
contour plot of the PFDmax of the one element model is shown over ∆ta,1 and ∆tb,2. The
time tb,1 remained constant, i.e. ∆tb,1 = 0. The plots of the Gmax(∆ta,1) or Gmax(∆tb,2) in
figure 5.15 reflect the movement along the y-axis or x-axis of the contour plot. As shown in
figure 5.19, all available dimensions have to be explored to determine the deviations ∆ta,1
and ∆tb,2, which provide the minimum of the PFDmax. This requires a high effort that
grows exponentially with the number of dimensions. Therefore, heuristic optimization
will be applied to explore the multi-dimensional space that is spanned by the degrees of
freedom and search for the minima of the PFD or PFDmax.
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Figure 5.19: Contour plot of PFDmax over ∆ta,1, ∆tb,2
91

Chapter 6
Optimization of preventive
maintenance plans
6.1 Preliminaries
In section 5.4 it was shown that, the PFD and PFDmax might be significantly changed
by a change of the respective PM plan. Particularly, the degrees of freedom of the PM
plans that were not treated by other models were analyzed, such as elementwise PM of
individual elements and arbitrarily variable individual periods, which are not restricted
to be equal, of PM. In this chapter a heuristic optimization algorithm is applied to vary
an initial PM plan within the given degrees of freedom to decrease the PFD or PFDmax.
The organization of this chapter is outlined below. First, the treated optimization
problems are defined in section 6.2. In section 6.3, the Nelder-Mead method is described,
which is the applied heuristic optimization algorithm. A heuristic approach to overcome
the local extrema and effectively minimize the PFDmax is introduced in section 6.4. In
section 6.5, the optimization results are presented and discussed. The general conclusions
that are given in section 6.6 were derived from the optimization results. Particularly,
a useful set of rules is given to decide for a given SRS if the PFD or PFDmax can be
significantly decreased via optimization of the PM plan.
6.2 Optimization problems
Let the probabilistic model of an SRS be given. T ∈ S is a PM plan of the given model
and S is a given PM strategy. The PM strategies that are applied in this thesis were
defined in section 4.4. The choice of a PM plan from the set that is given by a PM
strategy is formulated as the optimization problem given by
min{f(T ) | T ∈ S} , (6.1)
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where the function f(T ) : S ⊂ Rn → R is an objective function with the domain S. The
objective functions are evaluated via the given probabilistic model. The PFD and PFDmax
are calculated via the respective MP- CMC, as in section 4.2. It is assumed that, the
parameters except the PM plan remain constant and the PFD(T ) and PFDmax(T ) are
functions of T . The treated objective functions are introduced immediately hereafter.
Objective function quantifying PFD
The objective function that quantifies the PFD is given by
PFD(T ) : S ⊂ Rn → R . (6.2)
The respective optimization problem is defined by min{PFD(T ) | T ∈ S}.
Objective function quantifying PFDmax
The objective function that quantifies the PFDmax is given by
PFDmax(T ) : S ⊂ Rn → R . (6.3)
The respective optimization problem is defined by min{PFDmax(T ) | T ∈ S}.
Objective function quantifying the weighted trade-off between PFD and PFDmax
The two objective functions introduced above are combined to define the objective func-
tion that quantifies the weighted trade-off between PFD(T ) and PFDmax(T ). The respec-
tive objective function
WT (T ) : S ⊂ Rn → R , (6.4)
is given by
WT (T ) = c · PFD(T )
PFD(TPFD)
+ (1− c) · PFDmax(T )
PFDmax(TPFDmax)
. (6.5)
where c ∈ R, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, is a given trade-off factor and TPFD, TPFDmax are the argu-
ments of the solutions of the two former optimization problems defined above, TPFD =
arg
(
min{PFD(T ) | T ∈ S}) and TPFDmax = arg (min{PFDmax(T ) | T ∈ S}). The respec-
tive optimization problem is defined by min{WT (T ) | T ∈ S}.
6.3 Optimization algorithm
6.3.1 Preliminaries
This subsection treats the optimization algorithm that is applied to the optimization
problems. First, the choice of the optimization algorithm is motivated. After this, the
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Nelder-Mead method, which is the chosen optimization algorithm, is described in subsec-
tion 6.3.2.
The choice of the optimization algorithm is based on the characteristics of the respec-
tive optimization problem. The treated optimization problems are nonlinear because of
the nonlinear objective functions and no derivatives of the objective functions are avail-
able. Moreover, the objective functions are not explicitly defined due to the complexity
of an explicit definition. Instead, it is preferred to implicitly specify an objective func-
tion via a given model. A robust and easy to apply optimization algorithm is required
that can handle nonlinear objective functions and does not require derivatives of objective
functions. Several optimization algorithms might be applied to the optimization problems
with the described characteristics, e.g. evolutionary algorithms or direct search methods,
see [LTT00]. This thesis does not aim to find the best available optimization algorithm,
but to apply a robust algorithm that converges to a local or possibly global minimum.
Therefore, the Nelder-Mead method is chosen in this thesis to be applied to the treated
optimization problems.
6.3.2 Nelder-Mead method
The Nelder-Mead method was introduced in [NM65]. In [LRWW98], the convergence
properties of the Nelder-Mead method were analyzed. This optimization algorithm is
available in the optimization toolbox of MATLAB, the numerical computing software
developed by MathWorks. The Nelder-Mead method is widely applied to minimize a
scalar-valued nonlinear objective function of n real variables. Only the objective function
values are used for the optimization and no derivative information is required. The Nelder-
Mead method is usually applied to unconstrained optimization problems. However, the
treated optimization problems imply constraints for the times of a PM plan. These times
are intended to be within the mission time interval, i.e. 0 ≤ t ≤ tm. Because the constraint
violations are penalized by the objective functions, the respective optimization problems
can be treated as unconstrained optimization problems.
The algorithm of the Nelder-Mead method is outlined hereafter. Let us consider
an objective function of n variables and a given initial value. First, the initial simplex
that is specified by its n + 1 vertices is determined from the given initial value. The
initial value is the first vertex of the initial simplex. The other n vertices are calculated
by adding 5% of each component to the initial value. The objective function values of
the n + 1 vertices are calculated. After that, the algorithm computes at each iteration
an updated simplex. A set of procedures is available to compute the updated simplex.
These procedures are illustrated in figures 6.1 and 6.2 for n = 2 variables. The current
simplex is drawn by dashed lines and the respective updated simplex by solid lines. The
illustrated procedures are defined in [LRWW98]. Basically, that vertex of the simplex,
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where the objective function value is greater than that of other vertices, is moved to
a point with a less objective function value. The applied procedure to compute the
updated simplex is selected based on the relative ranks of the objective function values.
This is a characteristic feature of the direct search methods, numerical values are not
used. The iterative computation will terminate if the termination constraints are met.
If the difference in the objective function values of the simplex is less than ftol and the
difference between the current best point and the other points of the simplex is less than
xtol, the algorithm will terminate. The termination constraints ftol and xtol have to be
specified. Further termination constraints are the maximum number of iterations and the
maximum number of evaluations of the objective function. The best computed value is
returned as the solution of the evaluated optimization problem.
x1 x2
x3
xr
x1 x2
x3
xr
xe
Figure 6.1: Reflexion and expansion iterations of Nelder-Mead method; [LRWW98]
The drawbacks of the Nelder-Mead method have also to be mentioned. The Nelder-
Mead method might result in a slow convergence towards the solution of an evaluated
optimization problem. This is especially the case for high-dimensional optimization prob-
lems and in comparison to optimization algorithms that use derivatives of the objective
function. Moreover, similar to all existing nonlinear optimization algorithms, it can not
be guaranteed that the Nelder-Mead method will overcome the possibly existing local
extrema and find the global extremum.
In example 6.1 the convergence of the Nelder-Mead method is illustrated for the min-
imization of PFDmax.
Example 6.1 (Convergence of Nelder-Mead method towards a minimum). Let
the one element model be given, which was discussed in case 3 of subsection 5.3.5. The
initial PM plan is given by Tinit = (Ta, Tb), Ta = (ta,1), Tb = (tb,1, tb,2), where the times
96
6.3 Optimization algorithm
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Figure 6.2: Outside contraction, inside contraction, and shrink iterations of Nelder-Mead
method; [LRWW98]
of PM are ta,1 = 5, tb,1 = 2.5, and tb,2 = 7.5 years. The time tb,1 remains constant and
the times ta,1, tb,1 are varied by the Nelder-Mead method to minimize the PFDmax. The
contour plot of the PFDmax is shown over ∆ta,1 and ∆tb,2 in figure 6.3. The first six
iterations of the Nelder-Mead method are shown in the contour plot of figure 6.3. The
initial point is placed at the origin. It is clearly noticeable that the points computed by
the Nelder-Mead method converge towards the minimum.
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Figure 6.3: Convergence of Nelder-Mead method in example 6.1
It has to be noted that, for nonlinear optimization problems the convergence of an
optimization algorithm towards an extremum strongly depends on the chosen initial point.
The explored domain of the objective function might have multiple basins of attraction,
where the optimization algorithm would converge to a local extremum and be stucked
there. This problem occurred for some of the optimization problems that are treated in
this thesis. The next section describes the applied heuristic approach to overcome this
problem.
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6.4 Heuristic approach to minimize the maximum PFD
The drawbacks of the Nelder-Mead method were mentioned above. Particularly, the
inability to overcome local extrema is an important disadvantage. It was observed that,
local minima frequently occurred for the direct minimization of the PFDmax, especially
for an increasing number of dimensions, i.e. the number of varied times of a PM plan.
An exemplary case is shown in figure 6.4. The PFD(t) plots for the initial PM plan and
the PM plan that was determined by the direct minimization of the PFDmax are shown.
The one element model of example 6.1 was treated. The initial PM plan is given by
Tinit = (Ta, Tb), Ta = (ta,1, . . . , ta,4), Tb = (), where the times of PM type A are ta,1 = 2,
ta,2 = 4, ta,3 = 6, and ta,4 = 8 years. It is clearly noticeable that, the peaks of the blue
PFD(t) plot that results from direct minimization of PFDmax are not equal. As will be
shown below, a PM plan with equal peaks provides a value of PFDmax that is less than
that in figure 6.4. Hence, the algorithm was terminated although it is evident that the
minimum of the PFDmax was not found. The algorithm must have computed a local
minimum that could not be overcome. Different initial PM plans have been evaluated
and the algorithm usually got stuck in a local minimum. An initial PM plan that will
provide convergence to the global minimum is not available for all types of models.
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Figure 6.4: Result of direct minimization of PFDmax
In contrast to the minimization of PFDmax, no obvious problems with local extrema
occurred for the minimization of PFD. Different initial PM plans were evaluated and led
to very similar computed solutions. It can be explained by the different properties of the
objective functions that quantify PFDmax or PFD. Overall, it can not be assured that no
local minima have occurred for the minimization of PFD, but the respective optimization
problem seems to be less problematic in this regard. Therefore, the PM plans, which are
periodic with equal periods and simultaneous for all elements, will be used as initial PM
plans for the minimization of PFD.
98
6.4 Heuristic approach to minimize the maximum PFD
The heuristic approach described below is applied to improve the computation of the
optimization problem to minimize the PFDmax and overcome the local extrema. The
numerical ODE solver, which is applied to calculate the state probabilities and PFD(t)
of anMP- CMC, is utilized by the heuristic approach. The basic idea is to determine a
PM plan with equal peaks and this will be the PM plan that minimizes the PFDmax. The
applied numerical ODE solver has the so-called event location property. That will stop
the integration if a given upper bound of the PFD(t) is reached. When the given upper
bound is reached and the number of the phase transitions is not exceeded, the integration
will be stopped and the next phase transition triggered to occur. The heuristic approach
is to minimize the PFDmax by variation of the upper bound. If the upper bound is too low,
the phase transitions will occur too early and the PFD(t) will increase to a high value,
resulting in a high PFDmax. If the upper bound is too high, the phase transitions will not
occur at all and the PFDmax will also be high. If the upper bound is right, the peaks of
the PFD(t) will be equal and the PFDmax will be less than in the previous cases. It has
to be emphasized that, the sequence of the phase transitions is an additional restriction
that is required for the heuristic approach. It is assumed that this sequence is identical
to the initial PM plan. Each phase transition reflects an individual PM within the PM
plan. The resulting optimization problem is of dimension one. Hence, the PM plan with
equal peaks, which minimizes the PFDmax is determined.
The described heuristic approach is illustrated in figure 6.5. A PM plan with only one
time of PM is considered. The respective phase transition will occur if the given upper
bound PFDb is reached, i.e. at the time ta,1 in figure 6.5. By variation of the PFDb the
time of the phase transition that minimizes the PFDmax will be determined. For example,
if the upper bound PFDb in figure 6.5 is increased, the PFDmax will be decreased.
0
PFD
t
PFDb
PFDmax
tmta,1
Figure 6.5: Heuristic approach to minimize PFDmax
It has to be emphasized that, a different optimization problem is solved via the heuris-
tic approach in comparison to the direct minimization of the PFDmax. The objective
function of the heuristic approach is given by
PFDmax(PFDb) : R→ R . (6.6)
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Hence, the respective optimization problem is given by min{PFDmax(PFDb) |PFDb ∈ R}.
It is clearly noticeable that the dimension of the optimization problem is always one. In
contrast, the dimension of the direct minimization of PFDmax depends on the initial PM
plan and is usually multi-dimensional, see definition in section 6.2.
The described heuristic approach was applied to the exemplary optimization case that
is shown in figure 6.4, where a local minimum occurred. The result is shown in figure
6.6. The peaks of the blue PFD(t) plot are equal. The determined PM plan provides
the PFDmax(TPFDmax) that is less than the result of direct minimization in figure 6.4. The
introduced heuristic approach is effective to overcome local extrema and is applied in this
thesis to minimize the PFDmax.
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Figure 6.6: Result of minimization of PFDmax via heuristic approach
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Preliminaries
The Nelder-Mead method was applied to search for a PM plan from a given set to mini-
mize a given objective. The optimization results are presented below and in the following
subsections. The evaluated optimization problems were formulated in section 6.2. Partic-
ularly, the minimized objectives are the PFD, PFDmax, and the weighted trade-off between
the PFD and PFDmax.
The organization of section 6.5 is briefly outlined. A description of the optimization
procedure, which was applied to all treated models, and an overview of the results of the
1oo3 model are given directly hereafter. The optimization results of further models with
different element structures, degrees of redundancy, coverages of PM, and fractions of
cc-failures are presented and discussed in the following subsections. The models without
redundancy, which have the 1oo1 or 3oo3 element structure, are treated in subsection
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6.5.2. The treated models are additionally classified into these with a complete cover-
age of the PM type A or an incomplete coverage. In subsection 6.5.3, the models with
redundancy, which have the 1oo3 or 2oo3 element structure, are treated in a similar man-
ner. After that, the models with redundancy and common-cause failures are treated in
subsection 6.5.4.
The applied optimization procedure is described. First, the PFD was minimized.
A conventional PM plan, which is periodic with equal periods and simultaneous for
all elements, was used as the initial PM plan. After that, the PFDmax was minimized
via the heuristic approach that was presented in section 6.4. Finally, the trade-off was
minimized with the PM plan that minimizes the PFDmax as initial PM plan. These
three minimization runs were executed for different PM strategies. A PM strategy de-
fines the available degrees of freedom for the minimization. The PM plan that min-
imizes the PFD, PFDmax, or weighted trade-off is denoted by TPFD, TPFDmax , or TWT .
Each PM plan T ∈ {TPFD, TPFDmax , TWT} is characterized by the respective values of
the two objective functions PFD(T ) and PFDmax(T ). These are given relatively to
the respective values of the initial PM plan, i.e. G(T ) = PFD(T )/PFD(Tinit) and
Gmax(T ) = PFDmax(T )/PFDmax(Tinit) in figure 6.7. Due to the relative representation,
the results are independent on the number of PM of an initial PM plan. For exam-
ple, the gains G(TPFD), Gmax(TPFD) quantify the impact of the minimization of PFD
on PFD(Tinit) or PFDmax(Tinit) for an arbitrary initial PM plan with equal characteris-
tics. The results given below can be generalized for initial PM plans Tinit ∈ SV , where
Ta,i = (ta,i,1, . . . , ta,i,nea,i), Tb,i = (tb,i,1, . . . , tb,i,neb,i), and neb,i = 2nea,i. The initial PM
plan that was used for the optimization is given by Ta,i = (5) years, Tb,i = (2.5, 7.5) years,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} of a model with k elements.
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Figure 6.7: Overview of optimization results of 1oo3 model
The results of the 1oo3 model with complete coverage of PM type A are shown in figure
6.7. The gains G and Gmax are shown for each PM plan TPFD, TWT , and TPFDmax . Only
the results for the PM strategy I are given in this overview, i.e. TPFD, TWT , TPFDmax ∈ SI .
First, the minimization of PFD is discussed. The PFD is decreased by approx. 20%.
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The PFDmax is decreased by approx. 25% through the minimization of PFD. Now, the
minimization of PFDmax is discussed. The PFDmax is decreased by approx. 60% and
the PFD is decreased by approx. 7% through the minimization of PFDmax. It has to be
noted that, the lowest determined values of G and Gmax did not occur simultaneously. It
indicates that the objectives to minimize the G or Gmax are conflictive. The minimization
results of the weighted trade-off between PFD and PFDmax are given for selected values
of c. The choice of the weighting factor c enables to determine a PM plan that provides
the desired trade-off between the minimal PFD and PFDmax. Overall, it is demonstrated
that, the introduced optimization framework is effective to significantly decrease the PFD
or PFDmax, and for this model even both of them simultaneously.
6.5.2 Models without redundancy
PM type A with complete coverage
The optimization results of models without redundancy, with the 1oo1 or 3oo3 element
structure, are presented and discussed below. These models feature a complete coverage of
the PM type A. The minimization of PFD or PFDmax is treated. In figure 6.8, the results
of the 1oo1 model are shown. It has to be noted that, the simultaneous PM are not
applicable to the 1oo1 model due to only one element. Hence, the PM strategies explored
by optimization are limited to the PM strategies IIIb and I. In contrast, for models with
multiple elements all the PM strategies, defined in section 4.4, were explored. The results
of the 3oo3 model are shown in figure 6.9.
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Figure 6.8: Optimization results of 1oo1 model with complete coverage
The results of the minimization of PFD are discussed first. The decrease in PFD is less
than 0.1% for the 1oo1 and 3oo3 models, as shown in figures 6.8 and 6.9. This decrease
is considered to be negligible. In comparison to the initial PM plan, the minimization
of PFD does not significantly decrease the PFD. Moreover, the PFDmax is increased by
approx. 2-4% through the minimization of PFD.
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Figure 6.9: Optimization results of 3oo3 model with complete coverage
The discussed results are explained below. The observed negligible decrease in PFD
is explained by the shape of the respective PFD(t) plots, see figures 6.10, 6.11. The
PFD(t) plots have an approx. constant gradient. For the 1oo1 model it is caused by the
comparably small rate parameters of failures and large rate parameters of repairs. This
leads to an approx. constant probability flow to the states of theMP- CMC, where the
safety function is not provided. For the 3oo3 model, the total PFD(t) is the sum of the
PFD(t) of each element. In general it can be stated that, the models without redundancy
have a PFD(t) plot with an approx. constant gradient for usual practically relevant
values of the rate parameters. For an approx. constant gradient of the PFD(t), a periodic
PM plan with equal periods will provide a comparable low PFD that can not be further
significantly decreased by optimization. Furthermore, if the number of the PM executions
per element is equal, a PM plan that is simultaneous for all elements will be appropriate
to provide low PFD. However, for some particular values of the rate parameters the
minimization of PFD might determine a PM plan that significantly decreases the PFD.
Now, the results of the minimization of PFDmax are discussed. The greatest decrease
in PFDmax equals approx. 10% or 22% for the 1oo1 or 3oo3 models, as shown in figures
6.8 and 6.9. The PFD is increased by approx. 4% or 9% through the minimization of
PFDmax. For the 1oo1 model only two PM strategies were evaluated. Hence, in order to
analyze all available PM strategies we focus on the 3oo3 model. The results are compared,
starting with the PM strategy with the most restrictions, i.e. IV and continue to that
with the least, i.e. I. The detailed analysis of figure 6.9 identifies that, the decrease in
PFDmax occurred in three steps. In a first step, the PFDmax is decreased by approx. 10%
via optimization for the explored PM strategy IV or IIIa. A further decrease by approx.
3% is achieved for the explored PM strategy IIIb or II. Finally, the total decrease in
PFDmax, by approx. 22%, is achieved for the explored PM strategy I.
The discussed results of the minimization of PFDmax are explained below. The decrease
in PFDmax, which is related to the first step of decrease, is achieved via the variation of the
simultaneously executed PM B, permitted by the PM strategy IV. No further significant
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Figure 6.10: PFD(t) for optimized PM plans of 1oo1 model with complete coverage
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Figure 6.11: PFD(t) for optimized PM plans of 3oo3 model with complete coverage
decrease is achieved via the additional variation of the simultaneously executed PM A,
permitted by the PM strategy IIIa. A further decrease is achieved via the additional
variation of the elementwise executed PM B, permitted by the PM strategy IIIb. Again,
no further significant decrease is achieved via the additional variation of the simultaneously
executed PM A, permitted by the PM strategy II. Finally, a further decrease is achieved
via the additional variation of the elementwise executed PM A, permitted by the PM
strategy I. Overall, the significant total decrease in PFDmax is explained via the greater
total number of phase transitions for the elementwise PM A and B. The greater number
of phase transitions more effectively prevents the PFD(t) from an increase to high values.
The results of the minimization of the trade-off between PFD and PFDmax are shown
in figure 6.8 for selected weighting factors. The PFD(t) plots of the 1oo1 or 3oo3 models
are shown in figures 6.10, 6.11. The PFD(t) plots for the PM plans that minimize the
PFD or PFDmax are shown in comparison to the PFD(t) for the initial PM plan. The
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initial PM plan is periodic with equal periods and simultaneously executed PM. The PFD
and PFDmax are shown for the PM plans, which were determined by optimization.
PM type A with incomplete coverage
Now, the models that feature the PM type A with an incomplete coverage of 80% are
treated. The minimization of PFD and PFDmax is treated in a similar way as above. In
figures 6.12, 6.13 the results of the 1oo1 or 3oo3 model are shown.
SI SIIIb
G
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
SI SIIIb
G
m
a
x
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
TPFDmax
TWT , c = 0.75
TWT , c = 0.9
T
PFD
Figure 6.12: Optimization results of 1oo1 model with incomplete coverage
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Figure 6.13: Optimization results of 3oo3 model with incomplete coverage
The results of the minimization of PFD are very similar to the results of the models
with complete coverage of PM, which were discussed above. Hence, the derived findings
are equivalent to those that were given above.
The results of the minimization of PFDmax differ from those of the models with com-
plete coverage of PM. The differences are described below. Each explored PM strat-
egy with less restrictions on the respective PM plans provided a significant decrease in
PFDmax. It is clearly noticeable for the PM strategies IV, IIIb, IIIa, II, and I, see figure
6.13. However, for some PM strategies a disproportionately large increase in PFD was
caused through the minimization of PFDmax. This is the case for the PM strategies IV and
105
6 Optimization of preventive maintenance plans
IIIb. Furthermore, the PFD is overall slightly greater increased through the minimization
of PFDmax, in comparison to the results of the models with complete coverage of PM, see
figure 6.9.
The discussed results of the minimization of PFDmax are explained below. The dispro-
portionately large increase in PFD through the minimization of PFDmax is treated first.
This is explained by the times of the PM A, which are not varied by the optimization
for the given PM strategies IV and IIIb. The variation of the times of PM A enables
to achieve a greater decrease in PFDmax for a less increase in PFD. Finally, the overall
greater increase in PFD through the minimization of PFDmax is explained by the incom-
plete coverage of the PM type A. Therefore, the PM plans require greater changes (i.e. a
greater shift to the right on the time axis) to minimize the PFDmax, in comparison to the
models with complete coverage of PM.
The PFD(t) plots of the 3oo3 model with an incomplete coverage of PM are shown in
figure 6.14.
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Figure 6.14: PFD(t) for optimized PM plans of 3oo3 model with incomplete coverage
6.5.3 Models with redundancy
PM type A with complete coverage
The optimization results of models with redundancy, with the 1oo3 or 2oo3 element
structure, are presented and discussed below. The treated models feature a complete
coverage of the PM type A. The minimization of PFD or PFDmax is treated in a similar
way as described above for the models without redundancy. In figure 6.15, the results of
the 1oo3 model are shown. The results of the 2oo3 model are shown in figure 6.16.
The results of the minimization of PFD are discussed first. The greatest decrease in
PFD equals approx. 20% or 5% for the 1oo3 or 2oo3 models, as shown in figures 6.15 and
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Figure 6.15: Optimization results of 1oo3 model with complete coverage
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Figure 6.16: Optimization results of 2oo3 model with complete coverage
6.16. The PFDmax is decreased by approx. 27% or 7% through the minimization of PFD.
The detailed analysis of the figures 6.15 and 6.16 identifies that, the decrease in PFD was
mainly achieved via optimization for the explored PM strategy I.
The discussed results are explained below. For the 1oo3 model, the decrease in PFD is
significant because the PM type A of each element is also a PM type A of the entire 1oo3
model, even with a complete coverage. Hence, a PM plan with elementwise PM type A
provides a greater total number of PM that are applied to the model, in comparison to
a PM plan with simultaneous PM. For the 2oo3 model the achieved decrease in PFD is
significantly less compared to the 1oo3 model. This is explained by the elementwise PM
type A, which are only PM with incomplete coverage of the entire 2oo3 model.
Now, the results of the minimization of PFDmax are discussed. The greatest decrease
in PFDmax equals approx. 60% or 40%, see figures 6.15 and 6.16. It has to be noted
that, the achieved decrease in PFDmax is significantly greater than for models without
redundancy. Through the minimization of PFDmax, the PFD is decreased by approx. 5%
or increased by approx. 5%. The detailed analysis of figures 6.15, 6.16 in regard to the
explored PM strategies identifies that, the decrease in PFDmax occurs in three steps, as
for the models without redundancy and with complete coverage of PM, see subsection
107
6 Optimization of preventive maintenance plans
6.5.2.
The discussed results of the minimization of PFDmax are explained below. The eval-
uated PM strategies provide similar results as those of the models without redundancy
and with complete coverage of PM, see subsection 6.5.2. Hence, the derived findings are
equivalent to those given above. The significantly greater achieved decrease in PFDmax is
explained by the increasing gradient of PFD(t) of the models with redundancy. The in-
creasing gradient leads to high peaks of PFD(t) and a greater initial PFDmax that enables
a greater decrease.
The PFD(t) plots of the 1oo3 or 2oo3 model with complete coverage of PM are shown
in figures 6.17, 6.18.
Time t (year)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
F
D
0.0
0.1
0.2
×10−3
PFD(t) for Tinit
PFD(t) for T
PFD
PFD(t) for TPFDmax
Figure 6.17: PFD(t) for optimized PM plans of 1oo3 model with complete coverage
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Figure 6.18: PFD(t) for optimized PM plans of 2oo3 model with complete coverage
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PM type A with incomplete coverage
The models with redundancy and a PM type A with an incomplete coverage of 80% are
treated below. The minimization of PFD and PFDmax is treated in a similar way as above.
In figure 6.19, the results of the 1oo3 model are shown. The results of the 2oo3 model are
shown in figure 6.20.
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Figure 6.19: Optimization results of 1oo3 model with incomplete coverage
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Figure 6.20: Optimization results of 2oo3 model with incomplete coverage
The results of the minimization of PFD are discussed first. The greatest decrease in
PFD equals approx. 8% or 3% for the 1oo3 or 2oo3 models, as shown in figures 6.19 and
6.20. Compared to the models with redundancy and complete coverage of PM, which
were treated above, the achieved decrease in PFD is significantly less. The PFDmax is
significantly decreased by approx. 20% or 8% through the minimization of PFD.
The discussed results are explained below. The occurred less decrease in PFD is
explained by the less coverage of PM. The dn-failures that are caused by the incomplete
coverage can not be revealed by PM. These failures significantly contribute to the total
PFD and this contribution can not be influenced by the PM. Hence, the decrease that
can be achieved is less.
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Now, the results of the minimization of PFDmax are discussed. The greatest decrease
in PFDmax equals approx. 60% or 40% for the 1oo3 or 2oo3 models, as shown in figures
6.19 and 6.20. The results are comparable to those of models with redundancy and
complete coverage of PM, which were discussed above. It has to be noted that, through
the minimization of PFDmax the PFD is increased significantly greater than for models
with redundancy and complete coverage of PM.
The discussed results of the minimization of PFDmax are explained below. The men-
tioned greater increase in PFD through the minimization of PFDmax is explained by the
incomplete coverage of PM type A. Therefore, the PM plans that minimize the PFDmax
require a greater shift to the right on the time axis and this causes a greater increase in
PFD. Moreover, an observation, that also occurred for models with incomplete test cov-
erage and without redundancy, has to be mentioned here. It was described in subsection
6.5.2. For the PM strategies IV and IIIb, a disproportionately large increase in PFD is
caused through the minimization of PFDmax. This observation was explained above.
The PFD(t) plots of the 1oo3 and 2oo3 models with incomplete coverage of PM are
shown in figures 6.21, 6.22.
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Figure 6.21: PFD(t) for optimized PM plans of 1oo3 model with incomplete coverage
6.5.4 Models with redundancy and common-cause failures
1oo3 element structure
The impact of the cc-failures on the optimization results that were treated above is an-
alyzed. The minimization of PFD or PFDmax was evaluated for a gradually increasing
fraction of the cc-failures β. The evaluated values of β were equal for all failure modes
and given by 0, 0.01, 0.05, or 0.1. These values were denoted in %, i.e. 0%, 1%, etc. The
PM strategy I was explored via optimization. Further PM strategies were not explored,
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Figure 6.22: PFD(t) for optimized PM plans of 2oo3 model with incomplete coverage
in contrast to the results of models without cc-failures, which were presented above. In
figures 6.23, 6.24, the results of the 1oo3 model are given for a complete or an incomplete
coverage of PM.
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Figure 6.23: Optimization results of 1oo3 model, complete coverage and cc-failures
The results of the minimization of PFD are discussed first. For an increased fraction
of cc-failures, a greater decrease in PFD is achieved. Additionally, a greater decrease in
PFDmax is achieved for an increased fraction of cc-failures through the minimization of
PFD.
The discussed results are explained below. The elementwise PM of 1oo3 model effec-
tively reveal the cc-failures. Hence, if the fraction of cc-failures is increased, the achieved
decrease in PFD will be greater.
Now, the results of the minimization of PFDmax are discussed. For an increased fraction
of cc-failures, a less decrease in PFDmax is achieved. Additionally, a greater decrease
in PFD is achieved for an increased fraction of cc-failures through the minimization of
PFDmax.
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Figure 6.24: Optimization results of 1oo3 model, incomplete coverage and cc-failures
The discussed results of the minimization of PFDmax are explained below. An increased
fraction of cc-failures results in a less decreasing gradient of PFD(t), since the redundancy
of the model is weakened. Its behavior gets similar to a model without redundancy, where
the initial PFDmax is less than that of a model with redundancy. The reduced initial
PFDmax results in the decreased ability of the model to reduce PFDmax.
2oo3 element structure
In figures 6.25, 6.26, the impact of the cc-failures on the optimization results of the 2oo3
model is illustrated for a complete and an incomplete coverage of PM.
0% 1% 5% 10%
G
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
0% 1% 5% 10%
G
m
a
x
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
TPFDmax
T
PFD
Figure 6.25: Optimization results of 2oo3 model, complete coverage and cc-failures
The results of the minimization of PFD are discussed first. For an increased fraction
of cc-failures, a less decrease in PFD is achieved. Additionally, a less decrease in PFDmax
is achieved for an increased fraction of cc-failures through the minimization of PFD.
The discussed results are explained below. In contrast to the 1oo3 model, the element-
wise PM do not effectively reveal the cc-failures. That is because at least two elements are
required to provide the safety function. Hence, if the fraction of cc-failures is increased,
the achieved decrease in PFD will be less.
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Figure 6.26: Optimization results of 2oo3 model, incomplete coverage and cc-failures
Now, the results of the minimization of PFDmax are discussed. For an increased fraction
of cc-failures, a less decrease in PFDmax is achieved. These results are comparable to those
of the 1oo3 model with cc-failures, which were discussed above. Additionally, no clear
tendency was observed for the changes in PFD through the minimization of PFDmax.
The discussed results of the minimization of PFDmax are explained below. The findings
on the reduced decrease in PFDmax are equivalent to those of the 1oo3 model with cc-
failures, which were given above.
6.6 General conclusions
Preliminaries
As demonstrated in section 6.5, an effective framework is provided to determine a PM plan
via optimization, for the objective to minimize the PFD, PFDmax, or weighted trade-off
between the PFD and PFDmax. This framework has been applied to selected types of SRS
models and the results were discussed in section 6.5. The general conclusions that were
derived from these results are presented in this section. The practically relevant types of
SRSs are treated. These SRSs have a conventional PM plan that is periodic with equal
periods and simultaneous for all elements. Particularly, a set of rules is given to decide
for a given SRS if the PFD or PFDmax can be significantly decreased via optimization of
the PM plan. These rules are based on the characteristics of an SRS, such as the degree
of redundancy, coverage of the PM, fraction of cc-failures, etc. Furthermore, the degrees
of freedom of a PM plan are specified, which have to be modified to achieve the desired
decrease. These degrees of freedom comprise elementwise PM of individual elements and
arbitrarily variable individual periods, which are not restricted to be equal, of a PM. The
provided rules enable to decide if the introduced framework should be applied to a given
SRS or not. Each of the following subsections treats an objective that will be minimized.
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PM plans to minimize PFD
The examined SRSs are classified into the SRSs without redundancy or with redundancy,
in order to decide if the PFD can be decreased. For an SRS without redundancy the PFD
can not be significantly decreased. In contrast, for an SRS with redundancy the PFD
can be significantly decreased and even the PFDmax will be simultaneously decreased. It
was shown that, the PFD is decreased by up to 20% for an SRS with the 1oo3 element
structure and complete coverage of the PM type A. The desired decrease is achieved by
the following modifications of the PM plan: elementwise PM type A and B and variable
individual periods of the PM type A and B. It has to be noted that, if these modifications
are not applicable to a given SRS, most likely no significant decrease in the PFD will be
achieved. The achieved decrease in the PFD will be declined by the decreased degree of
redundancy and coverage of the PM type A. The increased fraction of cc-failures might
enhance or decline the decrease in the PFD, depending on the degree of redundancy. For
a higher degree of redundancy, e.g. 1oo3, the decrease in the PFD will be significantly
enhanced by the increased fraction of cc-failures. In contrast, the decrease in the PFD
will be declined by the increased fraction of cc-failures for a lower degree of redundancy,
e.g. 2oo3.
PM plans to minimize PFDmax
The PFDmax can be significantly decreased for a given SRS independent of its charac-
teristics. However, the PFD will be most likely simultaneously increased. It was shown
that, the PFDmax is decreased by up to 60% for an SRS with the 1oo3 element structure
and complete coverage of the PM type A. The desired decrease is achieved by a set of
modifications of the PM plan, where each modification contributes to the decrease, as
outlined below. The examined SRSs are classified into the SRSs with the complete or
incomplete coverage of the PM type A. For a complete coverage, the following sets of
modifications provide an ascending decrease in PFDmax:
• variable individual periods of the simultaneous PM type B,
• variable individual periods of the elementwise PM type B,
• variable individual periods of the elementwise PM type A and B.
The greatest decrease in PFDmax will be achieved via the latter modifications, but the
less decrease that will be achieved via the two former will be significant as well. For an
SRS with an incomplete coverage, the sets of modifications are the following, in ascending
order:
• variable individual periods of the simultaneous PM type A and B,
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• variable individual periods of PM type A and B, where PM type A is simultaneous,
and PM type B is elementwise,
• variable individual periods of the elementwise PM type A and B.
As above, the greatest decrease will be achieved via the latter modifications and each set
will provide a significant decrease. It has to be noted that, further modifications, which
are related only to the PM type B, will also provide a significant decrease in PFDmax, but
for a disproportionately large increase in PFD. Therefore, these modifications are not
recommended for the SRSs with the incomplete coverage of the PM type A. In general,
the decrease in the PFDmax will be declined by the decreased degree of redundancy and
increased fraction of cc-failures.
PM plans to minimize the trade-off between PFD and PFDmax
The objectives to minimize the PFD or PFDmax are usually conflictive, e.g. the minimiza-
tion of the PFDmax leads to a significant increase in the PFD and vice versa. Hence, the
objective to minimize the weighted trade-off between the PFD and PFDmax is effective
to simultaneously consider both objectives. The objective function of the trade-off has a
weighting factor that quantifies the priorities of the two objectives.
In particular, for an SRS the PFDmax can be significantly decreased for a slight simul-
taneous increase in PFD. This ability is independent of the characteristics of the SRS.
The desired decrease is achieved by the following modifications of the PM plan: elemen-
twise PM type A and B and variable individual periods of the PM type A and B. This
set of modification provides the degrees of freedom to achieve most favorable trade-off
between the PFD and PFDmax. If some of the mentioned modifications are not available,
the achieved trade-off will be significantly worse.
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Chapter 7
Summaries
7.1 Summary in English
Probabilistic modeling
The probabilistic models of the Safety-related Systems (SRS) were introduced in this
thesis. An SRS is build up of multiple possibly dependent elements, which are subject
to multiple maintenance actions and failure modes. The failure modes comprise the safe,
dangerous detected, dangerous undetected, and dangerous non-revealable failures. The in-
troduced models focus on the detailed modeling of the preventive maintenance (PM). The
PM intends to reveal the undetected failures of an SRS and provides repair if necessary.
Up to two different types of PM for each element of the SRS were modeled, where each
type has a different coverage to reveal the undetected failures. The PM is scheduled via a
given PM plan that specifies the times when each particular type of PM of each element
of an SRS will be executed. A framework was provided to first model individual elements
of an SRS and afterwards automatically compose the respective model of the entire SRS.
A new class of probabilistic models, the Stochastic and Deterministic Timed Automata
(SDTA) were defined to enable the elementwise modeling and composition. The SDTA
are strongly connected to the concepts of the SRSs and enable straightforward modeling
of an SRS under consideration of the dependencies of individual elements. Moreover, an
insight is provided into further automata-based types of probabilistic models, which fea-
ture more or less restrictions on the timing of events. The probabilistic figures of merit of
the modeled SRS were efficiently computed via the Multi-phase Continuous-time Markov
Chains (MP-CMC). For this purpose the SDTAs were transformed into the MP-CMCs
by means of a transformation that was introduced in this thesis. The computed figures
of merit were the instantaneous, average, and maximum probability of dangerous failure
on demand (PFD), denoted by PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax.
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Model analysis and validation
The introduced framework to model the SRSs was applied to multiple selected SRSs with
practically relevant element structures and characteristics. These models were validated
via selected established models from the literature. It was shown that, the introduced
models provide plausible results and exhibit various exclusive features in comparison to
the literature models. These exclusive features, such as the detailed modeling of the
PM, were demonstrated and discussed. A procedure that is based on sensitivity analysis
was introduced and applied to analyze the parameter variations of the models. The
analysis has shown that, the parameter variations related to the PM have a significant
impact on the PFD(t), PFD, and PFDmax. Particularly, the parameter variations that are
related to the exclusive features of the introduced models were analyzed. It was concluded
that, additional degrees of freedom are available for the PM plans of the SRSs, such as
elementwise PM of individual elements and arbitrarily variable individual periods, which
are not restricted to be equal. These degrees of freedom can be used to decrease the PFD
or PFDmax or both in order to make an SRS more effective.
Optimization of PM plans
The choice of a PM plan within the available degrees of freedom for a given SRS was
formulated as an optimization problem. Different optimization objectives that are mini-
mized were introduced, such as the PFD or PFDmax or the weighted trade-off between the
PFD and PFDmax. The objective functions, which quantify the objectives, were given via
the respective probabilistic models. The Nelder-Mead method was applied to compute
the treated optimization problems. For selected practically relevant types of SRS, the
respective optimization problems were computed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
Nelder-Mead method. It has been shown that, the determined PM plans provide most
likely a significant decrease in the PFD or PFDmax or a favorable trade-off between the
two former. A set of rules was given to decide based on the characteristics of a given
SRS if the PFD or PFDmax can be significantly decreased via optimization. These rules
address practically relevant types of SRSs. The required degrees of freedom of PM to
decrease the desired objective were identified and evaluated. The presented rules aim to
support the decision if the optimization of a PM plan should be applied to a given SRS
or not.
7.2 Outlook
In this thesis, it has been shown that the probabilistic model of an SRS can be determined
via the SDTA. A model is provided that is based on automata and reflects the discrete
states and events, which are related to failure, repair, and restoration of the SRS. The
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events are classified to be either deterministic or exponential stochastic timed. The state
probabilities of the probabilistic model are efficiently calculated via the MP-CMC, which
is done to determine the PFD(t) and related figures of merit.
A promising research topic for future work is to extend the introduced probabilistic
model to arbitrarily timed events. This will lead to the Stochastic Timed Automaton
(STA), which was defined in [CL08]. The STA provides a probabilistic model, where
the events are timed by arbitrary CDFs and not restricted to be either deterministic or
exponential stochastic timed. This enables to model systems with failure and repair pro-
cesses that are not restricted to be deterministic or exponential. However, the numerical
calculation of the probabilistic figures of merit is expected to be more complex and less
efficient.
7.3 Extended summary in German – Kurzfassung in
deutscher Sprache
Motivation und wichtige Beiträge der Dissertation
In der Industrie werden zahlreiche technische Einrichtungen und Geräte, z.B. Maschinen,
Apparate oder Anlagen, betrieben. Ausfälle und Störungen dieser technischen Einrich-
tungen können eine Gefährdung von Mensch, Umwelt, Produktionsmitteln und Gütern
verursachen. Zum Schutz vor diesen Gefährdungen muss eine technische Einrichtung bei
einem Ausfall aus einem gefährlichen in einen sicheren Zustand überführt werden. Die-
se wichtige Aufgabe erfüllen die sogenannten sicherheitsbezogenen Systeme. Durch den
Einsatz dieser Systeme wird das Risiko von den beschriebenen Gefährdungen auf ein tole-
rierbares Maß herabgesetzt. Auf diese Weise können diese technischen Einrichtungen un-
ter Beherrschung der von ihnen ausgehenden Gefährdungen und dem damit verbundenen
Risiko betrieben werden. Die sicherheitsbezogenen Systeme sind in vielen verschiedenen
Industriezweigen im Einsatz, z.B. in der Prozessindustrie, Automobilindustrie, etc. und
schließen eine Vielzahl von unterschiedlichen Systemen ein.
Aufgrund der hohen Bedeutung der sicherheitsbezogenen Systeme werden durch inter-
nationale Normen besondere Forderungen an diese gestellt. Unter anderem in der Norm
[IEC11e] werden diese Forderungen beschrieben. Damit soll sichergestellt werden, dass
eine ausreichende Risikoreduktion für vorhandene Gefährdungen gewährleistet wird. Die
vorgegebenen Forderungen an ein sicherheitsbezogenes System richten sich nach dem Ri-
siko der Gefährdung, die von der zu überwachenden technischen Einrichtung ausgeht.
Dabei werden für technische Einrichtungen mit kontinuierlicher, hoher oder niedriger An-
forderungsart an ein sicherheitsbezogenes System unterschiedliche Forderungen gestellt.
In dieser Dissertation wird die niedrige Anforderungsart betrachtet, das bedeutet dass ein
sicherheitsbezogenes System im Mittel nicht häufiger als einmal im Jahr von der über-
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wachten technischen Einrichtung angefordert wird. Eine wichtige Forderung aus der Norm
an solche sicherheitsbezogenen Systeme gibt risikoabhängige Grenzwerte für die mittlere
Wahrscheinlichkeit eines gefahrbringenden Ausfalls bei Anforderung (PFD, engl. Probabi-
lity of Dangerous Failure on Demand) vor. Ein rechnerischer Nachweis wird gefordert, dass
die vorgegebenen Grenzwerte für die mittlere PFD nicht überschritten werden. Die PFD
ist eine probabilistische Kenngröße, welche mittels geeigneter probabilistischer Modelle
berechnet wird.
Das Verhalten von sicherheitsbezogenen Systemen unter Berücksichtigung von Aus-
fall und Wiederherstellung wird durch probabilistische Modelle modelliert. Mehrere Arten
von Ausfällen werden unterschieden: ungefährliche, gefahrbringende, erkannte sowie uner-
kannte. Insbesondere die gefahrbringenden unerkannten Ausfälle beeinträchtigen die PFD
erheblich. Als Gegenmaßnahme wird die präventive Instandhaltung eingesetzt. Damit sind
die Maßnahmen gemeint, welche zur Aufdeckung von gefahrbringenden unerkannten Aus-
fällen und ggf. Wiederherstellung durchgeführt werden. Die präventive Instandhaltung
von sicherheitsbezogenen Systemen ist von hoher Bedeutung, da sie deren Funktions-
fähigkeit und damit einen ausreichenden Schutz vor Gefährdungen gewährleistet. Diese
Dissertation legt ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die Modellierung der präventiven Instand-
haltung sicherheitsbezogener Systeme. Es werden dazu geeignete probabilistische Modelle
entwickelt. Diese Modelle ermöglichen insbesondere eine präzisere und detailliertere Mo-
dellierung der präventiven Instandhaltung als die in der Literatur verwendeten Modelle.
Die damit gewonnenen Freiheitsgrade werden analysiert und mittels Optimierung dazu
verwendet die PFD zu verbessern. Das Risiko von den jeweiligen Gefährdungen kann
damit deutlich herabgesetzt werden und der Schutz verbessert werden.
Die wichtigen Beiträge dieser Dissertation werden in folgende Kategorien unterteilt:
• Probabilistische Modellierung von sicherheitsbezogenen Systemen zur Berechnung
der probabilistischen Kenngrößen mittlere, instantane und maximale PFD unter
detaillierter Berücksichtigung der präventiven Instandhaltung,
• Validierung der eingeführten probabilistischen Modelle durch Literaturmodelle und
Analyse der Einflüsse präventiver Instandhaltung auf die probabilistischen Kenngrö-
ßen unter Berücksichtigung der gewonnenen, bisher vernachlässigten Freiheitsgrade,
• Optimierung der präventiven Instandhaltung durch die Formulierung geeigneter
Optimierungsprobleme zur Minimierung ausgewählter probabilistischer Kenngrößen
und deren Lösung unter Verwendung des Nelder-Mead-Verfahrens.
Jede Kategorie wird im Folgenden ausführlicher erläutert.
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7.3 Extended summary in German – Kurzfassung in deutscher Sprache
Probabilistische Modellierung
Die probabilistischen Modelle in dieser Dissertation basieren auf den zeitbewerteten Auto-
maten mit exponentialverteilten und deterministischen Verweilzeiten sowie den zeitkon-
tinuierlichen Mehrphasen-Markov-Ketten. Die erstgenannte Modellklasse wird in dieser
Arbeit zur Modellierung der sicherheitsbezogenen Systeme eingeführt. Dabei wird ein
enger Zusammenhang zu den jeweiligen Konzepten und Begriﬄichkeiten hergestellt, wie
beispielsweise mehrere Arten von Ausfällen sowie verschiedene relevante Instandhaltungs-
tätigkeiten, z.B. Prüfungen, Instandsetzung, Wiederherstellung, usw. Dieses Modell ent-
spricht der Denkweise eines Ingenieurs in einem höheren Maße als Markov-Ketten, die
dafür eine effiziente Berechnung der probabilistischen Kenngrößen ermöglichen. Darüber
hinaus lässt sich mittels der eingeführten zeitbewerteten Automaten die Verbindung zu
weiteren Modellklassen herstellen, welche entweder mehr oder weniger Einschränkungen
an die Verweilzeiten enthalten.
Insgesamt wird in dieser Dissertation eine ganzheitliche Methode zur probabilistischen
Modellierung präsentiert, welche die getrennte Modellierung einzelner Teile eines Systems
ermöglicht, die dann automatisch zu dem Gesamtmodell zusammengesetzt werden kön-
nen. Dabei lassen sich auch Abhängigkeiten der einzelnen Teile modellieren. Dies wird am
Beispiel eines gemeinsamen Reparaturteams für mehrere Teilsysteme verdeutlicht. Das
gewonnene Modell in Form eines zeitbewerteten Automaten lässt sich mit einer definier-
ten Transformation in die entsprechende Mehrphasen Markov-Kette überführen. Damit
können die probabilistischen Kenngrößen instantane, mittlere und maximale PFD effizient
berechnet werden.
Validierung und Analyse der probabilistischen Modelle
Die eingeführten probabilistischen Modelle werden zur Modellierung von mehreren Syste-
men mit praxisrelevanten MooN -Strukturen und Eigenschaften verwendet. Diese werden
mittels ausgewählter etablierter Literaturmodelle validiert. Es werden die Unterschiede
zu den Literaturmodellen diskutiert, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die detailliertere Mo-
dellierung der präventiven Instandhaltung. Eine Analyse der gewonnenen Freiheitsgrade
auf Basis einer Sensitivitätsanalyse wird durchgeführt. Damit wird gezeigt, dass sich die
gewonnenen Freiheitsgrade der präventiven Instandhaltung signifikant auf die probabilis-
tischen Kenngrößen auswirken.
Optimierung der präventiven Instandhaltung
Auf Basis der verfügbaren Freiheitsgrade der präventiven Instandhaltung werden mehre-
re Strategien präventiver Instandhaltung definiert. Die Pläne präventiver Instandhaltung
werden in Klassen mit unterschiedlichen Freiheitsgraden eingeteilt. Mit einem Plan der
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präventiven Instandhaltung werden alle jeweiligen Maßnahmen für ein System terminiert
und die resultierenden probabilistischen Kenngrößen können berechnet werden.
Die Pläne präventiver Instandhaltung werden optimiert, um eine Verbesserung der pro-
babilistischen Kenngrößen zu erzielen. Es werden die mittlere oder maximale PFD oder
alternativ eine zusammengesetzte, gewichtete Zielfunktion aus der mittleren und maxima-
len PFD minimiert. Die Minimierung erfolgt durch die Variation eines Plans präventiver
Instandhaltung innerhalb der durch die jeweilige Strategie präventiver Instandhaltung
verfügbaren Freiheitsgrade. Das Nelder-Mead-Verfahren wird zur Lösung der Optimie-
rungsprobleme verwendet. Es handelt sich dabei um einen heuristischen Optimierungsal-
gorithmus aus der Kategorie der Hillclimbing- oder Downhill-Suchverfahren.
Die Optimierung wird für ausgewählte, praktisch relevante Modelle durchgeführt und
die Ergebnisse analysiert. Die Performanz eines Systems, im Hinblick auf die mittlere und
maximale PFD, lässt sich in den meisten Fällen signifikant verbessern. Aus den Ergeb-
nissen werden wichtige Schlussfolgerungen mit Relevanz für die Praxis gewonnen. Durch
die in dieser Dissertation bereitgestellten Regeln lässt sich abschätzen, ob die mittlere
oder maximale PFD eines sicherheitsbezogenen Systems durch die Optimierung signi-
fikant verbessert werden kann. Diese Regeln basieren auf den Merkmalen des Systems,
wie z.B. Redundanz oder keine Redundanz, vollständige oder unvollständige Abdeckung
der präventiven Instandhaltung, usw. Mit dieser Entscheidungshilfe kann ein Ingenieur
abschätzen, ob der Einsatz der beschriebenen Optimierungsmethoden für ein System vor-
teilhaft sein kann.
Ausblick
Für die weitere Forschung im Bereich der probabilistischen Modellierung von sicherheits-
bezogenen Systemen erscheint eine Verallgemeinerung der hier verwendeten zeitbewer-
teten Automaten interessant. Durch die Ausweitung auf beliebig verteilte stochastische
Verweilzeiten können auch Ausfall- und Instandsetzungsprozesse mit Verweilzeiten, die
nicht exponentialverteilt oder deterministisch sind, berücksichtigt werden. Damit wird
jedoch die numerische Berechnung der probabilistischen Kenngrößen voraussichtlich er-
schwert und weniger effizient.
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Model of SRS element with reduced
number of states
The SDTA that models an SRS element is introduced below. The SDTA has been deter-
mined to have a low number of states as possible on one hand and on the other hand to
provide a sufficiently precise model.
The events introduced to model an SRS were defined in chapter 2. Let the SDTA
of the i-th SRS element be discussed. The CM event cmddi and the PM events pma2i,
pmb2i are closely related, as outlined hereafter. All these events are STEs and indicate
restoration due to a completed CM or PM after the element previously suffered from a
dd-, dua-, or duab-failure. The dd-failures are immediately detected, in contrast to the
dua- and duab-failures, revealed only by the respective PM activities. However, once
the dua- or duab-failures are revealed, these are treated just like the dd-failures. The
respective maintenance activities are immediately initiated and last for the period of time
until the restoration is achieved. This is modeled by the respective events cmddi, pma2i,
and pmb2i, which become active and occur. The states/transitions diagram to illustrate
the reasoning above is given in figure A.1. The events cmddi, pma2i, and pmb2i trigger
the individual transitions of the state 2* to state 1, 3* to 1, and 6* to 1 respectively.
Thus, the maintenance activities to achieve restoration in consequence of the dd-failures,
the revealed dua-, and duab-failures are modeled individually. Due to that, the rate
parameters of cmddi, pma2i, and pmb2i can be individually parametrized and reflect the
respective characteristics of the maintenance activities.
In practical applications, the maintenance activities to achieve restoration in conse-
quence of the dd-failures, or the revealed dua-, duab-failures have equal characteristics.
This feature is used in the following to reduce the number of states of the SDTA and
reduce the complexity of the model. Therefore, the following assumption is formulated.
Assumption 7 (Restoration of dd-, dua-, and duab-failures). The maintenance
activities to achieve restoration in consequence of the dd-failures, the revealed dua-, and
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Figure A.1: States/transitions diagram of SDTA modeling an SRS element, limited to
dd-, dua-, and duab-failures
duab-failures have equal characteristics. Hence, the rate parameters of cmddi, pma2i, and
pmb2i are equal, i.e.
λcmddi = λpma2i = λpmb2i .
Due to the explanation given above and assumption 7, the events cmddi, pma2i, and
pmb2i do not have to be longer differentiated. Instead, these events are combined and
considered as one event that is denoted by mdi. Additionally, the states of the SDTA,
where a dd-failure occurred, or a dua-, duab-failure occurred and has been revealed, are
melted to one state and no longer differentiated. The states that are melted to one
state are shown in figure A.1 and have the state attributes DD, DUAR, and DUBR. The
resulting states/transitions diagram of the reduced number of states SDTA that models
the i-th SRS element is shown in figure A.2. It is clearly evident that the number of states
is reduced in comparison to figure A.1 and the mentioned states were melted to a single
state with the state attribute DR.
It has to be mentioned that, due to the combined states it is not any more possible to
decide whether a dd-, dua-, or duab-failure has occurred once the SDTA is in the state
with the attribute DR. However, due to the reduced model complexity and sufficient
precision, the reduced number of states SDTA that models an SRS element is applied in
this theses. Particularly, the SDTA that is introduced in section 3.3.2 is based on the
reduced number of states SDTA outlined above.
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Figure A.2: States/transitions diagram of the reduced number of states SDTA modeling
an SRS element
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Appendix B
State classification of selected MooN
element structures
The set of the k-tuples of element safety attributes, which is denoted by U , defines the
state classification of the model in regard to the safety function of the respective SRS.
The sets UMooN of the MooN element structures that are treated in this thesis are defined
below.
B.1 1oo1 element structure
The set U1oo1 is given by
U1oo1 = {(Uel)} . (B.1)
B.2 1oo2 element structure
The set U1oo2 is given by
U1oo2 = {(Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel)} . (B.2)
B.3 2oo2 element structure
The set U2oo2 is given by
U2oo2 = {(Uel,Uel)} . (B.3)
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B.4 1oo3 element structure
The set U1oo3 is given by
U1oo3 = {(Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel),
(Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel)} .
(B.4)
B.5 2oo3 element structure
The set U2oo3 is given by
U2oo3 = {(Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel), (Uel,Uel,Uel)} . (B.5)
B.6 3oo3 element structure
The set U3oo3 is given by
U3oo3 = {(Uel,Uel,Uel)} . (B.6)
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Appendix C
Models of selected dependent SRS
elements
C.1 Repair priorities
In practice, separate repair teams are not available for the individual SRS elements,
contrary to the often used assumption. Consequently, the SRS elements are dependent.
Whether an element is repaired immediately after a detected failure or only after the
restoration of another element, depends on the current state of another element. In this
thesis, it is assumed that repair priorities were defined for the case, when the repair team
is required by multiple failed elements of an SRS. The repair priorities define the sequence
of elements to be repaired. The modeling of repair priorities is illustrated via the example
given below. The given example is based on the example 3.7. The SRS element 1*, with
a higher repair priority over the element 2, is introduced in example C.1 to replace the
element 1 of example 3.7.
Example C.1 (SRS consisting of elements with repair priority). Let the two
SDTAs, SDTA1∗ and SDTA2, be given. The states/transitions diagrams of the given
SDTAs are shown in figure C.1. It has to be noted that, the respective SRS elements are
dependent due to only one available repair team. The defined repair priority is in favor
of the element 1*, i.e. if the elements 1* and 2 fail, the element 1* will be repaired first.
That is modeled via the supplementary transition in SDTA1∗ that is triggered by the
event md2, which is also relative to SDTA2. Therefore, the event md2 is common and it
appears in SDTA1∗ and SDTA2, in contrast to example 3.7, where it is a private event
of SDTA2. The given SDTAs are combined via the parallel composition of SDTAs to
determine the SDTA∗. The result is shown in figure C.2. In contrast to the figure 3.5, no
transition from the state (2ˆ, 3) to the state (2ˆ, 1) is present in figure C.2. This transition
is missing due to the one available repair team and the defined higher repair priority of
the element 1*. The missing transition results in the repair of the element 1* until its
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restoration, before the repair of the element 2 will be carried out and its restoration will
be achieved.
SDTA1∗ SDTA2
2 3pma12
pma12
1
OK DUA DR
pma12
dua2
md2
1ˆ
OK
2ˆ
DR
md1 dd1
md2
Figure C.1: States/transitions diagrams of SDTA1∗ and SDTA2
1ˆ,2 1ˆ,3pma12
pma12
1ˆ,1
OK,OK OK,DUA OK,DR
pma12
dua2
md2
2ˆ,2 2ˆ,3pma12
pma12
2ˆ,1
DR,OK DR,DUA DR,DR
pma12
dua2
md1 dd1 md1 dd1 md1 dd1
Figure C.2: States/transitions diagram of SDTA∗ = SDTA1∗ || SDTA2
The SDTA that models an independent SRS element, introduced in subsection 3.3.2,
is now extended to consider repair priorities. Let us consider an SRS consisting of k ele-
ments. Let the focus be on the elements with the indices i, p, r ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The element i
has repair priority over the elements p and r. The repair priority is modeled via the SDTA
extension by additional transitions triggered by common events, as described in example
C.1. The SDTA of the element i is illustrated in figure C.3. Compared to the figure 3.3,
it is evident that additional transitions are present in figure C.3. These additional tran-
sitions are triggered by the common events h, for all h ∈ ERP = {cmsp,mdp, cmsr,mdr},
indicating restoration of the elements p, r. The additional transitions are self-loop tran-
sitions, which appear in states, where the repair team would not be occupied by the
maintenance activities of the element i. Moreover, the SDTA of the element p or r has to
be extended to model the repair priority of these elements.
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ERP = {cmsp,mdp, cmsr,mdr}
Figure C.3: SDTA modeling SRS element i with repair priority
It has to be noted that, the self-loop transitions triggered by an STE are of no relevance
for the respective SDTA. It becomes evident in figure C.3. The self-loop transitions do
not cause state transitions and can be ignored if only the SDTA that models the element
i is analyzed.
C.2 Inhibition effect
The inhibition effect is relevant for the failure detection of SRS elements in series. If
one element fails undetected, the failure detection of the further series elements might be
inhibited. Due to the failed element, the failure detection signal of the series elements is
interrupted on its way to the safety programmable logic controller. Hence, the dd-failures
of these elements, though being detected, take an effect comparable to the undetected
failures. The failure detection of these failures is inhibited and repair can not be initiated.
Instead, these failures are only revealed by the PM of the element, which caused the
inhibition. The inhibition effect results in dependencies between SRS elements. Whether
an element is repaired immediately after a detected failure, depends on the current state
of another element. The inhibition effect was analyzed and described in [Gab10].
An SRS that consists of the two series elements p and r is considered. Let the element
p be subject to the inhibition effect, which is caused by the element r. The inhibition
effect is modeled by the SDTA introduced below. In figure C.4, the SDTA that models
the inhibition effect of the two elements p and r is given. By use of the SDTA in figure
C.4, the SDTA that models the entire SRS, which consists of the two elements that are
subject to the inhibition effect is easily determined. First, the SDTA that models the
two elements is determined via the parallel composition, just as for elements without the
inhibition effect. After that, the obtained SDTA is combined via the parallel composition
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with the SDTA given in figure C.4, which models the inhibition effect. The result is the
SDTA that models the SRS, which consists of the two elements that are subject to the
inhibition effect.
1
4
ddp
mdp
2
ddp
duabr
pma1r, pmb1r
3
5 6
ddp
duarpma1r
pma1r, pmb1r
pma1r
pmb1r
pmb1r
pmb1r,
pma1r,
duabr,
duar
pmb1r,
pma1r,
mdp
Figure C.4: States/transitions diagram of SDTA modeling inhibition effect
The inhibition effect of the two elements p and r is specified via the SDTA in figure
C.4. The dd-failure of the element p will not be detected if previously a duab- or dua-
failure of the element r occurs. This behavior is incorporated in the SDTA, shown in
figure C.4. The SDTA is initiated in state 1 where both elements are fully operational.
Further it is differentiated whether a duab- or dua-failure of the element r or a dd-failure
of the element p occurs. These failures trigger the state transitions to the states 2, 4, or
6 respectively. After the dd-failure of the element p the repair is immediately started and
after its completion the state transition back to the state 1 is triggered. If the duab- or
dua-failure of the element r has occurred and afterwards the dd-failure of the element p
triggers the state transitions to the states 3 or 4, the repair of the element p is delayed.
The repair of the element p will only start after the duab- or dua-failure of the element r
will be revealed by the respective PM. Hence, the state transitions from the state 3 or 5
to the state 6 will be triggered. After the repair of the element p is completed, the state
transition to the state 1 is triggered.
It has to be noted that, the SDTA of figure C.4, which models the inhibition effect, is
not intended to be evaluated on its own. Instead, it aims to extend the behavior of two
independent elements by the inhibition effect.
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Nomenclature
D.1 Acronyms
cc Common-cause, page 28
CDF Cumulative distribution function, page 9
CM Corrective maintenance, page 29
dd Dangerous detected failure mode, page 26
dn Dangerous non-revealable failure mode, page 27
DTA Automaton with deterministic timing, page 55
DTE Deterministic timed event, page 39
dua Dangerous undetected failure mode A, page 27
duab Dangerous undetected failure mode AB, page 27
FSA Finite State Automaton, page 8
FT Fault Tree, page 7
MC Markov chain, page 8
MP-CMC Multi-phase Continuous-time Markov Chain, page 58
MP-DMC Multi-phase Discrete-time Markov Chain, page 11
ODE Ordinary differential equation, page 10
PFD Probability of dangerous failure on demand, page 34
PFH Frequency of a dangerous failure, page 33
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PM Preventive maintenance, page 30
RBD Reliability Block Diagram, page 7
RHF Random hardware failure, page 22
s Safe failure mode, page 25
SDTA Stochastic and Deterministic Timed Automaton, page 40
SE Simplified equation, page 8
SF Systematic failure, page 22
SIL Safety Integrity Level, page 4
SRS Safety-related System, page 19
STA Stochastic Timed Automaton, page 9
STAP Stochastic Timed Automaton with Poisson clock structure, page 40
STE Exponential stochastic timed event, page 40
D.2 Functions and operators
Γ Active event function of SDTA or FSA, page 41
Eˆ [TU(t1, t2)] Estimate of E [TU(t1, t2)], page 34
ˆ
A(t1, t2) Estimate of A(t1, t2), page 34
ˆMTTF Estimate of mean time to failure, page 33
E [TU(t1, t2)] Mean of TU(t1, t2), page 33
mod
(
a
b
)
Modulo operation, a modulo b, page 68
A(t1, t2) Average availability in the time interval (t1, t2], page 33
G(∆αj) Gain of PFD for deviation of parameter αj, page 87
PFD(t) Instantaneous probability of dangerous failure on demand, page 34
PFD(T ) Objective function quantifying average PFD for given PM plan, page 94
PFD(t1, t2) Average probability of dangerous failure on demand over the time interval
(t1, t2], page 34
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PFDmax(T ) Objective function quantifying maximum PFD for given PM plan, page 94
PFH(t) Instantaneous frequency of a dangerous failure, page 33
WT (T ) Objective function quantifying trade-off between average and maximum PFD for
given PM plan, page 94
A(t) Availability function, page 33
F (t) Lifetime distribution function, page 32
fel fm Function of state classification regarding element failure modes, page 49
fel safety Function of state classification regarding element safety functions, page 46
fsafety Function of state classification regarding safety function, page 46
ftr Transition function of SDTA or FSA, page 41
Gmax(∆αj) Gain of PFDmax for deviation of parameter αj, page 87
R(t) Reliability function, page 32
D.3 Mathematic symbols latin
cPFD State selection column vector, page 58
Ma,r Phase transition matrix, related to PM type A of element r, page 58
Mb,r Phase transition matrix, related to PM type B of element r, page 58
p(t) State probabilities row vector, page 58
pinit Initial state probabilities row vector, page 58
Q Transition rates matrix, page 58
AVel fm,j Value of element failure mode attribute of element j, page 49
AVel safety,i Value of element safety attribute of element i, page 46
Ael fm Set of element failure mode attributes, page 48
Ael safety Set of element safety attributes, page 46
Asafety Set of safety attributes, page 46
E Set of events of SDTA or FSA, page 41
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ECF Events set indicating common-cause failures, page 28
ECM CM events set of an SRS, page 29
Edet Set of deterministic timed events, page 38
EPMstoch Set of exponential stochastic timed PM events, page 39
EPM PM events set of an SRS, page 30
ESF Events set indicating single element failures, page 28
Estoch Set of exponential stochastic timed events, page 39
FSA Finite State Automaton, page 41
GE i Elements numbers set indicating the elements of group i, page 28
G Set of CDFs characterizing the set of stochastic clock sequences, page 40
MP- CMC Multi-phase Continuous-time Markov Chain, page 58
M Sequence of phase transition matrices, page 58
SDTA Stochastic and Deterministic Timed Automaton, page 40
SI Set of PM plans of PM strategy I, page 68
SIIIa Set of PM plans of PM strategy IIIa, page 69
SIIIb Set of PM plans of PM strategy IIIb, page 69
SII Set of PM plans of PM strategy II, page 69
SIV Set of PM plans of PM strategy IV, page 69
SV Set of PM plans of PM strategy V, page 70
T Sequence of phase transition time sequences and PM plan, page 58
TPFD PM plan minimizing average PFD, page 94
TPFDmax PM plan minimizing the maximum PFD, page 94
Tinit Initial PM plan for optimization, page 97
TWT PM plan minimizing trade-off between average and maximum PFD, page 101
Ta,SRS Phase transition time sequence, related to simultaneous PM type A of all SRS
elements, page 66
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Ta,r Phase transition time sequence, related to PM type A of element r, page 58
Tb,SRS Phase transition time sequence, related to simultaneous PM type B of all SRS
elements, page 66
Tb,r Phase transition time sequence, related to PM type B of element r, page 58
U Set of k-tuples of element safety attributes, page 46
V Set of deterministic clock sequences, page 39
Vh Deterministic clock sequence of event h, page 39
W Set of exponential stochastic clock sequences, page 40
Wh Stochastic clock sequence of event h, page 40
X Set of states of SDTA or FSA, page 41
XMC Set of states ofMP- CMC, page 58
U Attribute of states, complementary to U, page 46
PFD Average probability of dangerous failure on demand over the SRS mission time
interval, page 34
PFDmax Maximum probability of dangerous failure on demand over the SRS mission time
interval, page 34
PFH Average frequency of a dangerous failure, page 33
U Attribute of states, where SRS is either able to provide its safety function or in
spurious operation, page 46
CMooN Structure-related modification factor of common-cause failure fraction, page 53
cmddi Event indicating that CM of element i has been completed after a dd-failure,
page 29
cmsi Event indicating that CM of element i has been completed after an s-failure, page 29
dc Diagnostic coverage factor, page 72
ddi Event indicating dd-failure of element i, page 28
ddGEi Event indicating common-cause dd-failure of group i, page 28
dni Event indicating dn-failure of element i, page 28
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dnGEi Event indicating common-cause dn-failure of group i, page 28
duai Event indicating dua-failure of element i, page 28
duaGEi Event indicating common-cause dua-failure of group i, page 28
duabi Event indicating duab-failure of element i, page 28
duabGEi Event indicating common-cause duab-failure of group i, page 28
e Most recent event of SDTA (causing transition to state x), page 43
e′ Next event of SDTA (causing transition to state x′), page 43
Gh CDF characterizing the stochastic clock sequence of event h, page 40
MTTF Mean time to failure, page 32
nh Current score of event h, page 43
neh Length of deterministic clock sequence of DTE h, page 39
nea,i Number of phase transition times related to PM type A of element i, page 66
neb,i Number of phase transition times related to PM type B of element i, page 66
pi(t) State probability of state i, page 58
pma1i Event indicating the revealing of a dua- or duab-failure of element i via PM type
A, page 30
pma2i Event indicating that PM of element i has been completed after a dua- or duab-
failure, page 30
pmb1i Event indicating the revealing of duab failure of element i via PM type B, page 30
pmb2i Event indicating that PM of element i has been completed after a duab-failure,
page 30
qj,i Element of transition rate matrix Q with the indices i, j, page 59
si Event indicating s-failure of element i, page 28
sGEi Event indicating common-cause s-failure of group i, page 28
TF Continuous random variable of the time the SRS continuously performs its assigned
safety function or is in spurious operation, page 32
tm SRS mission time, page 34
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ta,SRS,j Phase transition time, j-th element of the sequence Ta,SRS, page 66
ta,r,j Phase transition time, j-th element of the sequence Ta,r, page 58
tb,SRS,j Phase transition time, j-th element of the sequence Tb,SRS, page 66
tb,r,j Phase transition time, j-th element of the sequence Tb,r, page 58
tFi i-th realization of random variable TF , page 33
tU,i i-th realization of TU(t1, t2), page 34
TU(t1, t2) Random variable of the time the SRS performs its safety function or is in
spurious operation during the time interval (t1, t2], page 33
tca Coverage of PM type A, page 72
tcb Coverage of PM type B, page 72
vh,j Deterministic clock j of event h, page 39
Wh,j Random variable of stochastic clock wh,j, page 40
wh,j Stochastic clock j of event h, page 40
x Current state of SDTA, page 43
x′ Next state of SDTA, given by x′ = ftr(x, e′), page 43
xinit Initial state of SDTA or FSA, page 41
y∗ Interevent time between the events e and e′, page 43
yh Current clock value of event h, page 43
Z(t) Discrete random variable indicating SRS condition, page 33
nh
′ Next score of event h, page 43
yh
′ Next clock value of event h, page 43
DN Element failure mode attribute of SDTA states, page 49
DR Element failure mode attribute of SDTA states, page 49
DUA Element failure mode attribute of SDTA states, page 49
DUAB Element failure mode attribute of SDTA states, page 49
OK Element failure mode attribute of SDTA states, page 49
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D Nomenclature
S Element failure mode attribute of SDTA states, page 49
D.4 Mathematic symbols greek
βddGEj Common-cause failure fraction of dd-failures for j-th group of elements, page 53
βdnGEj Common-cause failure fraction of dn-failures for j-th group of elements, page 53
βduaGEj Common-cause failure fraction of dua-failures for j-th group of elements, page 53
βduabGEj Common-cause failure fraction of duab-failures for j-th group of elements, page 53
βsGEj Common-cause failure fraction of s-failures for j-th group of elements, page 53
α Actual parameter vector, page 87
α0 Nominal parameter vector, page 87
λh Rate parameter of exponential CDF Gh, page 40
λcmsi Rate parameters of STE cmsi, page 73
λddi Rate parameters of STE ddi, page 72
λdni Rate parameters of STE dni, page 72
λduai Rate parameters of STE duai, page 72
λduabi Rate parameters of STE duabi, page 72
λmdi Rate parameters of STE mdi, page 73
λsi Rate parameters of STE si, page 73
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